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6. Manuscripts should not exceed 10,000 words in length.
Upon acceptance or an invitation to revise and resubmit, authors will be sent a style sheet which must be followed conscientiously for all subsequent revisions of the paper. Once the article
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NOTE FROM THE CO-EDITORS
2009 Manuscript Awards
We are pleased to announce the following winners of the annual
AHJ Manuscript Awards for Volume 36 (2009) as judged by the
editorial board. Monetary awards of $500 for the winner and
$250 each for the runners-up have been dispatched to the recipients.
WINNER:

Norman Macintoch, “‘Effective’ Genealogical
History: Possibilities for Critical Accounting
History Research”

RUNNERS-UP:

Igance De Beelde, Natalie GonthierBesacier, and Alain Mikol,
“Internationalizing the French Auditing
Profession”
Robert Russ, Gary Previts, and Edward
Coffman, “Corporate Governance in
the 19th Century: Evidence from the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company”

Congratulations to the recipients for outstanding pieces of work.
For the second consecutive year, every article in the two issues
received at least one vote.
Due to financial exigencies, the Academy of Accounting Historians announces the 2010 awards will be $300 for the winning
article and $100 for each of the two runners-up. However, the
prestige and the plaque will remain the same.
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The Crédit Lyonnais in France
(c. 1871-1918): UsING Cash Flow
Analysis to Assess Risk in BankinG
Abstract: In the absence of accounting rules, financial reports and
disclosures were of little use to shareholders and stakeholders before
World War I. To offset the unreliability of financial information, several banks, including the Crédit Lyonnais, implemented a system of
accounting analysis that, in essence, anticipated modern financialanalysis tools based on funds statements and cash-flow statements.
This paper, based on the Crédit Lyonnais archives, sets out to explain
the purpose of this method, to present the different concepts employed, and to show how they interact. The relevance of this model is
assessed through two case studies.

INTRODUCTION
After the failure in France of a number of Saint-Simonist1
initiatives, such as Laffitte’s Caisse Générale du Commerce et de
l’Industrie in 1837 and the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier from
1852 onwards, mixed banks (banks combining both commercial
and investment-banking activities) emerged at the same time as
large department stores. They would be called “savings banks”
before World War I, having been labeled on occasion with the
rather pejorative term of “financial bazaars” [Bigo, 1947, p. 182].
1
The French social philosopher and reformer Claude Henri de Rouvroy,
Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), was one of the founders of modern industrial
socialism and evolutionary sociology. Indeed, Auguste Comte, who is widely seen
as the father of sociology, was one of his secretaries. Saint-Simon denounced the
privileges of noble birth and saw the nobility essentially as “men of leisure” (oisifs),
idle hornets (frelons) who exploit a mass of “workers” (the bees). He argued for
the idea of creating a new society, one that relied notably on re-organizing the
economy and credit and one in which industrialists, thinkers, and artists were to
lead the nation. His arguments won over a significant vocal fringe of engineers,
mostly graduates from the École Polytechnique, persuaded by his ideas of renewal
of the governing elite.
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Notably during the Second Empire but also up to the inter-war
period, they were the main players involved in structuring the
credit system in France.
The Crédit Lyonnais (CL) was the epitome of a success that
was if not collective at least pluralistic since other so-called savings banks such as the Comptoir d’Escompte (1848), Crédit Industriel et Commercial (1859), the Société des Dépôts et Comptes
Courants (1863), the Société Lyonnaise de Dépôts (1863), the Société Générale (1863), and the Société Marseillaise de Crédit (1865)
can also be added to the list. The CL’s early move away from
direct investment in industry forced it to become the savings
bank par excellence, and its subsequent history demonstrates the
significance of this decision. From this constraint, it was able
to draw its strength – the small unitary margins generated by
commercial banking operations required the bank to implement
a high-performance organizational structure in which information had to be centralized to enlighten rational decision making
and to limit risk. For such everyday banking business, Henri
Germain, the founder and chairman of the CL until the turn of
the 20th century, would put accounting at the heart of his information system.
The CL’s withdrawal from the sector of direct investment
went together with the birth of its Service des Études Financières
(SEF) (the Department of Financial Analysis). On the issue of
financial brokering, in which the CL played a leading role, assessing the risk of insolvency2 did not yet rely on quantitative
and statistical analysis methods such as “credit rating,” but instead on financial and accounting analysis tools. In this context,
the SEF’s main purpose was to draft technical and/or financial
studies for numerous departments requesting them, such as
Securities Management, Risks, Interbank Relations, Securities
Issuance, to enable them to use sector-specific information and
accounting data provided by companies to measure company
economic viability and to assess the risks the bank was assuming. The SEF also carried out economic monitoring, including
macroeconomic studies, sector-specific studies, and data collection. Since it reported directly to general management, its
strategic function would always ensure it remained independent
from other departments.
2
For more in-depth study of the issue of risk assessment at the CL, see Praquin
[2003, 2005]. It should be noted that this paper does not consider the use of accounting techniques for the management of CL itself. For a recent study of this,
see Pezet and Sponem [2008].
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More specifically, this service set up a system of “deconstructing” accounts disclosed by companies with the purpose of
restating them. This analysis of financial statements constituted
one of the major reasons for this service to exist; the goal was to
reduce the risk of asymmetrical information tied to the windowdressing that most companies engaged in at that time in western
countries such as Britain [Edwards, 1980], France [Lemarchand, 1992], Germany [Spoerer, 1998], Spain [Bernal Lloréns,
2000], and the U.S. [Dicksee, 1927; Michael, 1996]. This tool
for analyzing annual statements relied on an intricate system of
tables designed to establish concordance between the earnings
disclosed by companies and the cash flows they generated. This
cohesive set of tools predated the methods of corporate financial
analysis that were to be implemented in France from the end of
the 1950s onwards.
This paper therefore pursues two aims. The first is to show,
both in general terms and through two case studies, how a profitable financial institution came to implement risk-assessment
tools. The second is to highlight the fact that historical research
enables us to understand how some accounting and financial
concepts, however much they may be perceived today as innovative, were actually envisioned in bygone eras before being
forgotten due to the lack of appropriate diffusion.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CL
The history of the birth and development of the CL is inextricably tied to the personality of its founder, Henri Germain,3
who was to leave his mark on the bank until retiring from business life. The first 20 years were marked by an uncertainty that
weighed heavily on the strategic direction given to the CL. After
an unfruitful period of direct investment in companies, Germain
took the decision to orientate the bank definitively towards
short-cycle activities.
1863-1882: An Uncertain Strategy for Assets: The composition of
the first Board of Directors was significant in terms of both the
3
 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������
Born in 1824, Germain studied law. In 1856, he took on a position as a broker and perfected his knowledge of the business world by working in a Lyon silkmaking business owned by the Saint-Simonist Arlès-Dufour. His second marriage
was to a Vuitry, the daughter of the former governor of the Banque de France,
former minister, and president of the State Council. At 40, he founded the CL.
Elected as a député on several occasions from 1869 onwards, he was prevented
three times from becoming a minister by James de Rothschild’s veto. He died in
1905.
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multiple influences they exerted on the CL at the outset and the
ambiguity of the strategy with which Germain wished to endow
it. Among the board members were Saint-Simonists, arguing
for a new social order to be built on industrial development and
wealth sharing, who rubbed shoulders with more conservative
bankers and industrialists. What they had in common was that
they all belonged to a business class faced with a banking system that they judged to be archaic and unable to satisfy their
financing needs. Local bankers offered insufficient financial
soundness, and the Banque de France declined to part from its
traditional role as discount broker and would only underwrite
certain securities – government securities, shares, and French
railway bonds. Some hoped to obtain easier cash loans while
others sought to find ways of underwriting and circulating the
bond loans they issued.
From this plethora of expectations was born a mixed
bank, similar to the main competitors previously mentioned.
G ermain’s convictions differed according to whether his
focus was on assets or liabilities. On the liability side, from
its creation onwards, the focus of the CL was invariably to try
to attract small investors by offering good rates of interest as
the bank sought popularity as a savings bank. In addition, it
proposed demand deposits, fixed-term deposits, commercial
paper, and interest accounts reserved for banking and business
clients. Germain proved to be still more inconsistent with regard
to assets. The CL began by becoming involved in industrial
investments in the hope of making quick capital gains. This
reflected a rationale typical of economic development in the
Second Empire when large investments made large profits. The
risk tied to the amount of capital invested was associated with
the possibility of a yield significantly higher than in current
banking operations. However, Germain did not wish to relive the
disastrous experience of the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier.4
He remained prudent and dedicated the majority of assets to
discount operations which were less fruitful but much safer
owing to the spreading of risk and the short-cycle nature of this
activity.

4
These brothers founded the first French conglomerate. Also Saint-Simonists,
they had built their businesses (rail and maritime transport, property, banking,
and insurance) by relying on a bank, the Crédit Mobilier, that was in charge of issuing and circulating the bonds necessary for financing these investments. Falling
out of favor, and unfortunate in a number of property deals, they lost the support
of the political powers and went bankrupt.
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From 1870 onwards, Germain’s turning away from all direct industrial investment forced him to invent another form
of banking and to create a model that stood for the soundness
and liquidity of its investments. This shift from a mixed bank to
what would later be called a savings bank was completed in the
aftermath of the stock market crash of 1882.
1882-1914: Success in Choosing a Banking Specialization: The
progressive disengagement from the industrial sector was a success for the CL. From the end of the 1870s, it became “the leading French publicly-traded bank” [Bouvier, 1961, p. 68] until the
end of World War I. While its competitors were still embroiled
in industrial “adventures,” such as the Société Générale with its
sulphur, guano, and loans businesses in Sicily and in Peru, or
the Comptoir d’Escompte de Paris’ backing of speculation in copper, Germain’s bank took advantage of this period of slower economic growth to strengthen its network in France and abroad.
From 110 branches and offices in 1882, it expanded to 257 by
1903. From 1884 onwards, it offered new services to its clientele,
such as rental of safe boxes, and by the turn of the century, it
had also launched a significant property-building program in
Lyon and Paris.
In other words, the choice of specializing in current operations proved to be profitable in the long term. This specialization occurred mainly through the management of accounts,
short-term operations (loans, overdrafts, seasonal loans), and
banking intermediation (selling shares and bond issues to its
clients). However, such an orientation could only be successful
at the price of constant vigilance, which specifically meant finding an accounting tool that performed ever better and setting up
specialized services such as the Service des Etudes Financières
(SEF). The latter was responsible for studying the quality of requests for banking intermediation that various companies made
to the CL. In order to assess better these proposals, it implemented a system of financial analysis, the history of which is
outlined below. The CL’s strategy proved to be effective especially
when compared to other banks. Its profit margins and dividend
payouts were significantly higher that those of its competitors
(Figure 1).
The CL’s growth ensured regular increases in its profits
which rose at the same pace as figures in the main entries of its
balance sheet (Figure 2). A comparison of progress in the main
liabilities (current accounts in credit, demand deposits) and in
assets (commercial portfolios, current accounts in debit) with
Published by eGrove, 2010
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FiGUre 1
dividend and Profit rates for the Crédit Lyonnais,
the société Générale, and the Comptoir d’escompte
(1870-1909)
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the rise in profits, whether disclosed or “original,”5 is fairly telling. The first observation is logical – the progression of assets
is in line with liabilities. The second observation proves to be
much more interesting in that following the crash of the Union
Générale in 1882,6 profits experienced regular growth, strongly
correlating to that of the main entries in the balance sheet.
In other words, the decision to increase its geographic
scope in France and abroad enabled the CL to stimulate not
5
The “original” profits are provided by Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are
defined in the following way: “the mass of profits is understood over each financial year as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’
fees), profits in reserve, diverse provisions and amortizations on dubious debtors,
insofar as these last two entries are signalled” (p. 219). We can see that in the
framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for comparing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they present hardly any difference
with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to show them insofar as they
could have provided additional insight given the considerable arithmetic variance
that exists with the disclosed net incomes.
6
The Union Générale was established in 1878 to compete specifically with the
CL and, more generally, “Jewish” finance. It aimed to attract mainly “Catholic”
savings and succeeded in obtaining the support of the French clergy. It experienced rapid growth, often criticized by its detractors. Numerous abuses and accounting manipulations brought it to bankruptcy in 1882. This bankruptcy triggered the first French stock-market crisis and brought about a series of economic
and social troubles.
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FiGUre 2
The Case of the Crédit Lyonnais: Trends in the
Main entries in the Balance sheet Compared
to Profits Made (1863-1913)
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Sources: All the entries except that of the “original” profits come from graphs
published by the CL on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary [Brochure du
cinquantenaire du Crédit Lyonnais: 1863-1913, archive hc14]. The “original”
profits are provided by the work of Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are defined
in the following way: “The mass of profits is understood over each financial year
as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’ fees), profits
in reserve, diverse provisions, and amortizations on dubious debtors, insofar as
these last two entries are signalled” [Bouvier et al., 1965, p. 219]. We can see that
in the framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for
comparing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they hardly present any
difference with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to us to show them
insofar as they could have provided additional insight given the considerable
arithmetic variance that exists with the disclosed net incomes.

only the flow of savings but also the flow of net incomes. The
quasi-indexation of low unitary profits on the growing mass of
resources (i.e., liabilities) mechanically generated an equally
increased accounting net income.
THE WORK OF THE SEF
In September 1871, Germain came up with the idea of an
office, unique in its way and never equaled [Kaufmann, 1914, p.
353]:
The Comptoir National also set up, a few years ago, a
financial analysis department. The Crédit Lyonnais’
department was used as a model. However, with only
limited staff, it cannot be compared, even remotely,
with its much larger rival. A body with this centralizing
Published by eGrove, 2010
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feature does not exist at the Société Générale. It leaves
each department to decide what information to acquire
and the data that it needs.
Even though the issue of assessing risk was a concern widely shared by the whole banking sector at that time [Bonin, 2000],
what is striking here is the importance of the role played by the
SEF in the development of the CL [Bigo, 1948; Bouvier, 1961].
The SEF was an independent and autonomous service. Depending on the case, its studies were released in single unified
documents that either explicitly or implicitly discriminated between the technical and the financial parts. One of the greatest
challenges the SEF encountered was managing to break away
from the window-dressing carried out by companies that disclosed their accounts to the CL.
Role and Purpose of the SEF: This service was responsible for
collecting and analyzing economic and financial intelligence. In
the public arena, the context was favorable since financial data
and economic statistics7 were developing and communication
infrastructures (the telegraph and the railway) could enable
their rapid circulation. It was the moment for the CL to create
added value by developing its know-how in centralizing, sorting, and organizing disparate data sets in order to draw quality
information from them and to be the first to act on “big business
opportunities” and to generate thereby “huge profits” [Meeting
of the Board of Directors, November 5, 1889, cited by Flandreau,
2003, p. 259; see also Bouvier, 1961, p. 290]. Also, it would later
enable the bank to target investments for its large clientele using
first-hand intelligence, as stated in the Brochure du cinquantenaire du Crédit Lyonnais (1863-1913): “The SEF is working for
both our clientele and for all of the services and branches of the
Crédit Lyonnais” [CL Archives, hcl4, p. 48].
The SEF periodically carried out in-depth studies that it
sometimes supplemented with reports drafted on more specific
points. These studies had several purposes. They gave the CL
7
In addition to the numerous newspapers born with the Second Empire and
affiliated to powerful moneymen (Mirès’ Le journal des chemins de fer, the Pereire
brothers’ Le journal des actionnaires, La semaine financière, which was indirectly
tied to the Rothschilds), a more independent press also developed, such as the
Messager de la Bourse, the Journal des économistes, or, much later in 1873, LeroyBeaulieu’s L’économiste français. From the mid-19th century onwards, economic
statistics developed in the form of congresses (Berlin in 1863, Budapest in 1878,
etc.) or studies, with the notable backing of Napoléon III.
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a chance to reduce its risks by knowing the financial quality of
both current and prospective clients in greater depth. They also
gave it an opportunity to improve the management of its clientele’s credit lines by increasing, maintaining, or reducing the
outstanding payments yet to be made. But, most importantly, in
the framework of the CL’s intermediation activities, these studies
enabled the bank to guarantee high-quality securities to its clientele of savers and investors. Specifically because of this financial
analysis service, the CL was widely recognized as a bank of the
highest order and soon won the trust of its peers. It often led
banking syndicates and found no difficulty gathering financial
partners around the table to float companies on the stock market and sell shares to the public. Companies also benefited from
these studies because obtaining intermediation from the CL was
for them an additional guarantee that the operation would move
ahead.
Germain had always planned for the SEF to be an independent service so that it would not be subject to external pressures
with respect to any findings in the studies it would issue. The
chairman-founder of the CL understood that it was important
to keep apart the functions of analyzing and decision making.
The SEF therefore worked on its own or provided analysis at the
specific request of other departments in the bank but was never
the decision maker. Evidence of how watertight this division was
between the SEF’s analysis and decision making by the other
departments can be found in the archives. Although it is possible to establish the purposes of SEF studies either by studying
them directly or by reading other research [Flandreau, 2003],
it proved impossible to discover the extent to which the SEF’s
findings influenced decision making by the other departments
or services receiving these studies. However, two factors suggest
that they did play a major role. First, Germain laid great emphasis on this service. Second, the periods of the bank’s success and
its subsequent decline also corresponded to the periods when
the SEF was at first considered irreplaceable but subsequently
progressively neglected.
Technical Studies: With respect to its banking intermediation
activities, for which the SEF was mobilized, the CL mainly dealt
with mining and industrial companies that needed to raise considerable funds to finance their investments. Railway companies
had no need for financial intermediation since they received
a state guarantee in 1840 underwriting the issuance of their
shares. This guarantee ensured the public’s trust and therefore
Published by eGrove, 2010
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they were able to sell their bonds directly to their clientele at
ticket offices in train stations.
The purpose of the so-called technical studies was to describe the conditions affecting the supply-chain and business
activities of the different entities in a given group. The goal was
to place a company in its competitive environment by highlighting historical details relating to the different stages of its
development by providing data on the geographical locations
of its factories and their accessibility, by assessing the quality of
different supply sources, and by analyzing the successive investments undertaken.
The purpose of the section dealing with production was to
shed light on the production process as a whole, from the mining of raw materials to the marketing of finished products. The
SEF did not lack the elements of comparison as it produced
data and statistics on both the company under scrutiny and its
competitors. The SEF was in a position to refer to sector-specific
information gathered from the annual public reports published
by the Ingénieurs des Mines and to compare them with data
disclosed, it appears, in a company’s accounting of its internal
costs. On this point, however, we should be cautious because the
precision of certain calculations may lead us to assume that the
only possible source was the company itself. Yet, at other times,
precise data are missing either because the CL had not received
them or the company was unable to provide them. As we will
see later, the bank analyzed the accounting for net income using
gross operating profit without knowing how it had been reached.
These data therefore essentially appear to stem from excellent
knowledge of the sector and timely investigations within the
company itself as a number of reports about on-site visits testify.
These data allow us to suggest that cost accounting and financial
accounting were totally decoupled. In the event that precise data
were lacking, the auditor would extrapolate from past indicators.
Financial Studies: The financial studies contained a descriptive
part drawing together the various elements that formed their
basis, the considerable work of restating accounting data that
department staff conducted upstream. These financial reports
detailed how the main accounting items were established (acquisitions, sell-offs, content), described the accounting methods
used (measuring inventories, amortization policy), and assessed
the pertinence of dividend payouts by comparing them with the
profits generated. The reports concluded with a valuation of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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the share price that was calculated, depending on the case, by a
measurement (specific to the SEF) of the company’s assets, by
capitalizing dividends, or by simulating forced bankruptcy.
Yet, the most notable feature during this turn-of-the-century
period of transition resided in the considerable work of restating
and analyzing accounting data disclosed on a company’s balance
sheet, income statement, and corresponding reports. By first deconstructing and then reconstructing the financial statements
provided by companies, the analysts at the CL sought to forge
their own opinion on the “veracity” (the term used at that time)
of the net income disclosed by comparing the company’s figures
with net incomes reached using their own methods.
The dual aim of the SEF was to break away from the uncertainties associated with the disclosed accounts and to implement
a homogeneous method of restating accounting data that offered
several advantages – standardizing processes for producing restated data, generating economies of scale, ensuring soundness
in decision making, minimizing risk, and creating internal technical competencies.
Issues Relating to Disclosed Accounts: The lack of homogeneity
in corporate accounting practices constituted the major challenge facing the SEF. This situation arose due to the following
phenomenon. In the absence of any accounting standards, the
lack of standardization of key concepts, such as those relating
to calculated cash flow8 or to the recognition of rules defining
assets as opposed to expenses, raised difficulties in interpreting the same economic situation. In order to enable translation
into accounting terms, this situation led to the use of numerous
accounts that worked differently. In other words, assets might
be charged indiscriminately either to the balance sheet or the
income statement, and depreciations might or might not be
recorded according to the ultimate configuration that company
boards sought to give to their financial statements.
More specifically for the CL, it was statements of investments (whether assets or expenses) that posed the greatest
difficulty for interpretation. The SEF had little information at
its disposal that enabled it to know the criteria that a company
8
 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������
This is stretching the current classical distinction between calculated expenses and paid expenses to cover all accounting movements that do not result in
a monetary flow, owing to the facts that amortizations, provisions, and reserves
fulfil analogous functions and that the accounting distinctions conceptually established today did not exist at that time.
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was following in improving, transforming, or acquiring an investment and whether such an investment was an asset or an
expense. Echoing this issue was the question of how expenditure on fixed assets was amortized. The methods most often
encountered were industrial amortization expenses, depletion of
a reserve account created for this purpose, and assets charged to
other reserve accounts or to accounts made of matured bonds.
The corollary of this was the deduction of depreciation from the
fixed-asset account in question.
Nevertheless, by examining reports disclosed with annual
statements, CL analysts were able to identify the different types
of accounting used by companies to state the fall in value of
their investments. Above and beyond the existence of statutory
amortization (most commonly either a rate of one fifth or a fixed
amount, both recorded as a drop in the gross operating profit),
companies turned to other ways of accounting for amortizations
that evaded disclosure in the profit-and-loss account. Thus, the
Compagnie des Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt
did not hesitate to multiply and blend the different options that
were open to it. From 1856 to 1860, it set up a reserve amortization fund that was both charged and depleted at the same time
over its financial years. Subsequently, this account remained
relatively inactive until the 1880s when once again it began to
be depleted. In 1867, it added an insurance fund that, according
to CL annotations, did not undergo any transactions other than
in 1869 and in 1872. Furthermore, being able to charge bond
reimbursements to the profit-and-loss account created de facto
supplementary reserves that could be used for future amortizations. This was the case from 1869 to 1887 and then from 1908
to 1919. Reserves could also be merged.
Faced with the impossible task of formulating an exact idea
of what fixed-asset and stockholder-equity accounts contained,
the SEF developed a statement that, although unable to provide
precise information on asset purchases and sales (charged to
fixed-asset accounts at sale price), enabled the SEF to know
the variations in fixed assets between one financial year and
another.
THE SEF METHOD: THE WORK OF RESTATING ACCOUNTS
Until the inter-war period, the diversity of accounting practices made it difficult for a third party to utilize accounts disclosed by companies. The SEF therefore set out very early on to
conduct technical and financial studies which, thanks to an accounting and financial method, allowed it to formalize a certain
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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number of restatements so as to measure better the net incomes
of companies with which the CL wished to maintain or develop
a business relationship.
To compensate for the lack of reliability in disclosed accounts, the CL set up a coherent system of financial analysis
based on two financial concepts, excess working capital and
gross operating profit, which hinged on the key concept of “new
works” (travaux neufs). However, the relevance of this model
depended on prior work on restating disclosed accounts using
formalized statements with a number of articulations.
A Key Concept: Calculating “New Works”: The CL performed most
of its financial brokerage business with industrial companies
that were required to reinvest relentlessly in order to remain
competitive. These investments, named “new works” by the SEF,
weighed heavily on the profitability of these companies which,
to improve the financial picture portrayed in their operating
statement, cut amortization expenses by transferring them, in
all or in part, onto their balance-sheets accounts. The goal of
the analysts at the CL was therefore to acquire a reliable and
homogeneous performance indicator. The intent was to break
away from window-dressing that might alter the impact of “new
works” on net income.9 Building such an indicator presupposed
having already identified and isolated all the accounting items
that contribute to making up these “new works.”
“New works” were therefore calculated on the basis of the
variation in net fixed assets to which were added all the decreases that the company had experienced during the financial year.
These were added in the form of asset sales or amortizations
charged to the different items of equity (profits, reserves, capital,
amortized bonds). The calculated figure reached constituted the
“new works in the financial year” (travaux neufs de l’exercice).
The “new works in the financial year” could then either be
charged in total to gross operating profit in order to attain, following other restatements, the profits and losses for the period
9
The SEF auditors did not fail to inform Germain of the impact of new works
on the accounting income. In a letter dated March 4, 1902 addressed to the chairman of the CL, Lucien Rolland d’Estape clearly states, with respect to the Compagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et des Chemins de Fer:
“I have compared turnover with gross profit, from which overheads have been
deducted, but not with the net operating profit, so that the percentage would be
free from the accidental variations that arise from the difference, often significant from one year to the next, in the amount of new works” [CL Archive, deef
23828].
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according to the SEF method. They could also be used to compare the profits disclosed by the company and the profits calculated using the SEF method.
In other words, analysts at the CL rejected all capitalization
of “new works” and treated them as definitive expenses. In this
way, they broke away from the accounting dualism (charging to
the profit-and-loss account and/or to the balance sheet) that was
being exploited by companies. Consequently, they could develop
their own accounting for net income (indifferently called profits
and losses or total net profits), calculated on the basis of variations in overall cash flows (called excess working capital) which
was subsequently compared with the gross operating profit.
Yet, “new works” were not just intermediary amounts; they
too were subjected to analysis in the reports. They were generally used to assess the level of investment carried out during a financial year, and their impact was accounted for in the analysis
of the amount of profits disclosed.
Financial Concepts – Variation in Excess Working Capital and
Gross Operating Profit: Analysts at the CL were interested in
knowing their clients’ performance and thereby assessing the
profitability of their companies. However, to achieve this end,
they had to possess reliable measurement indicators and, better
still, by deploying alternative calculation processes, to be able
to cross-check their figures by reaching identical net-income
results. For these reasons, as already stated, the SEF set out to
measure net income using two different concepts – variation in
excess working capital and gross operating profit.
Variation in excess working capital requires a brief detour
to look at the underlying notion, namely “working capital,” a
term coined during the 19th century but employed in different
[Batsch, 1995, p. 15] or even contradictory [Lemarchand, 1993,
pp. 366, 569] ways. Within the CL, this expression (still commonly found in the form of “revolving fund” in the 1870s) exclusively denoted current assets that, in addition to inventories,
accounts receivable, and cash accounts, also generally included
the portfolio of shares and bonds.
An essential sign of the asset liquidity in which the CL was
particularly interested, the analysis of working capital constituted a significant part of the comments found in the reports. After
each constituent item was broken down in detail and justified as
to its makeup and measurement, the report concluded with an
assessment of its reliability and liquidity. The underlying idea
was to ensure that once fixed assets were covered by sufficient
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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reserves, the working capital exceeded current liabilities, itself
composed of the “floating” debt (i.e., revolving debt) and, less
commonly, the “consolidated” debt (i.e., bonds payable). Shorn
of inventories, and sometimes of shares and bonds, the excess
working capital then became “immediate available assets”
(short-term liquidity), as shown in Figure 3.
FiGUre 3

A system of Accounting restatements

23

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
16

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2010

The aim of the diagram is to show that the SEF calculated
the performance of a company based on its capacity to generate
cash flows. The particularity of the system is that potential net
cash flows are calculated on the basis of the fictive liquidation
of immediately available assets and liabilities. In a historical
context where liquidity was rare and the banking system underdeveloped, the CL, which was mainly a short-term lender,
sought to ensure that its clients could face their short-term commitments, even in the most difficult situations (i.e., bankruptcy).
Furthermore, fixed assets were considered as being difficult for
the CL to mobilize. For this reason, it accorded them little importance and sought to “neutralize” them by ensuring only that
they were covered with sufficient reserves. To mark clearly this
conceptual difference between the long and the short terms, the
diagram distinguishes between these two elements, whereas the
CL only focused on the short term. Calculation of this liquidity,
performed in successive stages, was accompanied by an assessment of the overall situation which, to foster comparison, was
reported in tonnage produced or per business operation.
Measured by its variation and after restatement of operations having no impact on the operating statement (sales of fixed
assets, increases in capital, and dividend payouts), the excess
working capital constitutes an interesting indicator of a company’s cash flow in that, with its very mode of calculation free from
potential window-dressing carried out on the profit-and-loss
account, represents sound liquidity flows capable of confirming
the reliability of disclosed profits.
Net income calculated on the basis of the variation in excess
working capital is also measured using the gross operating profit
disclosed in the company’s accounts. However, since the CL did
not dispose of any information regarding how it was made up
(disclosed profit-and-loss accounts shifted seamlessly from turnover to gross profit), calculations on the basis of gross operating
profit had only one purpose. That was to ensure the coherence
of the whole financial-analysis system by obtaining a net-income
figure identical to the one determined using the variation in excess working capital. The discretionary character of profit-andloss account disclosure at that time, the limited confidence the
CL had in its reliability, and the clear preference for the balance
sheet owing to its capacity to measure the company’s solvency
meant that the former received much less comment in the reports.
Analysis Statements – Possible Articulations and Cross-Checking:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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It would appear that this coherent and complete system of financial and accounting analysis emerged with the creation of
the SEF in 1871. The first studies based on summary statements
date from the early years of that decade. Although the archives
consulted do not always provide a totally identical number
of statements for each company (either because some were
deemed unnecessary or because others have been lost or were
left unfinished for lack of information), their composition varied
little from one company to the next. This may be seen as a sign
that there was a real desire to standardize analysis beyond the
particular choices made by each company.
The following statements served as a basis for the SEF’s
work:
• Presenting the balance sheet, operating statement, and
profit-and-loss account, as they were disclosed by a company, but adapted to an internal CL matrix which, notably, allowed working capital to be measured and excess
working capital easily calculated.
• Drafting intermediary statements (investment expenditure, calculation of net profit using excess working capital, and a linking statement) ensuring the link between
the company’s accounts and those assessed by the CL
on the one hand and, on the other, profits calculated on
excess working capital and operating profits.
• Drafting the revised balance sheet, operating statement,
and profit-and-loss account calculated by the SEF in the
previous two steps.
This three-stage, account-restatement procedure was based
on significant levels of theoretical thinking. In addition to crosschecking consistency, the fundamental relationships that the CL
established between net profit and excess working capital should
be highlighted. A breakdown of these two concepts, with respect
to modern techniques of financial analysis based on the funds
statement and developed by the French Plan Comptable Général
in 1982, illustrates the relevance of this approach (Appendix I).
In other words, the SEF succeeded in reaching a profit
figure based solely on cash flows while ensuring that this result
could be compared with the figure disclosed by the company using its linking statement. This method enabled the CL to make a
clean break from the variety of ways used to account for investments whose impact on the disclosed profit it could not control.
However, it should be noted that although analysts at the CL
effectively succeeded in building a coherent system for examining accounts, they were still limited in their ability to comment
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on variations arising from one financial year to another without
ever putting them into the perspective of a conceptual framework as has been done in this analysis. The concordance they
established was aimed more at ensuring the coherence of the
system and the reliability of the net profit figure than at constituting a tool for analyzing variations in corporate financing.
Furthermore, this net-profit figure, free from the uncertainties
tied to the variety of methods used to account for investments,
was not developed any further in the commentaries.
In fact, their goal was two-fold. From an organizational
viewpoint, it was a question of seeking to break away from the
plethora of accounting practices in order to formalize common
methods at the CL. From a technical viewpoint, it was a question of isolating the flows of operating liquidity10 (variation in
excess working capital) from the major impact of internally financed investments so that the reliability of the net-profit figure
calculated on the basis of balance-sheet items could be verified.
This paper has sought to push this reasoning to its logical
conclusion in order to test the relevance of the model and to
show that in the final analysis, such theoretical thinking proves
to be very close to current tools of analysis such as the funds
statement or cash-flow statement.
MEASURING NET INCOMES: THE IMPACT OF
RESTATEMENTS
The next step is to measure the impact of restatements carried out by the SEF on disclosed net incomes. The interest of
measuring this impact is to ensure that the main cause of variance between earnings disclosed by companies in a business relationship with the CL and the results calculated by the SEF are
due to the different ways of stating investments (“new works”).
To do this, four types of calculation have been carried out:
(i) a comparison between the annual levels of profit determined by the SEF and the annual levels of profit
disclosed by companies. The aim is to show the impact
of the accounting statement relating to “new works” on
the level of earnings.
(ii) the same comparison using a moving average over nine

10
The term “operating” should be understood in its broadest sense; that is,
free from the impact of investment expenditure and not compared with other
forms of income (e.g., financial or extraordinary) which would make no sense at a
time when modern distinctions were completely unformalized.
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years.11 The aim is to determine whether the variances
smooth out over time and do indeed stem from the accounting statement relating to “new works.”
(iii) a comparison (SEF vs. company) between the variance
in amortizations and the variance in profits in order to
ensure that it is indeed the accounting statement including the “new works” that has an impact on the net
income disclosed by companies
(iv) the same comparison using a moving average over nine
years
The present analysis was carried out using case studies
based on the annual accounts of two companies, one of which,
the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye, had a precarious financial balance
that tended to worsen at the turn of the 20th century. The other,
the Compagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, des Forges et Aciéries de la
Marine et d’Homécourt, maintained sustained growth up to the
eve of World War I. However, due to a lack of data over time,
only the first calculation could be carried out in the case of the
Société de Vezin-Aulnoye.
With regard to the comparison of annual profits, we can
observe that short and stable periods present fewer variances
between disclosed profits and those calculated by the CL as
testified by the regularity of the figures reached during the
years 1884-1890. In contrast, over a short and turbulent period
(financial difficulties facing the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye or conjunctural growth12 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt over the previous decade), the CL method tended to increase the variances
between the figures calculated by the SEF and those disclosed
by the company (Figures 4 and 5).
The differences observed were significant. The variance
between profit figures calculated by the CL and disclosed profit
amounted to 67% for the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye from 18891890 to 1901-1902, and 306% for the Compagnie d’Homécourt
over the years 1907-1919. Whereas companies, such as VezinAulnoye, could limit industrial amortizations (i.e., those that the
11
In order to avoid superimposing the graphs and to facilitate their reading,
the moving average is calculated on the basis of half of the average lifespan of
investments carried out by the companies.
12
“Repercussions from the international crisis were only felt at the end of
1907 and the industrial recession was only slight....Europe remained unaffected
by the American slowdown of 1910-1911.... Industrial production would exceed,
in 1913, the 1908 level by 32%; the increase rose to 58% for the steel industry, 65%
for the mechanics industry while production of potash doubled” [Flamant, 1976,
pp. 329-331].

Published by eGrove, 2010

27

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
20

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2010

FiGUre 4
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company recorded in its profit-and-loss accounts) to reduce the
impact on their bottom line of a conjuncture or unsuccessful
management, CL’s restatement of “new works” had the effect
of erasing the smoothing effect caused by amortizations of the
disclosed accounts and of increasing the variances between the
two forms of net incomes. Conversely, periods of strong growth,
such as that experienced by the Compagnie d’Homécourt between 1916 and 1919, were used by the companies to increase
their amortization expenses and therefore to reduce their net
incomes, with the effect of stimulating the net profit calculated
by the SEF. In other words, during stable cycles, disclosed net
incomes and the CL’s net incomes were similar, whereas in turbulent periods they seemed to diverge significantly.
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In this sense, the SEF-implemented statements constituted
effective alarm indicators for risk because they enabled the SEF
to state the real level of a company’s activity based on its cash
flow rather than on its disclosed earnings, the object of much
manipulation. The CL could then adjust its commitments (shortterm operations and financial intermediation) with a better understanding of its clients’ financial situations.
Over the longer term, the SEF restatements had a minor
impact, and the figures calculated on both sides tended to balance out (Figure 6). The cumulated profits calculated by the CL
differ from the figures disclosed by the Compagnie d’Homécourt
by only 5%, whereas the extreme variances were 0.64% in 1878
and 119% in 1918. Such a mild impact is logical because both
the method of amortizing “new works” used in the disclosed
accounts and the CL’s method of charging them globally had,
in the end, an identical effect on profit levels. Moreover, this
method offered little of interest to a managerial approach of
forecasting risk and preferring liquidity. What mattered most
to the CL was the predictability in the short and, in due course,
medium term.
FiGUre 6
Comparison of C.L. net Profits - Cie des hauts-Fourneaux…
d’homécourt disclosed net Profits (1856-1919) rolling Average over 9 years
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The last interesting element to analyze is the impact of restating “new works” on the net income. To this end, it suffices
to compare for each financial year the variance in amortizations with the variance in net profit. Indeed, if the two variances
have a similar movement, it means that the main source of
divergence between the two forms of net income arises from the
restatement (amortizations or “new works”) of investments. The
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first is calculated by measuring the difference between disclosed
amortizations and amortizations calculated by the CL (potential
amortizations and “new works”); the second by deducting from
the disclosed profits those calculated by the CL.
In the stable short term, variances in amortizations are
shown to be close to variances in profits, but the difference rises
in periods of instability, regardless of whether they were profitable like in the period 1916-1919 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt
(Figure 7). Over the longer term, as measured using rolling
averages, the variances balance out (Figure 8). Differences in
amortizations (6%) are not far at all from those in profits (5%).
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This close correlation confirms that the issue of “new works”
constituted the main source of concealment of profit or loss by
companies. For the CL, it was therefore important to know the
impact of these investments on its clients’ earnings since a low
level of cash flow could be an indication of a lower performance
and of an increased risk of failure. This type of information gave
it a competitive advantage as it could better select its clients, reduce its risks, and improve its financial performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper confirms the importance that companies have
always given to cash flows to estimate the viability and reality
of an economic activity [Lemarchand, 1992]. It also enables us
to shed new light on the expectations of a creditor bank. Faced
with a plethora of uncontrollable accounting practices, the bank
pushed its rationale to its limit, considering any investment
as an expense, by building a technical system that enabled the
CL to verify the sincerity and the regularity of the accounts
submitted for its inspection (cross-checking the net income by
two methods). It also satisfied the preference for liquidity for
which it had consistently argued. By implementing this type of
accounting restatement, the SEF succeeded in achieving the first
goal set by the founder of the CL – detecting as effectively as
possible the risk of insolvency of any company seeking to build
a business relationship with this top-tier bank. This study also
shows that the issue of financing constitutes a central pillar of
measuring and controlling the real performance of a company
and demonstrates how close the CL method was to the modern
concept of “free cash flow” (operating cash flow – capital expenditures – dividends paid out).
Reliance on such account analysis fell after the war. We
might assume that the development of medium and long-term
bank financing and the fall in corporate internal financing from
the inter-war period were the causes of this decline. However,
this argument does not apply directly. In many countries, funds
statements emerged very early on by whatever means companies
financed their activities.
In the U.S., the funds statement emerged as early as 1863,
taking on numerous forms until 1925 when these converged
in the concept of variation in working capital [Rosen and DeCoster, 1969]. This form then developed towards the statement
of changes in financial position [APB 19, 1971] and then the
cash-flow statement [SFAS 95, 1984]. In France, the first funds
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s tatements appeared at the end of the 1950s taking multiple
forms until the Plan Comptable Général of 1982 which highlighted the relation between net global working capital (working
capital + amortizations and provisions + long-term liabilities
– gross investments), working-capital requirements (inventories
+ creditors – debtors), and cash and cash equivalents [Hoarau,
1995]. On an international level, this change mirrored the one
seen in the U.S. where the statement of changes in financial position of 1977 was replaced on January 1, 1994 by the cash-flow
statement.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note a recurrence of the
same issues among those who instigate such tools [Hoarau,
1995]. In the first phase, they seek to highlight the risk of liquidity. In the second phase, their goal is to account for the set of
movements that affect the financial situation by focusing more
specifically on the issue of structural financing. In the third
phase, they return to the issue of measuring solvency, this time
through a more in-depth analysis of cash flows split between
operations, investments, and financing.
The tool implemented by the CL and described in this paper arose from the first phase. However, it is interesting to note
that its technical construction is close to tools implemented in
France in the second phase. Furthermore, the CL may be seen
as a long-forgotten forerunner in the French context, whereas
this type of tool had already seen relatively widespread use in
the U.S.
Yet, at the dawn of the 21st century, it is surprising to hear
echoes of concepts confidentially developed within the CL more
than a century before: “ ‘We have observed significant divergen
ces between cash flow caused by operations and disclosed net
incomes, which sounds the alarm for potential profit manipulation,’ explains the company [Weiss Ratings] that has studied
7,000 companies” [Fay, 2002, p. 3].
The European Commission [1997, p. 8] shares this position:
This additional angle of observation [cash-flow statements] is deemed very useful by most users and preparers, because it is not influenced by accruals and
matching and therefore does not involve conventions
and estimates. It may also enhance the comparability
of the reporting of operating performances by different
enterprises, as it eliminates most of the effects of using different account treatments for the same transactions and events.The joint use of cash flow statements,
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts also helps
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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users in better evaluating the changes in net assets of
an enterprise and its financial structure (including its
liquidity and solvency), as well as its ability to affect the
amounts and timing of cash flows in order to adapt to
changing circumstances and opportunities. Morevover,
this may allow a better assessment of the quality of the
profits reported.
However, it should be noted that de-consolidation operations today enable unfavorable movements of cash flow to be
concealed. Yet, the first consolidated statements only appeared
at the end of the 19th century in the U.S. In France, several
scholars commented on consolidation during the inter-war period, but the first practices only became manifest in the 1950s.
In the absence of (de)consolidation, the method used by the SEF
proved to be very effective for assessing cash-flow movements in
the balance sheets it analyzed.
One final question remains – why did the CL method disappear? The most probable motive for the SEF’s gradual move
away from accounting and financial-restatement tables was the
fact that the tax administration stipulated as a precondition for
deducting amortizations from taxable income that amortizations be recorded as expenses. This might also explain why other
countries have continued to use funds statements when they
were not employed in France until the 1950s. From that point
forward, the financial interest of paying lower taxes trumped
the rationale of concealing “new works.” Blended accounting
(charging to reserves, amortizing bonds, recording assets as expenses, etc.) disappeared in favor of a normalization of accounting through fiscal criteria [Praquin, 2006].
Focused squarely on measuring the significant impact of
“new works” on economic and financial performance, SEF
analysts unfortunately did not recognize the theoretical scope of
their analytical framework which exceeded the restrictive limits
it had been assigned. Historical research therefore enables us to
bring these anonymous precursors of financial analysis out of
the shadows and to pay our respects to the contemporary relevance of the concepts they developed.
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APPENDIX I
Measuring Cash Flows: From the CL (1870s) to the
French Plan Comptable Général, 1982
C.L.: ∆ Ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.]
C.T.: ∆ WCR + ∆ NT
– ∆ GNWC
(Excluding external
financing and cash flows
from operating activities)

= G.O.P. – [V.A. – V.I. + B.Y.] = T.N.P.
= CFOA – V.A.

Where: C.L.: Crédit Lyonnais
C.T.: current transposition
∆ Ex. W.C.: Variation in excess working capital.
D.P.F.Y.: Dividend paid out during the financial year
I.C.: Increase in Capital
S.F.A.: Sale of fixed assets
N.W.: New Works
G.O.P.: Gross operating profit
V.A.: Various amortizations
V.I.: Various inflows
B.Y.: Bond yields
T.N.P.: Total net profit
WCR: Working Capital
			 Requirement
GNWC = Global Net Working Capital
NT: Net Treasury
CFOA = Cash flows from operating activities
Comments:
1. Entries in bold type bring out the basic points highlighted by the concepts of the Crédit
Lyonnais or by the French Plan Comptable Général 1982.
2. Insofar as:
• The current financing statement includes variations in long-term external financing,
which was virtually nonexistent during that era due to the preference for internal
financing, except in several industrial sectors; the comparison above is totally possible. Also, the Crédit Lyonnais sometimes “relegated” this external financing to the
excess working capital; so it was already balanced out.
• Calculated expenditure and products are virtually nonexistent and cash flows from
operating activities and total net profit tend to be confused.
3. In France, there is a formula to analyse the financial balance of any company which is:
• (Inventories + Accounts receivable) – Accounts payable = Working Capital Requirement (WCR).
• Treasury in assets – Bank overdrafts = Net Treasury (NT).
• (Equity + Long Term Liabilities) – Fixed Assets = Global Net Working Capital
(GNWC)
Then: WCR + NT = GNWC.
4. Variations in WCR and in NT are equal to the variation in GNWC; by deducting this
same variation from GNWC (excluding external financing), with deduction of cash flows
from operating activities, cash flows logically match up to operating activities. The sole
purpose of this tautology is to show that the Crédit Lyonnais was handling concepts that
were very close to ‘ours’ but with very different outcomes – measurement of liquidity and
of the inflowing income and not calculation of a financial balance based on the excess of
stable resources (that is liabilities).
Notes on calculations:
Detail of the calculation: the breakdown is carried out using the “calculation of net profits
through the SEF method” [Excess Working Capital]”  and the “profit and loss account set
up according to the SEF method”  from which the net accounting incomes are equal:
: ∆ Excess Working Capital (∆ Ex. W.C.) – Statutory royalties and gratuities + Dividend
paid out in the financial year (D.P.F.Y.) – Increase in the capital (I.C.) – Sale of fixed assets
(S.F.A.) + New works carried over as an increase in fixed assets (N.W.F.A.) = Total net profit
(T.N.P.)
: (Gross) operating profit (G.O.P.) – New Works charged to Expenses (N.W.E.) – Various
amortizations (V.A.) + Various inflows (V.I.) – Bond yields (B.Y.) – Statutory royalties and
gratuities = Profits and losses = Total net profit (T.N.P.).
Which enables us to write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. = G.O.P. – N.W.E. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
We may also write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. + N.W.E. = G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.]
= G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
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ON HIS MAJESTY’S SECRET SERVICE:
ACCOUNTING FOR THE SECRET
SERVICE IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
PERIL 1782-1806
Abstract: Reforms to the civil list in the late 18th century in England
sought to deny the Crown opportunities to use its civil-list funds and
sinecures to buy influence in Parliament and, thereby, diminish constitutional protections for liberty. Among the most important reforms
were tighter accounting requirements for civil-list spending, including that for the secret services. The unique nature and purpose of the
home and foreign secret services, which were the responsibility of
the Crown and paid from civil-service funds, resulted in accounting
controls which depended upon additional measures to provide Parliament with greater control over spending and enhanced accountability.
These enhancements to accountability were especially important at
a time of almost continual war between England and France in the
decades spanning the close of the 18th century, resulting in significant
increases in spending on the foreign secret service.

INTRODUCTION
The history of English public-sector accounting from the
“Glorious Revolution” in 1688 has been dominated by the need
to ensure the financial authority of Parliament. In the late 18th
century, during a remarkable period of public-sector reform,
the constitutional intent of making the executive financially
accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of monies appropriated by Parliament was confirmed as the essential, undiminished reason for the unprecedented reforms to government
accounting associated with the civil list. Binney [1958, p. v]
has referred to the last two decades of the late 18th century as
a period of “unique interest and importance” in the history of
British public finance for this period “witnessed the first drawing back of the curtain concealing from parliamentary and
public view the design and action of the financial machine.”
The American War of Independence (1776-1783) and the almost
continuous war with France from 1792 until 1815 were particuPublished by eGrove, 2010
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larly important in prompting reform of civil-list accounting and
audit reforms which provided the basis for subsequent enduring
reforms in the 19th century.
Until the financial crisis created by the American War of
Independence, Parliament took little interest in the civil administration of the “King’s Executive,” most notably accounts of
expenditure from the civil list, which provided for the financial
needs of the monarch, both personal and those of his executive
government [Chester, 1981, p. 34]. Unlike the civil list, parliamentary control over military spending through a stricter accounting and appropriation regime had been among the most
important constitutional outcomes of the Glorious Revolution.
The War of Independence exposed for the first time since then
the extent to which the Crown used the civil list as a potent form
of patronage and, thereby, allowed the Crown to threaten liberty
by extending its influence in the House of Commons.
In a recent paper, Funnell [2008] has examined the process
by which widespread apprehension caused by the increasing arrogance of the Crown confirmed the belief at the end of the 18th
century that there was an intimate dependency between a rigorous, parliamentary-controlled accounting for executive spending
on the civil list and the preservation of liberties fundamental to
the English Constitution. Although Funnell’s study provides a
detailed rendition of the motives for the civil-list reforms and
the accounting consequences of the reforms for most forms of
civil-list spending, absent is any mention of the secret services,
the peculiar purpose of which might have been expected to have
very different accountability requirements. The main aim of
the present paper is to meet this omission by highlighting the
changes to accounting for secret-service funding during the time
that William Pitt1 was prime minister (1783-1801, 1804-1806)
which were coincident with the comprehensive reform of the
civil list that began in the early 1780s and with later ongoing
hostilities with France. In particular, this paper is concerned
with a curious, yet understandable, paradox at the time in
Parliament’s position on accounting for secret-service monies
when compared with the improved accounting for other civil-list
spending, resulting in a less rigorous regime of formal accounting controls and a greater reliance on professions of honesty.
1
In this paper, “William Pitt” signifies the British prime minister often referred to as William Pitt the Younger to distinguish him from his father, William
Pitt the Elder, also a prominent politician in the 18th century, later known by his
title as the Earl of Chatham when elevated to the peerage.
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The overriding need to shield from overt public scrutiny those
who protected the nation’s interests by engaging in clandestine
activities, sometimes at the risk of their lives, meant that Parliament was prepared to treat the secret services as a special case,
which might permit a very different set of accountability controls and acceptable behaviors. However apposite Parliament’s
position may have been at the time, rarely has this been without
its critics. Namier [1963, p. 176], for one, referred to how:
Legends naturally surround all ‘secret service’; its very
name inspires fear and distrust and stimulates men’s
imagination – it is believed to be wise and wicked, efficient and powerful. In reality the most common characteristic of political secret service at all times is its stupidity and the unconscionable waste of money which it
entails. Where its task is to obtain ‘intelligence,’ it most
frequently produces tales which could not stand five
minutes’ cross-examination in a law court.
The present article, which deals with an exceptional period
in the history of public-sector accounting and accountability
at the end of the 18th century, is the first in the accounting history literature to examine the tensions between the peculiar and
required mode of operation of secret services and the need to
ensure accountability and transparency for the monies required
of these services. The growing body of public-sector accounting
history has been overwhelmingly concerned with accounting
methods used in central government and audit, notably in times
of war [for example, see Funnell, 1994; Black, 2001; Edwards et
al., 2002]. The great freedom allowed the Crown in the spending
of secret-service funds from the civil list and the absence of an
effective means to ensure that spending on the domestic and
foreign secret services would be controlled in total and accounted for systematically was a major concern of the promoters of
the reform of the civil list in the late 18th century. Any spending
by the Crown allowed to go unchecked represented a potential
threat to liberty, none more than spending on secret services.
Indeed, a prominent part of the Civil Establishments Act 1782
[22 Geo. III, c. 822], the centerpiece of the achievements of the
economic reform movement championed by Edmund Burke
2
“An act for enabling his Majesty to discharge the debt contracted upon his
civil list revenues; and for preventing the same from being in arrear for the future,
by regulating the mode of payments out of the said revenues, and by suppressing or regulating certain offices herein mentioned, which are now paid out of the
revenues of the civil list.”
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and the basis of subsequent government accounting reforms
[see Funnell, 2008], was devoted to innovations that limited total
spending for some parts of secret-service spending and tightened
the means by which those directly spending the funds would be
made accountable. Particularly notable as a form of accounting
control was the statutory reliance upon the swearing of oaths.
In the absence of accounts supported by documentary evidence,
these oaths fulfilled a highly effective, supplementary role in
the accounting process. While oaths were certainly not a new
feature of government, or indeed of the administration of law,
Parliament’s reliance upon them in the context of accounting for
secret-service spending recognized especially both the necessary
imperfections of the secret-service accounts and the religious
imperative in accountability relationships at the time.
In the first section that follows, a brief outline is provided of
the evolution of modern secret diplomacy and the importance
of the English secret service in the late 18th century, a time of
considerable international instability and threat for England.
The civil-list reforms in the late 18th century are then examined
to identify the very different approach that was implemented
for reforming the control of, and accounting for, secret-service
spending. Most of the details of secret-service spending in the
18th century that survive, and upon which this research relies,
are to be found preserved at the British National Archive, Kew,
in Home Office (H.O.) accounts, Foreign Office (F.O.) accounts,
Treasury (T) documents, and those from the Audit Office (A.O.).
THE ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE ENGLISH SECRET SERVICE
The English secret service in the late 18th century was the
product of a long period of evolution that owed much to the
practices of other countries, in particular Italy. From the Italian
city states during the Renaissance arose the features of intelligence gathering that were to define the modern intelligence
services throughout Europe. Although the need for information
about one’s enemies or potential enemies had always been important in any military success as far back as ancient times, not
until the 14th and 15th centuries did this intelligence gathering
reach a sophisticated and truly effective form in the Italian city
states of Venice and Genoa, a form that was quickly mimicked
by most other major European states [Thompson and Padover,
1963]. The Venetians had realized that the best way to create
and maintain the means to gather reliable information was to
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establish permanent embassies in neighboring states [Thompson and Padover, 1963, p. 17]. Not until the 16th century did
England under Henry VIII (1509-1547) follow the Italian example and establish permanent embassies in the major European
states [Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 2-3].
Most historians trace the origins of the modern English
secret service to the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and her
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Francis Walsingham
(1534-1590). In 1573, Walsingham was appointed to the powerful Privy Council and in this capacity, notes Haynes [1994, p.
25], contributed “mightily” to the foreign affairs of England.
Walsingham took office in the late 16th century at a time when
the major European states were seeking to expand their influence and territory and, therefore, were prone to conflict. The
17th century inherited this instability and became a century of
almost continual wars, commercial and political.
In response to the considerable international pressures
during Elizabeth’s reign, Walsingham created, for the times,
a formidable intelligence network, with intelligence gathered
mainly from sources in Holland, France, and Germany. Plowden
[1991, p. 55] believes that so sophisticated and comprehensive
was Walsingham’s intelligence-gathering network that it is “no
exaggeration to say that very little went on in Catholic circles …
during the 1570s and 1580s” that did not come to Walsingham’s
notice. Ambassadors were for Walsingham the most important
official source of information, providing reports of court gossip,
major political events, and official meetings [Bleiweis, 1976, p.
39]. Unofficial sources were the largest, most diverse but least
reliable group of “intelligencers,” which included English living abroad, soldiers, sailors, businessmen, artists, and students
[Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 16-18; Haynes, 1994, p. 12]. One 17th century contemporary [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963,
p. 60] wrote that diplomats should nurture their spies because
“Well-chosen spies contribute more than any other agency to the
success of great plans … And there is no expense better designed
… than that which is laid out upon a secret service, it would be
inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it.”
Despite the historical importance of intelligence gathering
for state security, not until 1582 did Elizabeth’s “spy master”
Walsingham have a regular budget. Initially it was set at £750,
rising to £2,000 in 1588. Still, this was never sufficient for Wal
singham to meet the need for regular, reliable foreign intelligence
from mainly Catholic France. Despite his frequent supplications
for more money, he often had to use his own money to keep his
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intelligence operations functioning, eventually bankrupting him
and his family [Plowden, 1991, p. 55; Haynes, 1994, p. 12].
Intelligence gathering was later raised to even more sophisticated levels under John Thurloe who became Secretary
of State in 1652 during the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell.
Thurloe was convinced that the best agents were those who
were motivated by money and that the essential requirement of
an effective intelligence service was “a good purse” [Thompson
and Padover, 1963, p. 92]. As a dictatorship surrounded by numerous domestic and foreign enemies, often working together,
an efficient intelligence-gathering system was essential to the
maintenance of Cromwell’s authority. Thus, Cromwell spent on
average more than £70,000 a year to garner both domestic and
foreign intelligence, none of which he formally accounted for. So
effective were his secret services that Samuel Pepys concluded
that “Cromwell carried the secrets of all the princes of Europe
at his girdle” [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963, p. 83].
Although England was almost continually in a state of preparation for war in the century that followed the dictatorship and the
restoration of the monarchy, not until the wars with France did
England under William Pitt the Younger again fully appreciate
the benefits of an effective secret service.
As effective and comprehensive as Cromwell’s secret services were, the spending on them while Pitt was prime minister
represented a very different scale of operation and sophistication. From almost the outbreak of revolution in France in 1789
until the end of hostilities in 1815, England was either at war
with France or believed that it needed to be ready for war. In
addition, when Pitt became prime minister, England had only
recently lost the American colonies, its hold over India was
being threatened by widespread administrative abuses, and
rebellion had been growing in Ireland. When war with France
did break out in April 1792, Britain quickly established an extensive, well-funded espionage center in neutral Switzerland to
coordinate the collection of intelligence under the direction of
William Wickham. France, Pitt warned England, had directed its
hostilities “against the very essence of your liberty, against the
foundation of your independence … against your constitution
itself” [House of Commons, November 10, 1797, in Pitt, 1806, p.
172]. So successful was intelligence gathering in the time of Pitt,
that it is sometimes credited with a critical role in expanding
and consolidating the British Empire [Thompson and Padover,
1963, p. 158]. Table 1 below shows that between 1785 and 1792,
spending on all parts of the secret service increased signifihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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cantly when England joined with her European allies against the
French. Annual outlays for the secret service in these years averaged £24,000 [Mitchell, 1965, p. 256]. There was a particularly
significant rise in foreign-service spending after 1794 as war
began to envelop Europe.
TABLE 1
Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money,
1775-1798

Year

Sums issued to
the Secretaries
of State (mainly
for foreign-secret
service)
£

£

£

£

1775

11,250

34,000

7,249

52,499

1776

9,000

39,000

6,263

54,263

1777

9,000

57,000

7,139

73,139

1778

9,000

51,000

7,159

67,159

1779

7,250

62,000

7,239

76,489

1780

8,362

37,000

7,139

52,501

1781

6,750

40,000

7,875

54,625

1782

15,225

31,000

3,569

49,794

1783

35,500

8,000

0

43,500

1784

7,006

3,000

0

10,006

1785

31,878

6,000

0

37,878

1786

25,727

96,000

0

121,727

1787

98,050

10,000

0

108,050

1788

212,851

10,000

0

222,851

1789

32,154

10,000

0

42,154

1790

26,221

10,000

0

36,221

1791

22,244

10,000

0

32,244

1792

14,992

10,000

0

24,992

1793

39,585

10,000

0

49,585

1794

49,335

10,000

0

59,335

1795

173,068

10,000

0

183,068

1796

183,194

10,000

0

193,194

1797

223,222

10,000

0

233,222

1798

175,000

10,000

0

185,000

Sums issued to
Treasury (mainly
for home-secret
service)

Sums issued to
Post Office (for
home-secret
service)

Total

Source: “An Account of the Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money,
1774-1798,” House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Vol.
121, July 4, 1799.
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Apart from the continued reliance upon traditional sources
of information, the Post Office in the 18th century, as Table 1
demonstrates, was an especially effective means of collecting
information about domestic and foreign matters until the 1780s,
when the funding arrangements for secret services changed dramatically. The importance of the Post Office as a source of intelligence, both domestic and foreign, was established in 1710 with
the passage of An Act for establishing a General Post Office for all
her Majesty’s Dominions [12 Anne c. 10]. The act gave the Post
Office a monopoly over all movement of mail. There was to be
only “one General Letter Office and Post Office … erected within
the City of London, from whence all Letters and Packets … may
be sent into any Part of the Kingdom … or to North America,
the West Indies, or to any other of her Majesty’s Dominions …”
[12 Anne c. 10, Section II]; control was to be absolute. These
exclusive rights gave the Post Office the ability to monitor almost all the mail entering, leaving, and moving around England.
The act also allowed the Principal Secretaries of State, and only
them, to delay and open any mail [12 Anne c. 10, Section XL].
Irrespective of the source of information, Namier [1963, p. 176]
regarded all secret-service spending in the early modern period
as a waste of money. With the primary function of the secret service to buy corruption, it was to be expected that it would only
be successful in purchasing the services of individuals whose
services were unlikely to be worthwhile. Secret-service spending
created a “mutual benefit society for pseudo-political parasites”
with a financial interest in fomenting fear and exaggeration
[Namier, 1963, p. 176].
The unique nature of the secret service and its growing importance, cost, and sophistication in the 18th century were recognized when it came time in the closing decades to reform the
civil list and accounting for civil-list expenditures, with several
main sections of the Civil Establishments Act concerned exclusively with the secret services.
REFORM OF THE CIVIL LIST AND THE SECRET SERVICES
Throughout the 18th century, the relationship between
Parliament and the executive was one of an overdeveloped desire to ensure a separation of their respective powers. Only by
“destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the
legislature and the rest” would the constitution be threatened
[Bentham, 1776, p. 73]. Parliament did not want to know how
the King spent his money from the civil list on the royal househttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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hold or on the civil government; Parliament only wanted to be
certain that limits were placed on the level of civil-list spending
[Funnell, 2008]. It was the King’s government and it was accepted as the King’s constitutional right to govern as he saw fit
[Chubb, 1952, p. 9; Blackstone in Roseveare, 1969, p. 87]. The
civil-list funds were therefore accepted as a means of reducing
any constitutional friction between the Crown and Parliament
[Cromwell, 1968, p. 5]. The high ideals of the constitution, however, did not prevent the Crown from regularly attempting to
influence Parliament through the use of honors and sinecures
associated with the civil list, which Castlereagh observed were
“more likely than any others to secure parliamentary influence”
[quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 499].
The cost of the royal household and of departments of state
was to be met primarily from the Crown’s hereditary sources of
income. In addition, Parliament granted monarchs additional
funding at the beginning of their reigns, which constituted the
civil-list funds. The intention of Parliament was to ensure that
the Crown had sufficient income to meet all its needs, both the
personal needs of the sovereign and for carrying out executive
functions. In return, the Crown was expected to live within its
income, except during periods of emergency such as wars. The
reality was somewhat different. Even in the absence of war,
Parliament was frequently called upon to vote amounts to cover
large accumulated deficits in the royal budget. However, it was
war, and the Crown’s indebtedness that war inevitably produced,
which provided Parliament with unchallengeable opportunities
to examine the financial affairs of the Crown when additional
funding from Parliament was sought, none more so in the 18th
century than the American War of Independence [see Funnell,
2008].
The American War of Independence was a watershed in not
only refashioning England’s standing as an imperial power but
also in the changes that it produced in government finances. The
mounting cost of the war and the Crown’s growing indebtedness
and influence in Parliament soon raised concerns about the way
in which the war was being managed, about whether the money
taken from a small and wealthy elite was being used effectively
and appropriately. From this spreading discontent arose the
economical reform movement, popularized by Edmund Burke’s
speech in the House of Commons on February 11, 1780 [Parliamentary History, XXI, cols. 1-73]. Earlier Burke [Parliamentary
History XX, December 7, 1779, col. 1,257] had criticized spending on the war and for domestic purposes as:
Published by eGrove, 2010
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Lavish and wasteful to a shameful degree. Oeconomy,
the most rigid and exact oeconomy, has become absolutely necessary … Amidst the many and various matters that require reformation … before this country can
rise superior to its powerful enemies; the waste of public treasure requires instant remedy …
While financial concerns most immediately and directly
created the economical reform movement, these were also
symptomatic of a more fundamental and far more serious
worry. The vast sums involved in the war against the American
colonies allowed the Crown to purchase greater influence in
Parliament with the granting of profitable, war-related contracts
and sinecures [Watson, 1960, pp. 232, 247]. According to one
member of the House of Commons, in no other period of history
did contracting abuses “flourish in such rank extravagance. At
no other period were they so detrimental to the public service”
(observations made in the House of Commons, as quoted in
[Porritt, 1963, p. 218]). A leader of the economical reform movement, Christopher Wyvill, warned that the war had resulted in
“the national substance … fast waning away by the profusion
of expence in this rash and unfortunate war; and the influence
of the Crown fed by that very prodigality, and increased in full
proportion to it, is now swollen to a most alarming magnitude”
[quoted in Harling, 1996, p. 34].
Allowing the Crown to buy influence by the granting of
sinecures undermined the independence of both public officials
and weakened the constitution [see Burke in Cromwell, 1968,
p. 6]. The Crown’s influence during the War of Independence,
observed the pre-eminent constitutional authority William
Blackstone, had become “most amazingly extensive” [Blackstone quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 484; Funnell, 2008]. Charles Fox
referred to this influence of the Crown as the “one grand domestic evil, from which all our other evils, foreign and domestic,
have sprung. … To the influence of the Crown we must attribute
the loss of the … thirteen provinces of America …” [quoted in
Ayling, 1972, p. 287]. Dunning’s resolution in the Commons that
“the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and
ought to be diminished” [Parliamentary History XXI, April 6,
1780, cols. 340-388; Watson, 1960, p. 232; Ayling, 1972, p. 283]
helped to precipitate the beginning of the end of the more outrageous abuses of royal patronage. Deficiencies in accounting for
civil-list expenditures, including for the secret services, and the
threat that this posed to liberty also prompted Dunning [Parliamentary History XXI, April 6, 1780, col. 367, also col. 691; see
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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also Foord, 1947, p. 491] to call upon the House:
To examine into and to correct abuses in the expenditure of the civil list revenue. … If the public money was
faithfully applied and frugally expended, that would reduce the influence of the Crown; if, on the other hand,
the influence of the Crown was restrained within its
natural and constitutional limits, it would at once more
restore that power which the constitution had rested in
that house – the inquiring into and controlling the expenditure of public money …
Enactment of the remarkably innovative Civil Establishments Act [22 Geo. III, c. 82] in 1782, which owed its existence
to the commitment, political standing, and brilliance of Edmund
Burke, provided for the elimination of many sinecures which
had been used to enhance the Crown’s influence in Parliament
[see Funnell, 2008]. It also established a more formal regime of
accounting for civil-list funds, thereby enhancing Parliament’s
financial authority over the executive. More immediately, it introduced a number of iconoclastic reforms to control the level of
spending on the secret services and to enhance significantly parliamentary surveillance through improved accounting requirements centered on the Treasury.
The highly influential Lord Shelburne believed at the time
that publicity through better accounting was the only sure way
to avoid the abuses that now plagued the executive and the civil
list. He sought to ensure that all matters that involved expenditure should be open to public view, although, significantly, not
those pertaining to the secret services [Binney, 1958, p. 268]. Accounting for the secret services had always been haphazard and
at the discretion of the Crown. When upon leaving the Treasury
in 1766, Lord Rockingham asked how to close the secret-service
accounts, he was informed by the Duke of Newcastle, one of
his predecessors, that when he had provided the secret-service
accounts to George II, “the late King used to burn them in the
presence of the person who was concerned” [quoted in Namier,
1963, p. 173]. Only rarely when the Crown sought additional
funds to meet mounting deficits would Parliament be able to
see something of what had been spent on the secret services and
how it had been spent. Accordingly, the secrecy that normally
surrounded the civil list was to be found in an exaggerated form
with the accounts for the secret services, which allowed the
Crown great discretion in the use of money for secret service or
other purposes, including corrupting Parliament. Use of secretservice funds to buy influence in Parliament had a long hisPublished by eGrove, 2010
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tory, especially at election time. In one election, cited by Namier
[1963, p. 203], the not inconsiderable sum of £1,000 was paid
out of the secret-services money of the civil list to the Duke of
Argyll and additional monies paid to another 24 candidates. In
addition, between elections, considerable sums were spent out
of the secret-service funds to assist the government in gaining
influence in boroughs.
ACCOUNTING FOR SECRET-SERVICE SPENDING
AND THE 1782 ACT
Spending Limits: The Civil Establishments Act has been described by Reitan [1966, p. 335] as the act that finally ended
the struggle over the nation’s finances between Parliament and
the executive. Pitt was later to remind Parliament that it should
never take for granted its financial authority for “the general
principle which constituted the chief security of our liberties
… [was still] the power of controlling the public expenditure”
[House of Commons, December 8, 1796, in Pitt, 1806]. The
overriding intentions of the act to give greater publicity to the
financial affairs of the executive and to control spending on the
civil list were clearly established in the preamble with the need
for “introducing a better Order and Oeconomy in the Civil List
Establishments, and for the better Security of the Liberty and
Independency of Parliament.”
Until Burke’s reforms, there was no protocol for determining the amounts to be spent on the secret services, which were
organized according to domestic or foreign activities. This
changed notably in the case of the home secret-service spending
when, in response to repeated abuses and the absence of reliable
accounts which permitted these abuses, Burke was able to introduce statutory limits to spending. The 1782 act required “for
preventing … all Abuses in the Disposal of Monies issued under
the Head of Secret Service Money” for monies spent “within
this Kingdom,” that the home secret service, was not to exceed
£10,000 in any one year [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. At the
same time, in an effort to tighten control over the issue of secretservice monies, the new act no longer allowed the Post Office to
be a conduit for these monies. This is clearly seen in Table 1
above where, after 1782, all secret-service funding for the Post
Office ceased. The Post Office would still remain a very effective
means of collecting intelligence throughout England and in obtaining intelligence by intercepting communications to and from
foreign representatives in England.
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Burke made it clear that he did not want to threaten the
effectiveness of the home secret service but, consistent with the
main purpose of the act, he did want to limit the total spending in any one year and deny the Crown any discretion in the
amounts to be spent. Should the total spent on the home secret
service need to increase beyond the amount now set by legislation, this would now have to be considered by Parliament
since any increase in spending required an amendment to the
controlling legislation. Thus, the total spent on the home secret
service was to be limited, indeed fixed, and better controlled by
Parliament. Although it served an important role during periods
of major social unrest, of which the 1790s are notable, the home
secret service under Pitt, as before, never assumed any great
importance. Indeed, there are very few references to agents in
its employ in extant ministerial papers and other official documents from the late 18th century. Rarely did its agents work
full-time in gathering information [Ehrman, 1983, p. 137]. Accordingly, spending on the home secret service was insignificant
when compared to that which had for some time been spent on
the foreign secret service. Spending on the foreign secret service, often in states which were potentially and actively enemies
of England, was also far more difficult to control with certainty,
especially in times when war threatened to erupt at anytime.
Where it was not possible easily to limit the level of spending “by reason of the uncertain quantity of the service,” such
as in a time of war, Burke’s Act required that any spending for
the service be confined “to its line”; that is, all spending for the
service must be accounted for in the one type of appropriation
and not distributed between votes or types of appropriations
which would provide the Crown with the opportunity to hide
spending and to deceive Parliament. He sought to reassure
Parliament that he did not seek “to stop the progress of expense
in its line, but to confine it to that line in which it professes to
move” [Parliamentary History, February 14, 1780]. This had the
great advantage of allowing Parliament to be certain that, while
the level of spending may not be within its full control, the appropriation accounts would guarantee that it was aware of the
extent to which spending had occurred. For this to be effective,
a more prominent role for the Treasury was required.
The Accounting Role of the Treasury and the Secretary of State: To
enhance further the control of all secret-service spending and
accounting, from 1783 on, all secret-service monies would be
issued only through the Treasury, to whom the person receiving
Published by eGrove, 2010
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the monies would be accountable and from whom he would
receive his discharge. No longer would secret-service monies be
paid out of civil-service monies without the express permission
of the Commissioners of the Treasury [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section
XXVIII]. The Treasury was also required to keep detailed accounts of all parts of the civil-service receipts and spending and
to strike an annual balance for each element [22 Geo. III, c. 82,
Section XXXV]. At the head of the Treasury were the five Lords
Commissioners, with the First Lord specifically authorized to
pay monies out of the fund provided for secret services [Binney,
1958, p. 170]. In addition to now controlling all accounting and
audit for civil-service monies, the Treasury was the authorized
body to commence any legal actions for the recovery of any
amounts for which a discharge had not been given.
Complementing the greatly enhanced role of the Treasury
in accounting, the 1782 act stipulated that the authority to use
the money appropriated to the foreign secret service was now to
be restricted to only three senior public officials who, ultimately,
would be held accountable to Parliament through the Treasury
for the monies given into their charge. Accordingly, the 1782
act required that the payment of any monies from the civil-list
revenues for the foreign secret service was to be only through
one of the Principle3 Secretaries of State at the Foreign Office
and the Home Office or the First Commissioner of the Admiralty
[22 Geo. III. c. 82, Section XXV]. Thus, for example, the following information concerning use of civil-service funds for the
foreign service was still being sent to the Treasury decades later
in September 1830: “£432/13/- received by Earl of Aberdeen,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spent on Foreign
Secret Service and for which I am accountable under Civil List
Act of 22 George III c. 82” [A.O. 119/118]. Each of the newly authorized officials would be charged by the Treasury with secretservice monies and required to submit accounts to the Treasury
at predetermined intervals to receive their discharge or quietus.
Consistent with the wider reform of accounting for civil-service
spending and, in particular, to provide greater transparency
and accountability for monies given to senior officials, the Civil
Establishments Act also prohibited the long-standing practice of
allowing secret-service monies paid to the Principle Secretaries
of State to be disguised as part of their salary. Thus, in 1769, for
example, £3,000 was paid to each of the two Principle Secretaries of State, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the Secretary
3

“Principle” is the correct historical spelling for the period.
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for Foreign Affairs, from secret-service monies as part of their
salaries [Namier, 1963, p. 192]. After the 1782 act, secret-service
monies would now be clearly identified as salary, a fee, or an allowance.
Most of the money provided through the Treasury to the
three senior approved officials subsequently would be made
available to English ambassadors and senior officers in the
armed services who, in turn, would be charged to account for
this money to one of the Secretaries of State or the First Commissioner of the Admiralty. Previous to the 1782 act, secretservice monies were given to a number of ministers who would
dispense the money to their informants or officials, mostly ambassadors, as they saw fit. For this money, they neither expected
nor required any receipts or other documentary evidence to
verify how the money was spent, only that it was received by the
ambassador and had been spent for the purposes authorized.
The greatly enhanced role for the Treasury in accounting for
secret-service monies required by the 1782 act also extended to
the audit of the accounts. Audit was put on a more permanent
and regular footing in 1785 with the creation of five Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts and their office, the
Board of Audit4 [25 Geo. III c. 52], which was placed very firmly
under Treasury control [see 25,Geo. III, c. 52, sections VIII, XI,
XIV, XVIII, XIX, XXI]. In particular, the Treasury continued to
be responsible for executing the commissioners’ oath of office
[s. IV], appointing audit staff, and for determining all conditions
associated with their employment [s. V]. The 1785 act marked
“in the strongest manner the intention of the legislature that
… [the Board] should be strictly subject to the controls of the
Treasury” [1810 Committee on Public Expenditure, Fifth Report,
p. 388]. In practice, the 1810 Committee on Public Expenditure
[Fifth Report, p. 398] found that this meant that:
the decision of the Auditors is in no instance final; but
the Lords of the Treasury exercise complete authority
with regard to all the articles of an Account … [The]
special jurisdiction of the Treasury is constantly and
habitually necessary to the final settlement and passing
4
The first Board of Audit, appointed on July 5, 1785, consisted of, in addition
to the five commissioners, two of whom were Controllers of Army Accounts, two
Inspectors General on £500 per.annum, and 16 clerks earning between £80 and
£300 per annum. By September 1785, an extra seven junior clerks, a solicitor,
an office keeper and two messengers had been appointed. The office was further
expanded in 1787 and remained at a total complement of 43 until into the 19th
century [Establishment Rolls, Board of Audit 1785-1799, National Audit Office].
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of the greater part of the Public Accounts which are examined by the Commissioners of Audit.
In another attempt to promote the wise management of individual civil-list revenues and to ensure that the necessary services would be provided without the Crown accumulating debts
which at regular intervals had required Parliament to grant additional funding, the 1782 act placed a limit of £900,000 on the
civil list. Very controversially, the act also provided for payments
to be made in a prescribed, unvarying order from the eight
classes specified for the appropriation of civil-list revenues. The
latter condition was intended in particular to reduce discretion
in how secret-service monies were spent. Where discretion by an
official of the Crown was able to be exercised over the civil-list
money appropriated by Parliament, Burke sought a new “plan of
arrangement” to prevent this discretion being abused. In Burke’s
view, it was not “safe to permit an entirely arbitrary discretion
even in the First Lord of the Treasury himself; it will not be safe
to leave with him a power of diverting the public money from
its proper objects, of paying it in an irregular course…” [Parliamentary History, February 14, 1780]. Removing the ability of
the Crown to choose how to spend secret-service monies would
enhance the ability of Parliament to make the executive accountable by establishing in the act “a fixed and invariable order in all
… payments, which it shall not be permitted to the First Lord
of the Treasury, upon any pretence whatsoever, to depart from”
[22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. Only when the costs of each
higher-ranked service had been fully provided for could the next
class of expenditures be paid.
Not surprisingly, the first priority of payments from the civil
list was the pensions and allowances of the royal family. This
was followed in the second class by payments for allowances
and pensions of senior government and parliamentary officials,
such as the Speaker of the House of Commons, and judges.
Payments to England’s ambassadors and foreign consuls, which
included secret service payments, formed the third class in the
civil list. Cleverly, to encourage Commissioners of the Treasury
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take seriously their
new responsibilities for the civil list, their salaries and other
remuneration were provided for in the eighth and final class [22
Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXI]. Thus, not until all other demands
on the civil list had been met, would these officials receive any
payments. In 1786, with a total of £900,000 now fixed for civilservice spending and when spending for the first seven classes
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of civil spending totaled £897,000, there was only £3,000 left
available for the Commissioners of the Treasury. Outcomes such
as this, notes Watson [1960, p. 248], made it very unlikely that
corruption and bribery by the Crown would be allowed to occur
on any appreciable scale and, at the same time, encouraged a
much more closely policed accounting regime. In addition, the
act prohibited any amounts unpaid to the Commissioners of the
Treasury being treated as arrears, providing another powerful
incentive to watch spending closely [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section
XXXII; Binney, 1958, p. 271]. Should any amount be unpaid, the
arrear “shall be wholly lapsed and extinguished, as if the same
had not been payable” [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXIII]. Accounts of spending in the order prescribed were to be kept by
the Treasury and made available to both Houses of Parliament
when required [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXV].
Oaths and Accounting for a Quietus: While clear lines of accountability for secret-service monies were established by the 1782
act, when it came to accounting for these after funds had left
the hands of the Secretaries of State and were given to agents
in the field, a very different set of accounting practices prevailed
to that required for all other parts of the civil list, thereby recognizing the peculiar nature of secret-service expenditure. The
juxtaposition of secrecy and access to large sums of money
with few formal accountability controls over agents in the field
of service recognized that accounting for secret-service spending on the frontline was expected to be very different from that
of other civil-list spending. Certainly it was unlikely, given the
nature of the process of gathering information from individuals
who would wish that their identities remain known only to their
immediate contacts, that there was the opportunity to obtain
detailed receipts for expenditures in a similar manner to that of
other government services. Burke recognized that the fluidity
and unpredictability of international politics, hence the need for
intelligence gathering and the need to keep secret the identities
of those gathering intelligence for England, meant that a very
different way of exercising accountability and of obtaining accounts was required.
Ambassadors, consuls, or commissioners representing England in another country, or any commander-in-chief or other
senior commander of the navy or land forces receiving secretservice monies from the Secretaries of State, would be expected
to provide receipts for the money received, although these were
in aggregate only. Unlike the more stringent accounting requirePublished by eGrove, 2010
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ments now required for all other civil-list monies, these receipts
were required to state only that the money had been received
for the “purpose for which the same hath been issued” [22 Geo.
III, c. 82, Section XXV]. The Secretaries of State and the First
Commissioner of the Admiralty would receive their discharge or
quietus from the Treasury once the necessary receipts had been
received and given to the Treasury. Crucially, they had to swear
an oath in person before the Barons of the Treasury, testifying
to the veracity of the accounts based upon these receipts. These
receipts from ambassadors and others had to be provided to
the Exchequer within three years of the money being issued
to obtain a quietus. The receipts for monies received from the
Secretaries of State and the First Commissioner of the Admiralty which formed the basis upon which a charge was created
against officials in foreign postings, were sufficient, once the
handwriting had been verified, to “acquit and discharge the
said Secretary or Secretaries, or First Commissioner of the Admiralty, in their said Account at the Exchequer” [22 Geo. III, c.
82, Section XXV]. The accounts for secret-service monies, with
receipts for spending, now required to be submitted by Secretaries of State to the Treasury, and thence to the Audit Office, were
in the form of the traditional charge-and-discharge accounts. In
Figure 1 below, the account and the oath which accompanies
it is typical of foreign secret-service accounts provided after
Burke’s Act in 1782 and after refinements contained in 45 Geo.
III, c. 76 in 1805.
Should it be necessary for the Secretaries of State or the
First Commissioner of the Admiralty to use money issued for
foreign secret service for domestic purposes, an acquittance
would be granted if they swore the following oath [22 Geo. III, c.
82, Section XXVII] before the Barons of the Exchequer:
I A.B. do swear, That the Money paid to me for Foreign
Secret Service, or for Secret Service in detecting, preventing, or defeating, treasonable, or other dangerous
Conspiracies against the State…, has been bona fide, applied to the said Purpose or Purposes, and to no other:
and that it hath not appeared to me convenient to the
State that the same should be paid Abroad. So help me
GOD.
In 1805, soon after the union of Britain and Ireland, a
similar provision was included in civil-list legislation for secretservice payments by Commissioners of the Lord High Treasurer
in Ireland to the Under Secretary for Civil Affairs in the Office
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FIGURE 1
General Account of the Monies issued and received
by the Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, late His Majesty’s
Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under the
Head of Secret Service from 1st November 1809 to the 14
March 1810
Discharge

Charge
£
By Balance received
from the Right
Honourable George
Canning
By Exchequer Issues
during said period
To pay the fees thereon

£

397.19.4 Expended by William
Hamilton as per receipt

30,000.0.0 To Foreign Ministers
768.10.0 Deducted at the
Treasury and Exchequer
for Fees
Balance transferred
to M. Willerby as per
Receipt
£31,166.9.4

24,067.9.3

168.5.8
768.10.0

6162.4.5

£31,166.9.4

“The Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, this Accountant maketh oath that the
above Accounts to the best of his knowledge and belief are true and just” (25 June
1812).
Source: A.O. 3/949

of the Chief Secretary. To enhance parliamentary control over
secret-service payments for rebellious Ireland in “detecting, preventing or defeating treasonable or other dangerous Conspiracies against the State,” an acquittance was to be granted for the
Under Secretary who had been given the secret-service money
after making an oath very similar to that required of officials in
England. Unusually, and recognizing the fraught conditions in
Ireland, receipts or other documentation were not required, only
that the Under Secretary affirmed by oath before the Barons of
the Exchequer in Ireland that the money given to him had been
“bona fide applied to such Purposes” as approved and that the
spending of the money for these purposes had been approved
[45 Geo III, c. 76].
For the officials, most often an ambassador, who had paid
foreign agents, for which documentary evidence would have
been most unusual, a quietus would be given if within one year
of arriving back in England, they either returned any money
Published by eGrove, 2010
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received to the Exchequer or made the following oath [also see
A.O. 19/118] before the Barons of the Exchequer:
I A.B. do swear, That I have disbursed the Money, instructed to me for Foreign Secret Service, faithfully,
according to the Intent and Purpose for which it was
given, according to my best Judgment, for his Majesty’s
Service, So help me GOD.
No further documentation was required. The discharge was
given by the Treasury through the Upper Exchequer, or Exchequer of Accounts, which had the authority to summon before
it most officials who performed the role of public accountant;
that is, the individual held accountable by Parliament for money
spent by the executive. The Upper Exchequer also recorded the
details of the accounts of the public accountants. Once the quietus had been given by the Upper Exchequer, this was the final
authority. No matters could again be raised in relation to the
accounts and monies nor could they be challenged by the courts
[Binney, 1958, p. 189].
In most cases when no documentation was provided by
the sources of intelligence who ultimately received the secretservice monies, whether full-time spies or unofficial agents for
whom anonymity may have been a matter of life and death, the
oaths required of accountable officers associated with the secret
services assumed great importance. The oath in effect at times
substituted for the documentary evidence which was required
when accounting for other civil-list spending and mirrored
oath taking in the courts and elsewhere. The oath that accompanied the accounts fulfilled an important auxiliary role in the
accounting process by providing Parliament and the Treasury
with an additional assurance that the accounts were a “true
and just” rendition of how the secret-service money had been
used. The practice of taking an oath to attest to the veracity of
accounts and the fidelity of actions was very widespread, to be
found wherever an account of any significance was to be given.
Indeed, swearing an oath and relying upon the integrity of the
authorized officials was an essential accounting control. Thus,
inspectors of accounts working on behalf of the Board of Audit
also were required to take an oath [Commissioners for Auditing
the Public Accounts, 1786]:
...not to permit, suffer, or conceal, any fraud whatsoever
in any accounts intrusted to your care. In all Accounts...
you shall see that they are carefully and faithfully examined, drawn, and prepared for Auditing; giving therein
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to no Accountant any allowance but such as shall be
duly and regularly vouched and allowable according to
the custom, method, and rules of the Exchequer.
The influential Lord Shelburne in the late 18th century
was far less convinced of the efficacy of oaths as an accounting
control, preferring instead the rendering of accounts in a public
forum, with the one notable exception of secret-service accounts.
He observed [quoted in Binney, 1958, p.269] that he had:
...found by experience that this is the grand principle of
economy and the only method of preventing abuses; far
better than oaths or any other checks which have been
devised. Instead, therefore, of oaths there should be an
obligation to print at the end of the year every expenditure and every contract, except in cases of Secret Service, which may be subject to checks of another nature.
Unlike the present, an oath had far greater social significance in the 18th century. The right to take an oath was both a
mark of social position and provided a clear indication of the
legal status of the matter for which the oath was made. Also, as
much as the legal importance of the oath and its role as an administrative device, the ritual of taking an oath impressed upon
persons the importance of what they were about to do. Most
obviously taking an oath in court, in a form which has some
religious significance, when giving evidence has long been the
means by which courts are able to impress upon those involved
the importance of their actions and statements; indeed, their
very life might be in danger for a false declaration [Binney, 1958,
p. 269]. In the 18th century, a time when everyone was expected
to have a strong religious belief, the ritual of the taking an oath
was in effect a solemn appeal to God testifying to one’s truthfulness, which symbolized the expectation that any lies would not
escape unpunished for to swear a false oath was to imperil one’s
soul.
CONCLUSION
Given that the overriding concern of the civil-list reforms after 1782 was to protect the liberties of all Englishmen, any part
of government which was allowed to continue to operate with a
high level of secrecy and, thus, was a potentially potent means
to threaten liberty was especially important. Even though profound accounting and accountability changes were made to the
civil list after 1782, notably the appointment of commissioners
for auditing the public accounts, the treatment of secret-service
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spending in the Civil Establishments Act recognized that these
reforms had their limits when it came to clandestine operations
for which the giving of formal accounts for monies spent may
be incommensurate with the clandestine nature of the services
performed. The considerable opportunity that this allowed for
abuse in the spending of secret-service funds did not escape the
attention of Burke. Thus, the 1782 act contained a number of
significant clauses which were concerned with the amounts to
be spent on the secret services and, as a means to ensure that accountable individuals could be clearly identified, the procedure
by which the money would be spent and accounted for. The provisions of the act that were related to the secret services sought
to compensate for the unavoidable paucity of secret-service accounts by limiting the authority for secret-service spending to a
very few senior offices and relying upon their integrity.
The concerns of this article have been limited to a period
of time when the beginnings of modern systems of financial
accountability for governments were established and were beginning to be more fully appreciated. Thus, the article provides
the opportunity to prompt accounting historians to examine the
subsequent evolution from the early 19th century of accounting
for the secret services in Britain and other democratic states,
although recognizing the obvious significant impediments that
may be present to gaining access to information. These difficulties in and of themselves would prove the value of attempts to
investigate whether and how secret services have been made
accountable, but especially in the most chaotic and extreme
political circumstances such as war when there is a welldemonstrated tendency for governments to become dangerously
arrogant and the protections that mechanisms of financial accountability have provided for individual citizens are shown to
be insufficient. The surprising, ongoing silence in the literature
about the accountability of the secret services contradicts their
significance in times of war or other national military emergen
ces, such as the 21st century “war against terror” by the U.S. and
its allies, but especially the threat that abuses by insufficiently
accountable secret services can have for the liberty of citizens
in democratic states. The potency of this threat and the alacrity with which governments may be tempted to jeopardize the
liberty of individuals, either for reasons of political self-interest
or supposedly in the national interest, have been exposed many
times throughout the war-ravaged 20th century and now into
the 21st century. An enhanced understanding of accounting for
secret services would also complement the work by researchers
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such as Chwastiak [1999, 2001, 2006] and Gallhofer and Haslam
[1991], who have exposed the importance of accounting in justifying war, providing opportunities for the military industrial
complexes in states such as the U.S. and Britain to gain extravagant financial benefits from war and in excusing the excesses of
war.
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FINANCIAL REPORTING IN 1920:
THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
Abstract: This study uses the 1920 Moody’s Analysis of Industrial
Investments to assess the extent of financial reporting by U.S. industrial companies. The reporting of an income statement and a balance
sheet, as well as the amount of disclosure in both of these statements,
is examined empirically to determine which economic factors influence this reporting. The results show that corporate-governance, operating, and financing factors all significantly influence the reporting
of financial statements and the extent of disclosure within those statements. However, the significant factors vary across the two financial
statements and the two decisions considered (reporting a particular
statement and the amount of disclosure within the statement to report). All factors are shown to influence significantly the decision to
report both a balance sheet and an income statement and the amount
of information to report in a balance sheet. The decision regarding
the amount of information to report in an income statement is only
influenced by corporate-governance and operating factors.

INTRODUCTION
Prior to the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and accounting standard-setting bodies, financial
reporting for U.S. industrial companies was not regulated at
the federal level. Companies were free to choose their own reporting policies. Financial reporting focused primarily on the
balance sheet [Kittredge, 1901; Sprague, 1901; Gilman, 1939;
Skinner, 1987; Kendig, 1993]. However, a number of companies
did report income statements although few details of income
components were included [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; Baldwin
et al., 1992]. This study will examine empirically the factors
Acknowledgments: We thank the editor and reviewers for their helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Business History Conference and the International Academy of Business and Public Administration
Disciplines Conference. We benefited from helpful comments by participants. Any
errors remain our own.
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that influenced these companies to disclose financial statements
voluntarily and the amount of disclosure contained within those
statements.
Coombs and Edwards [1995] developed a model for disclosure as a function of the market for disclosure and regulation.
This market included investor demand for information for decision making and firms supplying disclosure to attract capital.
The role of regulation in this model is to ensure that the supply
of disclosure does not fall short of demand. The authors note
that regulation has taken on an increasing role during the 20th
century. This model, then, recognizes the need for regulation to
ensure adequate disclosure.
Bartlett and Jones [1997] examine motivations for voluntary
disclosure in an environment where securities regulation exists.
The paper concludes that the amount of voluntary disclosure is
primarily attributable to the philosophy of the chairman of the
Board of Directors (BD) and the chief financial officer (CFO).
They found the main reasons to provide voluntary disclosure
were to meet social pressure, to demonstrate responses to social
pressure to prevent regulation, and to manage the corporate image. These same motivations for voluntary disclosure may also
exist in an era prior to securities regulation.
Merino and Neimark [1982] report that, in the late 19th
century, U.S. businesses promised more voluntary disclosure to
reduce the lack of competition and centralization of economic
power when faced with political threats. This increase in voluntary disclosure was not adequate, and federal legislation was
proposed annually from 1903-1914 and occasionally from 19191930. The increase in voluntary disclosure that did occur was a
response to social pressure to prevent regulation.
Prior to 1897, most industrial securities were traded
through the use of trust certificates.1 After 1897, stock in individual companies was marketed but issued through promoters
who gave shareholders confidence in the quality of the investment. (The promoters often were selling watered securities of
little value, but the public was unaware and had faith in the
promoters.) By 1902, shares of industrials were regularly traded
on exchanges [Navin and Sears, 1955] which required investors
1
Trust certificates represented ownership in a trust. The trust itself owned the
corporations. These trusts were put together by financiers who chose the companies to include in the trust, making ownership in a trust seem less risky than
buying individual stock. Ownership in a trust certificate then would be similar to
buying shares today in Berkshire Hathaway because of Warren Buffett’s proven
expertise in picking investments.
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to perform their own analyses of companies or to rely on rating
agencies for investment advice.
Therefore, during the early 20th century, the demand for
public financial information came from investors. This market
required a plentiful supply of securities, expert advice from
investment intermediaries, and useful financial information
[Bryer, 1993]. The first two of these requirements existed by
1920. However, the existence of useful financial information was
a debated issue.
Michael [1996] reports investor dissatisfaction with disclosure in the U.S. as early as 1900. Kohler [1926] expresses dissatisfaction with published financial information for analysis.
This paper indicates that less than 20% of balance sheets could
be considered useful for analysis. Senatra and Frishkoff [1984]
echo the same concerns. While using reports from 1925, they
could not perform adequate financial-statement analysis given
incomplete income-statement information. Couchman [1928]
criticizes the balance sheet only reporting model of the day for
not showing users where an organization is going. This paper
concludes that a statement that shows the results of operations
is necessary to assess the investment potential of a company.
Edwards [1989a] notes that the criticisms of accounting in
the U.K. in 1920-1930 were excessive summarization, failure to
prepare consolidated statements, failure to publish a profit-andloss account, and excessive use of secret reserves. Many of these
same deficiencies existed in U.S. reporting as the British model
was closely followed. The first three of these criticisms relate to
financial-statement disclosure.
These papers indicate that there was social pressure during
the years around 1920 to promote voluntary disclosure by companies. Merino and Neimark [1982] also note the existence of
threatened regulatory action. Further, Hawkins [1963] indicates
that between 1920 and 1927, the Investment Bankers Association of America sought, through voluntary actions, to standardize the information regarding industrial securities presented to
the public and called for both a balance sheet and an income
statement, again providing evidence that companies of the day
were considering these social pressures in their disclosure decisions.
Taken together, this literature shows that the 1920 era
was a time when social pressure for increased disclosure and
threatened legislative or regulatory action were present in both
the U.S. and the U.K. This situation created an environment
in which both the models proposed by Coombs and Edwards
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[1995] and Bartlett and Jones [1997] would suggest that companies would logically react by increasing voluntary disclosure.
Yet, the empirical reality is that many companies continued to
provide minimal financial-statement disclosure. Other com
panies did seem to respond to the calls for increased disclosure
and put out considerable amounts of information. As a result,
the supply of financial information was very company specific
and primarily relates to the philosophy of the BD chairman and
the CFO as posited by Bartlett and Jones [1997]. Merino et al.
[1994] provide some era-specific evidence by discussing the differences in reporting style and the use of audits by companies
controlled by J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. Perhaps other
economic factors in the operating environment of the company
may have influenced the decision of these policy makers within
the company to choose a particular level of disclosure.
What motivated a company to issue financial statements
during this era of voluntary disclosure? By becoming aware of
the economic factors in the operating environment of firms that
voluntarily disclosed financial information, the development of
financial reporting in the U.S., as well as the need for and effect
of accounting regulation, can be increasingly understood.
Barton and Waymire [2004] assert that the quality of financial reporting is a function of information costs in securities
markets, contracting and control conflicts among stakeholders,
competitive and political costs, and available alternative information. For firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in 1929, the results indicate that the quality of financial
disclosure increased if the firm operated in a technology-based
industry, had recently issued common equity, or was highly
levered. The quality of financial disclosure decreased with the
age of the firm, if the firm issued dividends, or if the firm was
regulated. The study concludes that the quality of financial disclosure increases with economic incentives to provide information to investors.
Archambault and Archambault [2005] find that regulated utilities typically reported income statements in the 1915
Moody’s Analyses of Investments (Moody’s). They also report that
industrial companies that are listed on a stock exchange were
more likely to issue both income statements and balance sheets
than were unlisted companies. The conclusion of that study was
that regulation, either externally imposed as in the case of railroads and utilities or self-imposed as in the case of listed companies, increased disclosure. That study focused on the regulatory
component of Coombs and Edwards’ [1995] disclosure model.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9

64

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting

57

The current study uses a similar approach and data set as
Archambault and Archambault [2005], but examines a different
issue. The focus of the current paper is on the motivations for
companies to disclose information voluntarily. Industrial companies are chosen as the sample because the companies did not
have any external regulatory pressure for disclosure. Therefore,
this study seeks to develop a more complete understanding of the
motivation to report financial information for industrial firms,
focusing on the supply of disclosure component in the Coombs
and Edwards disclosure model. To examine this issue, the paper
will concentrate on various economic factors faced by companies
in their operating environment to determine if these factors help
explain the variation in disclosure during this time period.
This study utilizes a sample of 200 industrial firms randomly selected from the 1920 Moody’s. This sample represents
an earlier stage of financial reporting in the U.S. than that
studied by Barton and Waymire [2004]. In addition, this study
includes listed and unlisted firms, which is a broader, more generalized sample than firms listed on the NYSE only. The current
paper focuses on incentives to disclose a balance sheet and/or
an income statement. Barton and Waymire [2004] concentrated
primarily on overall financial-reporting quality but did report
weak results in explaining balance-sheet transparency. Thus, this
study extends our knowledge of influences on financial reporting
in the early 20th century by extending the time period back and
by broadening the types of firms examined.
The factors considered in this investigation are corporategovernance, operating, and financing factors. Both the decision
to report a statement, either the income statement or the balance sheet, and the extent of disclosures within the statements
will be examined.
Developing a better understanding of what disclosure occurred and the influential economic factors leading companies
to choose more extensive disclosure will help us understand
the historical development of accounting and the role regulation plays in ensuring full disclosure. The efficient operation of
capital markets relies on sufficient disclosure to prevent financial manipulation, to provide investors with enough financial
information to make resource-allocation decisions, and to allow
equal access to important information [Benston, 1973]. The results indicate that there were a number of important factors that
influenced disclosure. However, the results also indicate that
some companies did not experience the economic circumstances
that promote voluntary statement disclosures.
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Income-statement reporting is shown to be positively associated with corporate-governance, operating, and financing
factors. Companies that seek broader ownership by having
shares traded on an organized exchange, companies that have
increased complexity in terms of international operations and
larger size, and those that met capital needs by issuing debt or
equity securities in the past three years or have their equity securities rated by Moody’s are more likely to issue an income statement. Companies with an insider-focused, corporate-governance
structure as measured by the portion of the BD that are officers
are less likely to issue an income statement. Companies with
high debt-to-asset ratios were also found to be less likely to issue
income statements.
Balance sheets are more likely to be issued by companies
seeking broader ownership by trading common shares on an organized exchange, having complex operations with international
activity, and issuing additional capital (both debt and equity)
within the last three years. Financing factors were also shown
to reduce the likelihood of issuing a balance sheet. Companies
with rated bonds were negatively associated with balance-sheet
issuance.
The amount of disclosure was shown to be positively related to having traded shares and operating factors of increased
complexity and size. Total disclosure was negatively influenced
by insider-focused corporate governance. The extent of balancesheet disclosure showed similar results. Additional positive
influences for balance-sheet disclosure are having bond and equity ratings and having higher return on assets. The amount of
income-statement disclosure was associated positively only with
the complexity of operations and negatively with the lack of an
independent BD and company age.
By finding a number of economic factors associated with
voluntary statement reporting, the paper provides a link to the
supply of voluntary financial-statement information beyond
corporate-governance philosophy as documented in Bartlett and
Jones [1997]. However, the paper also finds that, consistent with
the Coombs and Edwards’ [1995] model of disclosure and regulation, not all firms possess the economic circumstances that are
associated with increased voluntary financial reporting.
The next section of the paper discusses the literature and
develops hypotheses concerning the relationship between various firm characteristics and disclosure levels. This is followed
by a section that will discuss the data and methodology used to
determine which economic factors are significantly associated
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with disclosure levels. The results of those tests are then analyzed. The last section provides a summary and conclusion.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Separation of ownership and management is thought to create a need for financial disclosure [Berle and Means, 1968]. Financial reporting did not exist before corporations and financial
markets [Parker, 1986]. Therefore, growth in the corporate form
of business created a demand for financial-statement disclosure.
A market in industrial corporations formed by 1902 [Navin and
Sears, 1955]. Hawkins [1963] reports that the sources of change
in financial-statement reporting were the public responsibility
of managers, the criticism of financial reporting, government
regulation, and development of generally accepted accounting
principles. These sources are all related to the business environment. As noted earlier, these social pressures can give rise to
an increased demand for financial-statement disclosure. However, companies determine the supply within the constraints
of government regulation. A number of economic factors in
the operating environment of a company may influence the
corporate-governance team of a company regarding the amount
of financial information it decides to supply. Table 1 presents the
factors that will be considered in this study and their expected
effect on the financial statements.
TABLE 1
Hypothesized Factors Influencing Financial Disclosure
Hypothesis

Construct

Balance Sheet
Effect

Income Statement
Effect

+

+

+

+

+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+

Corporate-Governance Factors:
H1

Listing Status

H2
Board Control
H3
State of Incorporation
Operating Factors:
H4
Complexity
H5
Longevity
H6
Profitability
H7
Size
Financing Factors:
H8
Securities Rating
H9
Securities Issuance
H10
Leverage
H11
Dividends
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Corporate-Governance Factors: When a new firm comes into
being, choices exist regarding its form of organization. Since
all of the companies in this study are corporations, a demand
is created for financial information. The amount of disclosure
demanded by an owner increases as the owner becomes further
removed from the operations of the corporation. This dispersion
of ownership is another choice a company faces. A company
that remains closely held by a few dominant shareholders could
supply fewer disclosures than a widely held corporation with
thousands of shareholders. One of the easiest ways to achieve
dispersed ownership is to list the company’s shares on an organized exchange. This listing comes with a set of requirements
that must be met to receive the privilege of listing. These requirements exist, in part, to provide investors with the information
they need to make informed investment decisions. Thus, a corporation, in choosing to list on an exchange, is voluntarily choosing to supply more financial disclosure. The increased disclosure
may be required by the exchange or may be volunteered by the
corporation to attract investors. This study will use the listing
status of a company to proxy for the economic circumstance of
increased ownership dispersion. As an example of the imposed
disclosure requirements of organized exchanges, the NYSE required in 1900 newly listed companies to issue an annual report
disclosing a balance sheet and income statement, to hold an annual meeting, and to distribute proxy statements [Gross, 2002].
The literature also supports the relationship between increased
disclosure and listing status. Archambault and Archambault
[2005] report that pre-regulation firms listed on stock exchanges
were more likely to disclose an income statement and a balance
sheet. Singhvi and Desai [1971] found increased disclosure for
firms trading on public exchanges relative to those traded overthe-counter. Therefore, firms that desire increased ownership
dispersion by listing shares on an organized exchange are expected to have more financial-statement disclosure.
H1: Firms that trade on an organized exchange are
more likely to issue financial statements and will provide more disclosure within those statements.
Another economic factor that may influence disclosure
choices is the composition of the BD. The BD is the shareholders’ representative and is to make decisions about the company’s
operations. Because the composition and philosophy of the BD
varies widely among companies, its composition will be used as
a variable to test one aspect of governance.
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Management-controlled firms may be in a better position to
limit disclosure costs by practicing the “British Secretive Model”
with minimal disclosure and a balance-sheet focus [Michael,
1996]. Bryer [1993] notes that in the early 20th century, the BD
in British companies regularly limited public disclosure but provided auditors and shareholders with internal information beyond the published financial statements. Guy and Leung [2004]
report that firms with a CEO also serving as the BD chairperson
have less voluntary disclosure. Disclosure decreases with increased managerial ownership [Eng and Mak, 2003]. This probably also occurs because managers have access to additional
information and owner-managers have an incentive to keep that
information private so that they can be the ones to earn higher
returns on that insider knowledge. Firms with a more independent BD membership have smaller abnormal accruals [Klein,
2002]. Firms with outside BD members are more likely to issue
earnings forecasts [Ajinka et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas,
2005].
The literature, then, indicates that including more outsiders
on the BD increases the amount of external disclosure. This can
result from a reduced management incentive to act on insider
information and a stronger external-shareholder focus resulting from more independent BD members. These findings are all
consistent with the expectation that, as the number of officers
on the BD increases, the reporting of income statements and
balance sheets should decrease.
H2: Firms with a higher proportion of officers on the
BD are less likely to issue financial statements and will
provide less disclosure within those statements.
Another factor influencing the governance of the corporation is the set of laws that govern its existence. A corporation is
a citizen of the state in which it seeks incorporation. This state
is chosen by the BD. Most companies incorporate in the state
where it is headquartered, but some choose another state when
the BD seeks a set of laws (governance restrictions) that better
suit the corporation’s needs.
New Jersey enacted corporation laws during the late 1800s
that attracted a large number of firms from other states [Stoke,
1930]. Delaware and several other states enacted similar laws
in the early 1900s before World War I [Grandy, 1989]. States
competed against each other by offering lower tax rates and
more liberal laws. Dodd and Leftwich [1980] compare two explanations for firms changing their state of incorporation – the
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stockholder-exploitation hypothesis asserts that firms change
in order to extract wealth from the stockholders, and the costavoidance hypothesis stresses that the change enables the firm
to minimize the cost of production, investment, and financing
activities. This paper reports positive abnormal returns before
and around the announcement of the change in venue of incorporation and concludes that the results do not support the
stockholder-exploitation hypothesis. Jagannathan and Pritchard
[2008] find that Delaware corporations have higher-quality directors and CEOs. Barton and Waymire [2004] predict that firms
incorporated in Delaware will provide higher-quality financial
reporting due to a more intensive monitoring by shareholders.
However, they find an insignificant effect on reporting. Since
Delaware and New Jersey were leaders in enacting laws with
the purpose of attracting incorporations, this study will test corporate governance by grouping companies incorporated there
separately from those incorporating in other states.
H3: Firms that choose to incorporate in Delaware and
New Jersey are more likely to issue financial statements
and will provide more disclosure within those statements.
Operating Factors: While all companies in the sample are industrial companies, other operating factors besides industry could
create economic circumstances that would lead to differences
in the financial-statement disclosures a particular company will
make. The operating factors considered in this study are complexity of operations (firms with subsidiaries and international
operations), longevity of the entity (the number of years the
company has existed), profitability of operations (return on assets), and size of the entity (total assets).
The more diverse and complex an entity’s operations become, the more information users need to evaluate those operations. One way to measure complexity is by the number of
subsidiaries. Also, as a company expands operations to global
markets, operations become more complex. Zarzeski [1996]
finds that disclosure needs increase with the number of subsidiaries and with foreign operations. To attract more resources
and inform investors, more disclosure is needed as the complexity of operations increases.
H4: Firms that have more complex operations are more
likely to issue financial statements and will provide
more disclosure within those statements.
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The longevity of the firm may also influence disclosure
policy. As a firm ages, it proves the viability of its business
model, operating capabilities, and management expertise. A
newer firm needs to disclose more information about these
issues to the financial markets to establish its viability as a
going concern. Chen et al. [2002] note that younger firms are
more likely to disclose balance sheets voluntarily along with
quarterly earnings announcements. Wasley and Wu [2006]
report that young firms voluntarily disclose good news in
cash-flow forecasts to signal economic viability. Barton and
Waymire [2004] also report a negative relation between age
and financial-reporting quality. These results suggest that
young firms are expected to be more likely to disclose balance
sheets and income statements to help users better assess the
firm’s viability.
H5: Firms that have been in existence longer are less
likely to issue financial statements and will provide less
disclosure within those statements.
Financial statements are the means for a company to
disclose its results of operations and financial position. The
amount of that information may vary based on the economic
performance of the entity in a given period. More profitable
firms may be more willing to disclose income-statement information [Singhvi and Desai, 1971]. Patton and Zelenka [1997]
and Raffournier [1995] also find a positive relation between
profitability and disclosure. However, Alsaeed [2005] finds no
association between profitability and disclosure. Profitable
firms have more good information to disclose so may have more
information within their financial statements. However, this
increased disclosure may be limited to the income statement
which focuses on profitability. This study will use return on assets as the measure of profitability.
H6: Firms that have higher return on assets are more
likely to provide more disclosure within the income
statement.
Larger firms have been shown in the literature to disclose
more information [Hawkins, 1963; Singhvi and Desai, 1971;
Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Ahmed
and Courtis, 1999]. Stanga [1976] lists possible economic motivations for larger firms disclosing more information: greater
public attention, more existing and potential stockholders, less
competitive pressure, and greater ability to afford increased
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disclosure. Thus, larger firms are expected to have more
financial-statement disclosure.
H7: Firms that are larger (as measured by assets) are
more likely to issue financial statements and will provide more disclosure within those statements.
Financing Factors: As a company grows, it needs additional capital to fund growth. U.S. output of finished goods from 1909-1918
was $56.4 billion while corresponding output from 1919-1928
was $83.4 billion [Bean, 1945]. Rajan and Zingales [2003] document similar growth in the stock market during this time period.
Thus, the time period under study was one of considerable economic growth. Companies could finance this growth either with
internal or external sources. Since most firms paid out most of
their earnings as dividends prior to 1920 [Previts and Merino,
1979], the companies in this study were probably seeking significant sources of external financing. Companies could choose to
issue either debt or equity to satisfy these needs. The financing
factors associated with capital-structure choice are measured by
the existence of a rating for debt or equity securities, the issuance of debt and equity securities, the debt-to-assets ratio, and
the dividend-payout ratio.
Morrison [1935] states that public information about companies should be directed at investors so that they can make
buy, sell, and hold decisions. To aid investors in these decisions,
Moody’s provided ratings for debt and equity securities based on
public information. To receive a debt rating, 1915 Moody’s required that the client firm disclose an income statement. While
an income statement was not required to receive a stock rating,
one of the components considered in the rating did require an
income statement. Therefore, a more informed stock rating
would result from the issuance of an income statement. These
ratings could be used by investors to help them make investment
decisions. Obtaining stock and bond ratings could be considered
a type of social pressure. As noted in Bartlett and Jones [1997],
meeting social pressure is a motivator for increased disclosure.
Additionally from the issuers’ perspective, having a rating for
the company’s stock or debt could then be associated with a
decreased cost of capital and an easier placement of new issues
if the rating attracted more interest. Since a lower cost of capital
and easier placement would be a desire of most companies, additional disclosure to acquire that rating would be an artifact of
obtaining that rating. Thus, firms with rated debt and equity are
expected to be more likely to disclose financial statements.
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H8: Firms that have ratings associated with existing
stock and bond issues are more likely to issue financial
statements and will provide more disclosure within
those financial statements.
The desire for a rating associated with debt or equity to attract investors at the lowest possible cost of capital is primarily
a concern of a firm when stock or bonds are issued. It is this issuance of new stock, either common or preferred, or bonds that
would allow a company to obtain additional capital to meet its
expansion needs. After issuance, ratings help keep the market
for these securities, but the rating is only directly beneficial for
attracting additional capital for firms when they issue new securities. Morrison [1935] discusses the importance of providing
adequate information to attract new investors. Most companies
did not provide adequate information in the time period under
study. However, issuing new securities would create an incentive
for the firm to provide more financial disclosure to attract investors. Barton and Waymire [2004] report that firms that have
recently issued equity disclose higher-quality financial information. Therefore, firms that have recently issued debt or equity
are expected to be more likely to disclose financial statements.
H9: Firms that have issued debt or equity securities
within the past three years are more likely to issue financial statements and will provide more disclosure
within those statements.
The type of external financing used by a company may influence the amount of disclosure. Debt financing is associated
with greater risk. One way to measure the relative use of debt
to finance a company’s resources is the debt-to-assets ratio.
Financial leverage tends to increase disclosure [Wallace et al.,
1994; Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Barton and
Waymire, 2004]. This follows from the need of the firm to show
that it can service this debt level. Thus, firms with a higher debtto-assets ratio are expected to be more likely to issue an income
statement and a balance sheet.
H10: Firms that have a higher debt-to-assets ratio are
more likely to issue financial statements and will provide more disclosure within those statements.
The net income of a company can either be paid as dividends or retained. Companies with a lower dividend-payout ratio are relying more heavily on internal financing. The literature
provides some documented relationships between dividends
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and disclosure. Dividends may act as an alternative source of
information about the amount and timing of future cash flows
[Miller and Rock, 1985]. Firms that pay dividends may disclose
less financial information [Barton and Waymire, 2004]. However, Archambault and Archambault [2003] report that dividendpaying firms are associated with greater disclosure to allow
investors to evaluate the ability of the firm to continue dividends
[Einhorn, 2005]. The literature is mixed concerning the relationship between dividends and disclosure.
Edwards [1989b] notes that, at the turn of the 20th century
in the U.K., performance of a firm was judged mainly in terms
of the amount of dividends paid. This view of dividends would
seem to be more consistent with Einhorn [2005] than Miller and
Rock [1985].
Tax laws in effect during and immediately after World War I
may also have affected disclosure. Corporate income taxes were
a function of return on invested capital [Kohler, 1925]. Balance
sheets may have been more conservative as a result [Montgomery, 1919]. Companies had incentives to write-off assets or recognize liabilities in order to reduce taxable income. These actions
may increase or decrease the amount of disclosure in financial
statements.
However, dividends reduce invested capital and, consequently, increased taxable income. Firms that paid dividends
may have had an incentive to disclose more information in order to justify the dividends. Therefore, in this paper, the positive
relationship between dividends and disclosure will be used as
the basis for hypothesis development.
H11: Firms that have a higher dividend-to-net income
ratio are more likely to issue financial statements and
will provide more disclosure within those statements.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To examine which economic factors influence a firm’s voluntary disclosure of financial-statement information, those made
in 1920 were chosen, relating to the 1919 fiscal year financial
statements. This year was selected because it predated the SEC
but was late enough into the 20th century that individual industrial firms had achieved economic significance and served as an
investment alternative for those seeking returns [Baskin, 1988].
The disclosures were obtained from a random sample of
200 industrial firms incorporated in the U.S. that were not wholly owned subsidiaries from the 6,882 companies comprising
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Moody’s 1920 edition. The sample was limited to industrial firms
because other types of companies, such as utilities, railroads,
banks, etc., were generally subject to some form of regulation
that required certain disclosures.2 The focus of the paper is on
U.S. companies to keep the economic and cultural environment
consistent throughout the sample. A number of ownershiprelated variables were considered as explanations for voluntary
disclosure. Therefore, publicly traded companies needed to be
used because the information disclosures of wholly owned subsidiaries could be much different because of the lack of outside
shareholders.
The pages in Moody’s covering each selected company were
examined to determine whether an income statement and balance sheet were provided. To calculate the amount of detail provided in the financial statements, the number of line items in the
financials was collected. In counting line items, totals and subtotals were not considered if previously disclosed items were used
to generate them. However, if a statement started with a subtotal, like net earnings, then the total or subtotal was counted as
an item since it then represented a distinct disclosure.
Other data items collected from Moody’s included: total
debt; total assets; dividends; net income; equity issues, either
common or preferred, in the past three years; bond issues in the
past three years; bond and stock ratings; the exchange on which
common stock is listed; the dates of company origination and
incorporation; incorporation and headquarters state; existence
of subsidiaries and/or international operations; number of BD
members; and the number of officers serving on the BD. Net income was seldom labeled as such. Any subtotal listed on the income statement before dividends were deducted was considered
net income. The financial-statement disclosure items are used to
compute the debt-to-assets ratio, the dividend-payout ratio, and
the return-on-assets ratio. Firm size is measured by total assets.
The variable used in the study for the age of the company is the
older of the age of origination or incorporation. The percentage
of officers on the BD is used to measure the Board’s independence.
For the multiple regressions, a company missing any of the
data items collected could not be used in the multi-variate analysis. Because of missing data, the sample was reduced to 191
companies when the regression did not require data from either
2
See Archambault and Archambault [2005] for a discussion of the types of
regulatory disclosures required of railroads and utilities.
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financial statement, 142 companies when a balance sheet but
not an income statement was required, 100 companies when an
income statement was required but not a balance sheet, and 86
companies when both balance-sheet and income-statement data
were required for the regression equation. Least-squares regression was used to examine what factors influence total statement
disclosure and its extent in each statement. The dependent variable was the number of line items reported. The more line items
a company reported, the more detail provided by its statements.
Enhanced detail represents broader information provided by
companies to statement users.
For examining the existence of the statements, a logit model
is used. The dependent variable is dichotomous, coded as one if
the balance sheet or income statement was reported by Moody’s.
Five sets of regressions resulted in the form as follows:
DISCLOSURE = a +b1EX + b2BO + b3DLNJ + b4SUB + b5INT +
b6AGE + b7ROA +
b8TA + b9BR + b10CR + b11BI + b12EI + b13DA + b14DPO + e
where:
DISCLOSURE one of the five measures of disclosure (incomestatement existence, balance-sheet existence,
number of line items in the income statement,
number of line items in the balance sheet, total
number of line items in the income statement
and balance sheet taken together)
EX

dichotomous variable where 1 = traded on any
organized exchange3

BO

number of officers on the BD divided by number
of members on the BD

3
The tests were also run using the NYSE listing coded as one and all other
companies coded as zero. The significance of the exchange variable was the same
for all models tested whether it was coded as any exchange or only NYSE. The
any exchange measure was chosen for reporting in the study for two reasons.
First, some exchanges other than the NYSE may have had statement disclosure
requirements for listing and would therefore have the same effect on voluntary vs.
involuntary disclosure as the NYSE listing. Second, using any exchange as the independent variable resulted in higher adjusted R2 and F-statistics, indicating better statistical fit than only the NYSE. The other exchanges included are New York
Curb, Boston, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Providence, Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, San
Francisco, Philadelphia, Louisville, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Toronto, Montreal,
London, and Amsterdam.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9

76

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting

69

DLNJ

dichotomous variable where 1 = incorporated in
Delaware or New Jersey

SUB

dichotomous variable where 1 = company has a
subsidiary

INT

dichotomous variable where 1 = company has
international operations

AGE

number of years that the company has been in
existence (using either the date of incorporation
or date of origin, whichever is longer ago)

ROA

net income divided by total assets

TA

total assets4

BR

dichotomous variable where 1 = company has
rated bonds

CR

dichotomous variable where 1 = company has a
rated common stock

BI

dichotomous variable where 1 = company issued bonds within the past three years

EI

dichotomous variable where 1 = company issued equity within the past three years

DA

total debt divided by total assets

DPO

total dividends divided by net income.

A second multi-variate model was also estimated which
left out the variables that required statement information (TA,
DA, DPO, ROA). This was done to allow a multi-variate regression without requiring the existence of the financial statements.
This is especially important for the income-statement and
balance-sheet existence models because with the statement being required, the companies without a statement would not be
included in the model estimation. Since this model is trying to
explain why an income statement or a balance sheet may have
been disclosed, the dependent variable needs to include some
observations where the statement did not exist. The full model
allows a test of the importance of the financial-statement vari4
Total assets are used in the study rather than the more commonly used log
of total assets because using log of total assets caused the goodness-of-fit test to
fail for some of the regressions. Because of the model-fit issue, total assets in millions are reported.
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ables considered. Therefore, two multi-variate models are used.
Pearson correlations between the independent and dependent variables are also reported to examine whether a significant
relationship exists between the independent variables and the
dependent variable without considering the other independent
variables.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The N
column indicates how many of the 200 companies in the sample
had data for each variable. This table indicates that 56% of the
sample provided an income statement and 74% provided a balance sheet. The considerably lower percentage of companies
providing an income statement relative to a balance sheet is consistent with Skinner [1987] and Buckmaster and Jones [1997].
The existence of 26% of the sample that did not report a balance
sheet is inconsistent with the literature that concludes that
almost all U.S. firms published a balance sheet [Brief, 1987].
The average income statement consisted of just three line items.
Balance sheets provided considerably more disclosure with an
average of just over 14 items. This is consistent with findings in
the literature that few details about income components were
reported in the early 20th century [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984;
Baldwin et al., 1996]. The items in the income statement were
also more likely to be summary numbers such as gross profit
with no detail of the components of the subtotal. Only 31% of
the companies reporting an income statement disclosed gross
revenues.
Only 30% of the sample companies traded stock on an
organized exchange. Officers represented 45% of the BD members on average. Delaware and New Jersey were successful in
their efforts to attract incorporations with 26% of the sample
incorporating in those two states. The majority of companies
had a subsidiary (59%). International operations existed for
39% of the sample firms. The median age of a company in the
sample was 16 years. Thus, new companies do not dominate the
sample. Return on assets averaged 8%. The size of companies in
the sample varies considerably as seen by the standard deviation
of total assets. A bond rating exists for only 37% of the sample,
and only 18% issued debt in the three prior years. Equity issues
were more common with 26% of the sample issuing some form
of equity in the prior three years with 95% having a commonstock rating. The sample firms were not highly levered with a
debt-to-asset ratio of 0.19 on average. The dividend-payout ratio
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was high with 51% of profits being paid as dividends on average.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Income Statement

200

0.56

1.00

0.50

Balance Sheet

200

0.74

1.00

0.44
1.80

Income Statement Items

112

3.37

3.00

Balance Sheet Items

148

14.16

14.00

4.62

Traded on Exchange

200

0.30

0.00

0.46

Percentage of Board that are Officers

191

0.45

0.43

0.20

Incorporated in Delaware or New
Jersey

200

0.26

0.00

0.44

Subsidiaries

200

0.59

1.00

0.49

International Operations

200

0.39

0.00

0.49
18.47

Age

200

20.17

16.00

Return on Assets

96

0.08

0.07

0.06

Total Assets (in millions)

148

43.25

10.00

199.69
0.48

Bond Rating

200

0.37

0.00

Common Rating

200

0.95

1.00

0.22

Bond Issues

200

0.18

0.00

0.39

Equity Issues

200

0.26

0.00

0.44

Debt-to-Assets Ratio

148

0.19

0.15

0.15

Dividend-Payout Ratio

104

0.51

0.43

2.32

The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. The variables are defined as
Income Statement = 1 if the firm issued an income statement and 0 otherwise.
Balance sheet = 1 if the firm issued a balance sheet and zero otherwise. Income
Statement Items = the number of non-total line items listed in the income
statement. Balance Sheet Items = the number of non-total line items listed in the
balance sheet. Traded on Exchange = 1 if the company trades on any organized
exchange (see footnote 3 for a list of exchanges) and zero otherwise. Percentage
of Board that are Officers = number of officers on the Board of Directors dividend
by number of members of the Board of Directors. Incorporated in Delaware or
New Jersey = 1 if the company is incorporated in either Delaware or New Jersey
and zero if it is incorporated in any other state. Subsidiaries = 1 if the company
has subsidiaries and zero otherwise. International Operations = 1 if the company
has international operations and zero otherwise. Age = number of years that the
company has been in existence (using either the date of incorporation or date
of origin, whichever is longer ago). Return on Assets = net income dividend by
total assets. Total Assets (in millions) = total assets dividend by 1,000,000. Bond
Rating = 1 if the company has a bond rating listed in Moody’s and zero otherwise.
Common Rating = 1 if the company has a common stock rating listed in Moody’s
and zero otherwise. Bond Issues = 1 if the company issued bonds within the past
three years and zero otherwise. Equity Issues = 1 if the company issued any form
of equity within the past three years and zero otherwise. Debt-to-Assets Ratio
= total debt dividend by total assets. Dividend-Payout Ratio = total dividends
divided by net income.
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Total Disclosure: To examine which environmental factors are
related to total voluntary financial-statement disclosure, the
sum of the number of the income-statement and balance-sheet
line items was used as the dependent variable. The results of
this total disclosure test are shown in Table 3. The correlations
TABLE 3
Total Statement Disclosure
Least-Squares Regression
Part 1
Correlation

Part 3
Multi-variate

Coefficient

t-Stat

Coefficient

t-Stat

14.48

4.74***

13.92

4.70***

0.37***

2.58

2.63***

2.54

-0.16

-5.47

-2.14***

-6.03

-2.22**

Incorporated in
Delaware or New
Jersey

0.23**

-0.15

-0.14

-0.76

-0.70

Subsidiaries

0.47***

3.64

3.50***

3.81

3.55***

International
Operations

0.22**

0.40

0.40

-0.23

-0.22

Age of Company

-0.12

-0.03

-0.92

-0.04

-1.11

Return on Assets

-0.16

10.37

1.28

Total Assets (in
millions)

0.41***

0.01

3.59***

Bond Rating

0.64

Variable

Coefficient

Part 2
Multi-variate

Constant
Traded on
Exchange
Percentage of Board
that are Officers

2.47***

0.21**

1.48

1.14

0.88

Common Rating

0.12

3.06

1.08

2.65

1.00

Bond Issues

0.16*

0.88

0.59

-1.60

-0.95

Equity Issues

0.12

1.23

1.17

1.60

1.47

Debt-to-Assets
Ratio

0.20**

4.96

1.03

0.05

0.19

0.69

Dividend-Payout
Ratio
Adjusted R2

29.8%

F-statistic (p-Value)

5.21

N

100

42.2%
0.000

5.44

0.000

86

The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correlations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All
variables are defined in Table 2.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels
with results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was
predicted.
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between the dependent and independent variables are shown in
part 1 of Table 3. Significant positive correlations exist for trading on an exchange, incorporating in Delaware or New Jersey,
having subsidiaries and international operations, being larger,
having rated bonds, issuing bonds, and being more highly levered. No significant negative correlations exist.
To examine the factors that explain total disclosure when
all factors are considered together, multi-variate regressions
were estimated. The results are shown in Parts 2 and 3 of Table
3. Part 2 is the regression without financial-statement variables
and Part 3 shows the results for the complete model. The model
in Part 2, which required the existence of either an income statement or a balance sheet, has an adjusted R2 of 29.8%, indicating
reasonable explanatory power of the variables considered but
also implying other significant factors as well. The explanatory power increases considerably in the Part 3 regression (R2 of
42.2%) as more variables are added. The results for both models
are consistent. Requiring the existence of both an income statement and a balance sheet in the Part 3 model does not significantly change the results, adding only total assets as a significant
variable but not changing the significance of any other variable.
When all variables are considered together, trading on any
organized exchange, having a subsidiary, and being larger are all
associated with increased total disclosure. A negative relationship between total disclosure and the percentage of officers on
the BD is documented. These results indicate that a significant
relationship exists between total disclosure and at least one variable within two of the three economic factors considered in this
study – corporate governance and operating. Thus, disclosure is
a function of various influences.
Archambault and Archambault [2005] also document a positive relationship between listing status and a voluntary disclosure of statements. The disclosure of statements was generally
required by the exchanges by 1920. Thus, documenting this support for H1 is not surprising. Operations become more complex
with the existence of subsidiaries and international operations.
This increased complexity seems to create an incentive to report more voluntary disclosures to help users of the statements
understand performance. Some companies did report gross or
net revenues from different operating sources separately which
would increase the amount of disclosure, supporting H4.
Operations become subject to more public and political
scrutiny as companies grow larger [Stanga, 1976; Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986]. The positive relationship between discloPublished by eGrove, 2010
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sure and firm size is consistent with many previously reported
findings [Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996;
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999] and H7.
Corporate governance is also shown to play a role in the
amount of total disclosure. Less independent BDs disclose less.
Bartlett and Jones [1997] note the importance of corporate- governance philosophy and voluntary-statement disclosures. These
results provide support for a relationship between BD membership and statement disclosure as well, consistent with H2.
Some of the variables found to have a significant relationship with disclosure in the correlations do not end up as
significant in the multi-variate models. This result could occur
if variables exhibit multicolinearity. However, standard tests
for multicolinearity, both correlation matrices and varianceinflation factors, indicate that no strong multicolinearity exists
among the independent variables. These differences between
uni-variate and multi-variate results are similar to those in
Singhvi and Desai [1971]. That study looked at total disclosure
for companies in 1965. The uni-variate results showed that disclosure was significantly related to size, number of shareholders,
listing status, CPA firm, profitability, and earnings margin. The
multi-variate results were reduced to only listing status and
earnings margin being significant.
This analysis examines total disclosure; however, one or
more factors may influence a company to report only an income
statement or a balance sheet. Some factors may influence a
company to disclose more balance-sheet information and less
income-statement information at the same time. Looking at
total disclosure then provides an incomplete understanding of
the factors that motivate the issuance of each statement. Some
factors may be important in the reporting of both statements,
but other factors may strongly influence the decision to disclose
one statement and have little effect on the decision to report the
other. The analysis will now examine the two statements separately.
Income-Statement Disclosers: Since only 56% of the sample
reported an income statement, what factors motivated these
companies to make this disclosure? Table 4 shows the results of
the correlation between that dichotomous variable and each independent variable and the regression equations.5 Trading on an
5
Results for dividend payout and return-on-assets are not reported because
these two ratios require the existence of an income statement to be reported.
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exchange, incorporating in Delaware or New Jersey, having subsidiaries and international operations, having a common-stock
rating, and issuing either bonds or equity within the past three
years are all positively associated with the likelihood to disclose
TABLE 4
Income-Statement Existence
Logit Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

Part 2
Multi-variate
Coefficient

t-Stat

Part 3
Multi-variate
Coefficient

t-Stat

-0.96

-0.98

052

0.40

Traded on Exchange

0.38***

2.08

4.51***

1.93

2.96***

Percentage of Board
that are Officers

-0.17**

-1.69

-1.91**

-2.76

-2.19**

Incorporated in
Delaware or New
Jersey

0.14**

-0.03

-0.07

-0.56

-0.93

Subsidiaries

0.17**

-0.19

-0.46

-0.74

-1.30

International
Operations

0.26***

1.30

2.82***

1.18

1.87**

Age of Company

-0.08

-0.01

-0.60

0.01

1.09

Total Assets (in
millions)

0.11

0.06

2.27**

Bond Rating

0.05

-0.36

-0.82

1.43

1.80**

Common Rating

0.12*

1.18

1.37*

2.15

1.87**

Bond Issues

0.17**

1.56

2.67***

-0.30

-0.34

Equity Issues

0.16**

0.56

1.32*

0.39

0.72

Debt-to-Assets

-0.04

-2.72

-1.55#

Log-Likelihood

-101.4

Zero Slopes Test
(p-Value)

59.30

N

191

-60.6
0.000

19.51

0.000

142

The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correlations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using logit. All variables are defined
in Table 2.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was
predicted.
Therefore, the equation could not be estimated since only those companies with
income statements had these variables.
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an income statement. The higher the representation of management on the BD, the less likely the company is to disclose an income statement. These results are very similar to the results for
total disclosure reported in Table 3. Firm size and bond rating
are shown to be significant determinants of total disclosure, but
not for presenting an income statement. Disclosing an income
statement is shown to be a function of having rated common
stock and recently issued debt and equity.
Parts 2 and 3 of Table 4 examine the multi-variate relationship between these factors and the existence of an income statement. Logit regression is used to see which variables are still
significant in explaining the provision of an income statement
when all variables are considered. The model in Part 2 looks
at companies regardless of which financial statements were reported. The Part 3 results relate to companies that had a balance
sheet and may or may not have had an income statement. The
results do vary, indicating that the decision to report an income
statement is influenced by different factors if the decision to
report a balance sheet has already been made. The results also
differ significantly from the results for total disclosure.
The Part 2 results indicate that corporate-governance (trading on an exchange and the percentage of officers on the BD),
operating (international operations), and financing (common
rating and bond and equity issuance) factors all significantly
influence the decision of a company to publish an income statement. The variables that explain the existence of an income
statement when a balance sheet exists (Part 3) differ in that
additional operating (total assets) and financing (bond rating
and debt-to-asset ratio) factors gained significance while the
constructs for issuing debt and equity lost significance.
For a company to achieve broader ownership interest by
listing on an exchange, the company may have been required
to publish an income statement as an exchange requirement. Also,having this statement would allow easier investor
analysis, so having the income statement is consistent with
the desire for broader ownership. This result supports H1.
Corporate governance through BD membership is again significant. A less independent BD results in a lower likelihood
of reporting an income statement. With fewer shareholder
representatives on the BD, the needs of shareholders for
adequate information were not considered, supporting H2.
Having international operations increases the likelihood of
reporting an income statement in both multi-variate regressions.
However, having subsidiaries is not significant. Thus, only the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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complexity factor of international operations motivated companies to issue an income statement. This result is consistent with
H4. Firm size is also a significant influence when it was considered in the model. This positive relationship is consistent with
H7. These results support the importance of operating factors in
the decision to report net income.
Having a bond rating only significantly enhances the likelihood of an income statement when a balance sheet is present.
This variable was significant while issuing bonds was not. In
a multi-variate model, these two variables may be proxies to
some extent for one another, conceivably explaining the change
in significance. Common-stock rating is significant in both
models, while equity issues are only significant in Part 2. The
debt-to-asset ratio is significant in Part 3, showing a negative
relationship. This result is opposite to expectation. However, the
hypothesis did assume that the companies have the ability to
service the debt. If highly levered firms seemed unable to service
their debt, not reporting an income statement would then be one
way to cover up this issue. All financing variables considered are
significant in one or both models. Thus, the need for additional
funds and the make-up of the capital structure seem significant
motivators in issuing income statements. Overall these results
show that a number of factors influence a company’s decision to
report an income statement. When comparing these results to
others in this study, it becomes clear that income statements are
issued more frequently when equity ratings and bond issuance
occur. Income statements are frequently issued when a company
wants investors to buy its stock or bonds or to continue a market in the company’s securities. Firm size is also a significant
factor. Larger companies may have become large through equity
and bond issuance, thereby appreciating the need for continued
disclosure of income to keep shareholders interested in company securities. With only 56% of the sample issuing income
statements, it may be hypothesized some form of regulation was
necessary to encourage wider reporting.
Income-Statement Items: The previous analysis examined
income-statement disclosure. However, traded companies on
most exchanges had to provide an income statement. Therefore,
disclosing an income statement was not totally voluntary for
some of the 30% of the sample that traded on an organized exchange. However, the amount of income-statement information
disclosed was voluntary.
Least-squares regressions and correlations are used to dePublished by eGrove, 2010
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termine which environmental factors help explain the amount
of income-statement disclosure. Part 1 of Table 5 reports the
results for the correlation between income-statement items and
the independent variables. International operations are shown
TABLE 5
Income Statement Disclosure
Least-Squares Regression
Part 1
Correlation

Part 3
Multi-variate

Coefficient

t-Stat

Coefficient

t-Stat

4.73

4.03***

4.57

3.57***

0.12

0.45

1.18

0.22

0.50

Percentage of Board
that are Officers

-0.14*

-1.27

-1.36*

-1.47

-1.25

Incorporated in
Delaware or New
Jersey

-0.02

-0.45

-1.10

-0.19

-0.40

Variable

Coefficient

Part 2
Multi-variate

Constant
Traded on
Exchange

Subsidiaries

0.04

0.33

0.83

-0.31

-0.67

International
Operations

0.19**

0.67

1.76**

0.60

1.33*

-0.03

-2.68***

Age of Company

-0.19*

-0.03

-2.09**

Return on Assets

-0.08

1.82

0.52

Total Assets (in
millions)

0.10

0.00

0.97

Bond Rating

0.08

0.03

0.07

-0.46

-0.78

Common Rating

0.00

-0.46

-0.43

-0.66

-0.58

Bond Issues

0.11

0.41

0.72

-0.07

-0.10

Equity Issues

0.04

0.12

0.78

-0.01

-0.02

Debt-to-Assets
Ratio

0.11

2.24

1.07

Dividend-Payout
Ratio

0.05

0.06

0.52

Adjusted R2

5.9%

F-statistic (p-Value)

1.63

N

100

0.0%
0.109

0.79

0.680
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The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correlations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All
variables are defined in Table 2.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was
predicted.
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to have a positive influence on the amount of income-statement
disclosure. Officers on the BD and company longevity both reduce the amount of information in the income statement.
To examine the effect of considering all variables together,
the multi-variate models are estimated in Parts 2 and 3 of Table
5. The results in Part 2 are for companies with an income statement regardless of whether a balance sheet exists. Part 3 results
include the financial-statement variables, so the sample includes
companies with both statements. Neither of these models is
statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, the
amount of income-statement disclosure is a function of factors
other than those considered in this study. The significance of BD
composition and age may be indicating that entrenched management/BD philosophy on reporting may be a key determinant of
the amount of disclosure as noted in Bartlett and Jones [1997].
No variable is included in the model to measure this philosophy
and, if a sufficiently significant variable does exist, it could explain the model misspecification indicated by the results.
Balance-Sheet Disclosers: Correlations and regressions are also
estimated to examine which environmental factors influence
the existence of a balance sheet.6 Different factors may influence
why a company chooses to report a balance sheet rather than an
income statement in the era before SEC requirements. As shown
in Table 2, 74% of the companies reported a balance sheet.
The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Part 1 of
Table 6. These results indicate that being traded on an exchange,
being incorporated in New Jersey or Delaware, having a subsidiary and international operations, and issuing equity within the
past three years are all associated with issuing a balance sheet.
Having rated bonds was shown to reduce the likelihood of reporting a balance sheet.
Part 2 of Table 6 shows the results of the multi-variate
logit regression for the sample of all companies regardless of
the statements issued. The logit regression for firms issuing
income statements and a balance sheet or not would not converge. Therefore, results of a second multi-variate model are
not reported since statistically, no logistic regression model

6
Results for total assets, debt-to-assets ratio, and return-on-assets are not reported because these variables require the existence of a balance sheet, and the
model needs to consider both firms with and without a balance sheet to explain
the existence of the statement.
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TABLE 6
Balance Sheet Existence
Logit Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

Part 2
Multi-variate
Coefficient

t-Stat

0.32

0.35

Traded on Exchange

0.22***

1.17

2.32***

Percentage of Board that are
Officers

-0.09

-0.77

-0.84

Incorporated in Delaware or New
Jersey

0.15**

0.53

1.06

Subsidiaries

0.15**

0.04

0.09

International Operations

0.19***

1.04

1.92**

Age of Company

-0.00

0.01

0.66

Bond Rating

-0.12#

-1.05

-2.39##

Common Rating

0.07

0.40

0.50

Bond Issues

0.06

1.07

1.79**

Equity Issues

0.23***

1.44

2.46***

Log-Likelihood

-90.7

Zero Slope Test (p-Value)

33.99

N

191

0.000

The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correlations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using logit. All variables are defined
in Table 2.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was
predicted.

could be estimated. The model in Part 2 indicates that trading
on an exchange, having international operations, and issuing
bonds or equity are positively associated with issuing a balance
sheet. Rated debt has a negative association with a balance
sheet. Therefore, corporate-governance, operating, and financing factors are important in explaining a balance-sheet disclosure.
The exchange variable is probably significant because of imposed exchange requirements. Complexity of operations again
encourages firms to issue more financial-statement information.
However, H4 is only supported with respect to international operations.
The bond and stock issuance variables are again significant
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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for reducing cost of capital and providing potential buyers with
needed information about financial position and the company’s
ability to meet its capital needs. These results are consistent
with H9.
The negative relationship between debt rating and the issuance of a balance sheet did not meet the expectation that
companies with traded debt were doing well financially and
would issue statements to keep a market in the securities. If the
company is too highly levered, then the company may not want
to report a balance sheet showing the true level of debt. H8 is
not supported by these results.
Balance-Sheet Items: Correlations of the independent variable
and the number of balance-sheet line items disclosed in Moody’s
were estimated. The results are shown in Part 1 of Table 7. These
results show the same significant variables as for total disclosure
in Table 3 with the exception of a rating on common stock increasing the amount of disclosure and a less independent BD
lowering the amount of balance-sheet disclosure.
Part 2 of Table 7 estimates a least-squares regression
of balance-sheet items using all companies with a balance sheet. The results indicate that corporate-governance,
operating, and financing factors are all important in explaining how much balance-sheet disclosure is made. The
specific significant variables that increase the amount of
balance-sheet disclosure are trading on an exchange (H1), having subsidiaries (H4), and having rated debt and equity (H8).
Once again, expanding the breadth of ownership, having
complex operations, seeking new capital, or maintaining a market in existing capital are all associated with greater disclosure
in the balance sheet. The positive relationship between the
amount of disclosure and security ratings is interesting given the
negative association between debt ratings and reporting a balance sheet. This combined result seems to indicate that once the
balance sheet is issued, ratings encourage additional disclosure.
Part 3 of Table 7 provides the multi-variate results on the
sample of companies that issue both a balance sheet and an
income statement. The results are again similar to those for
total disclosure (Part 3 of Table 3) with the addition of returnon-assets and equity issuance as variables that lead to greater
balance-sheet disclosure.
Overall, the disclosure model presented seems to explain the
choices concerning total disclosure, the issuance of an income
statement, and the amount of balance-sheet disclosure. The
Published by eGrove, 2010
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TABLE 7
Balance-Sheet Disclosure
Least-Squares Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

Part 2
Multi-variate
Coefficient

t-Stat

Part 3
Multi-variate
Coefficient

t-Stat

9.86

5.37***

9.15

3.89***

Traded on Exchange

0.38***

2.63

3.50***

2.40

2.94***

Percentage of Board
that are Officers

-0.18**

-1.83

-1.01

-4.24

-1.98**

Incorporated in
Delaware or New
Jersey

0.25***

0.61

0.75

-0.52

-0.60

Subsidiaries

0.42***

2.34

3.04***

4.16

4.87***

International
Operations

0.21***

0.67

0.88

-0.77

-0.92

Age of Company

-0.10

-0.00

-0.16

-0.01

-0.25

Return on Assets

-0.15

8.60

1.34*

Total Assets (in
millions)

0.42***

0.01

3.94***

Bond Rating

0.25***

1.55

1.59*

1.34

1.23

Common Rating

0.15*

2.44

1.48*

3.20

1.52

Bond Issues

0.19**

0.71

0.62

-1.52

-1.14

Equity Issues

0.07

0.05

0.07

1.43

1.67**

Debt-to-Assets Ratio

0.17**

3.16

0.82

Dividend-Payout
Ratio

0.09

0.13

0.59

Adjusted R2

26.2%

F-statistic (p-Value)

6.12

N

142

51.1%
0.000

7.43

0.000
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The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correlations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All
variables are defined in Table 2.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels
with results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was
predicted.
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models for income-statement disclosure and issuance of a balance sheet do not perform as well. While some factors are only
significant in one of these decisions, other factors are generally
shown to influence all facets of voluntary disclosure.
Table 8 provides a summary of the results from the other
tables. To control for potential overfitting of results, a variable
TABLE 8
Results Summary
Table 3
Variable

Table 5

Table 7

Table 4

Table 6

Income
Balance
Income
Balance
Total
Statement
Sheet
Statement
Sheet
Disclosure
Disclosure Disclosure Existence Existence

Corporate-Governance Factors:
Traded on
Exchange

+

Percentage of
Board that are
Officers

-

-

+

+

-

-

+

Incorporated
in Delaware or
New Jersey
Operating Factors:
Subsidiaries

+

+

International
Operations

+

Age of
Company

-

Return on
Assets
Total Assets

+

+

+

+

NA

NA

+

+

NA

Financing Factors:
Bond Rating

+

Common
Rating

+

+

Bond Issues

+

+

Equity Issues

+

+

Debt-to-Assets
Ratio

-

NA

NA

NA

DividendPayout Ratio

This table summarizes significant results reported in Tables 2-6. A variable
had to be significant in at least two specifications within a table or significant in
the only multi-variate model in which it was included to be summarized in this
table.
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needed to be significant in at least two specifications within a
table or be significant in the only multi-variate model in which
it is included to be considered significant in this summary. The
table shows that trading on an exchange, lack of an independent
BD, having complex operations, and firm size are important
variables for total disclosure decisions. Therefore, corporategovernance and operating factors influence overall statement
disclosure. Financing factors are shown to influence individual
statements but not total disclosure. Equity ratings and issuing
securities are shown to increase the likelihood to report an income statement and securities ratings are associated with more
disclosure of information in the balance sheet. This seems to
indicate that financing issues had different influences on the
two financial statements. Thus, companies wanting to broaden
ownership and seeking additional equity capital are most likely
to provide a full set of financial statements with reasonable
amounts of information. Complexity of operations also shows
a positive relationship with disclosure. Firms with subsidiaries
have increased amounts of disclosure, and those with international operations tend to issue both statements more frequently.
Larger companies are also more likely to provide greater statement disclosure. Corporate governance is shown to be related
to a heightened number of income statements but not balance
sheets. The volume of disclosure is increased in both.
The summary in Table 8 also shows that the amount of
disclosure is primarily a function of corporate governance,
complexity of operations, and firm size, while the issuance of
statements is a function of corporate-governance, complexity of
operations, and financing factors. The factors influencing a company to report either financial statement are very similar with
the exception of BD independence and securities ratings. This
finding that BD independence is only influential in the decision
whether to report an income statement but not in the decision
of whether to report a balance sheet provides some support for
the conclusion of Bartlett and Jones [1997] that BD philosophy
influences the amount of voluntary disclosure. Balance-sheet
disclosure was a more common practice as noted by the larger
number of firms issuing a balance sheet both in this study and in
the literature indicates that their promulgation was a common
practice of the day [Kittredge, 1901; Sprague, 1901, Gilman,
1939; Skinner, 1984; Kendig, 1993]. Therefore, balance sheets
may not have been viewed as voluntary to many companies,
while income statements were voluntary until they became a requirement for listing on an exchange. Thus, the BD philosophy
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on disclosure could more readily influence whether an income
statement was published along with a balance sheet.
The amount of disclosure within the statements is shown
to be influenced by many more factors for the balance sheet
than for the income statement. This contrasts with Barton and
Waymire’s [2004] finding that more factors explain incomestatement transparency than for balance sheets. However, the
multi-variate models for income-statement disclosure were not
significant, indicating that variables other than those considered
here are better explanatory factors of the volume of incomestatement disclosure. The amount of balance-sheet disclosure is
also shown to be a function of corporate-governance, operating,
and financing factors.
This study examined factors that would influence a company’s decision regarding the voluntary supply of information.
The results indicate that there are some important factors that
influence the decision to issue a statement and the amount of
information contained therein. Corporate-governance, operating, and financing factors all play a role in the disclosure decisions of companies, but those factors vary in their importance
in different decisions. The results indicate that disclosure decisions are complex and take multiple factors into account. Since
various factors were shown to influence the types of statements
reported and the amount of information conveyed, the results
confirm the conclusion of Coombs and Edward [1995] that
regulation is needed to equate the supply of financial-statement
disclosure provided by companies in response to the demands of
stockholders.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined financial-statement disclosures by
industrial companies as reported in the 1920 Moody’s. The paper looked at overall disclosure and disclosure particular to the
individual statements. The focus of the paper was to determine
which company-specific factors would affect the corporate
decision to disclose financial statements and the amount of
disclosure. By looking at these factors, the motivation of firms
to disclose voluntarily as in the Coombs and Edwards [1995]
model can be understood.
The model developed in this paper can be used to explain
factors that influenced the issuance of an income statement as
well as the contents of both financial statements. The model
provides some insight regarding the amount of information in
Published by eGrove, 2010
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the income statement and the issuance of a balance sheet, but
the model did not fit the data as well for these two corporate
decisions. The results showed that corporate-governance, operating, and financing factors are important, but that their relative
importance varied by the specific disclosure decision under consideration.
A company was more likely to issue an income statement if
it traded shares on an organized exchange, had international operations, was relatively larger, had securities rated by Moody’s,
and issued bonds and/or equity in the recent past. Having a large
percentage of officers on the BD and/or a high debt-to-asset ratio reduced the likelihood. The decision to issue a balance sheet
was positively influenced by trading on an exchange, having
international operations, and issuing stock and bonds, but not if
already existing debt was rated.
Factors influencing total disclosure and balance-sheet
disclosure are similar. Trading on an exchange, possessing subsidiaries, and relatively small size were shown to increase the
amount of disclosure. Both measures were negatively influenced
by BD composition. Balance-sheet disclosure was also positively
influenced by return-on-assets and rated debt and equity. The
equation used to estimate the amount of information disclosed
in the income statement was not significant. However, three significant coefficients resulted, indicating that income-statement
disclosures are greater for companies with international operations and lower for older companies and those with a less independent BD.
Seeking broader ownership by trading on an exchange was
shown to be significant in most types of disclosure decisions. As
noted earlier, exchanges did impose requirements for issuing
statements. Therefore, for these traded companies, statement
disclosure was not entirely a voluntary choice. However, traded
companies consistently reported more information which shows
more voluntary disclosure beyond the mere issuance of the
statement. Also, the choice to list securities for trading would involve consideration of all requirements to list. One requirement
is statement disclosure. Thus, when a company chose to list
securities voluntarily, a simultaneous choice to report financial
statements was also voluntarily made.
Complex structures with the existence of subsidiary or international operations were also important for all disclosure decisions. Such companies consistently reported more statement
information as is consistent with the literature [Zarzeski, 1996].
Corporate governance was also shown to be an important factor.
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Greater managerial involvement on the BD led to reduced disclosure in both statements and a decreased likelihood of reporting an income statement. This is also consistent with the literature [Klein, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Guy and Leung, 2004].
The results do indicate that incentives did exist in the preSEC era to encourage companies to disclose financial statements. However, the data and results show that smaller, domestic businesses with a BD controlled by management that neither
traded on an organized stock exchange nor sought additional
capital recently were highly unlikely to report an income statement voluntarily. These characteristics would seem to describe
entrepreneurial firms that were growing rapidly within the economy of the early 1920s. Many of these small, founder-focused
companies have grown into large, profitable corporations today.
The results of this study clearly document that many of these
companies lacked the incentives to provide the additional disclosure considered typical for an efficient capital market [Senatra
and Frishkoff, 1984] before regulatory intervention. This variation in economic factors encountered by firms created a gap
between the supply and demand for disclosure as modeled by
Coombs and Edwards [1995]. The economic factors faced by
some companies encouraged the decision not to disclose a statement or to disclose less then the amount of information wanted
by market participants [Kohler, 1926]. These results are similar
to those reported in Murphy [1988], who examined Canadian reporting and concluded that regulation was a necessary prerequisite for complete disclosure. This paper likewise concludes that
many companies lacked the incentives to provide full financial
disclosure without regulatory intervention.
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A CONTINGENCY THEORY
PERSPECTIVE ON MANAGEMENT
CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN AMONG U.S.
ANTE-BELLUM SLAVE PLANTATIONS
Abstract: This paper examines the management control-system design
of mid-19th century U.S. slave plantations using a contingency theory
framework. Large rice plantations that relied on forced labor and
tidal-flow agricultural technology were very profitable for their owners. This paper presents a model that links these favorable operating
results to a close fit between the control-system design and three key
contingent environmental variables. Absentee owners hired managers
to provide on-site oversight and periodic operational reporting. These
managers relied on slave drivers to assign individualized daily tasks to
the plantation’s field hands and monitor their performance. Productive field slaves were rewarded with greater free time each working
day. In addition, many slaves worked cooperatively with their masters
to obtain better jobs outside the rice fields and cash income. Ultimately, however, it was the institution of chattel slavery that kept the slaves
working in the rice fields under oppressive and unhealthy conditions.

INTRODUCTION
This paper extends the existing accounting history literature
with an analysis of the control systems and practices of U.S.
ante-bellum slave plantations. This topic has received limited
coverage in the existing literature. This analysis is couched in
a perspective of contingency theory. The relationship between
organizational control and the management of complex organizations has long been a popular topic for accounting research
[e.g., Otley, 1980; Dent, 1990; Chenhall, 2003]. This paper pre
sents a study of the managerial control systems and accounting
practices of 19th century Carolinas Lowcountry rice plantations.
The commercial success enjoyed by these large rice planters
reflected a good fit between management control systems and
Acknowledgments: I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to Diana Berry,
Michael Dintenfass, Edna Greene Medford, and Juliet Walker for their encouragement and insightful comments on previous versions of this paper.
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key environmental factors. The tidal rice culture was characterized by large-scale plantations relying on controlled flooding
and the forced labor of the descendents of slaves brought to
achieve commercial rice production for export markets. The
most profitable of these plantations covered thousands of acres
and employed hundreds of slaves. As such, they were some of
the largest and most complex commercial business operations
in the nation at that time. These business owners utilized an
integrated set of management and task controls, an integral part
of a broader framework of social control and culture, to manage
their agricultural enterprises. Written journals and face-to-face
reporting from on-site managers provided planters with operational feedback on the productivity and well being of their slaves
and land. These managers, in turn, relied heavily upon their
foremen to make many daily decisions essential for business
success, to supervise workers in the fields, and to help maintain
social order in the slave community. Historical scholarship also
suggests that the African origins of the tidal-flow agricultural
technology, along with the accompanying tasking system of
labor organization, evolved in the Carolinas during the 18th century as a mechanism to enhance worker productivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first
section presents a discussion on the study’s theoretical framework and a review of the research literature. The second section
outlines the archival resources that provided the study’s empirical data, followed by the paper’s main body containing the empirical findings. The final section offers conclusions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Framework: This paper focuses on management and
task control processes on 19th century U.S. slave plantations.
Management control describes the process of implementing
strategy [Anthony and Young, 1999]. Business owners typically
hire professional managers to run their enterprises on a daily
basis. Management control describes the relationship between
business owners and their hired mangers. Owners provide direction and oversight while managers develop operational plans
and motivate workers to implement those plans. For this reason,
management control involves managers and their staffs at all
levels of the organization [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998].
General controls, formal controls, and a system of compensation and incentives are the three primary mechanisms for exercising management control. General controls are based upon the
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 rganization’s behavioral norms [Goffee and Jones, 1996]. They
o
are applied through interpersonal interaction in the workplace
and the formal direction of subordinates in their activities. Job
descriptions, periodic formal or informal personnel performance
evaluations, and formal reporting structures within an organization are examples of general controls. Green and Welsh [1988]
describe formal means of control as a system in which standards
of performance are determined, measuring systems gauge performance, comparisons are made between standards and actual
performance, and feedback provides information on variances.
Financial budgeting systems, periodic responsibility accounting
reports, and standard cost reporting are formal control systems
commonly found in contemporary business enterprises. Formal
controls are supported by and operate through general controls.
An organization’s compensation and incentive system specifies
the appropriate financial rewards for desired individual performance. Compensation and incentive systems are the tangible
motivational links between individual work activities and organizational roles.
Management control practices are applied through an
organization’s task control system to influence daily efforts of an
organization’s workers. Task control involves the organization
and direction of workers as they produce the goods or deliver the
services that form the objective of its operating activities. Task
control is transaction-orientated; that is, it involves the control
of individual tasks. Rules to be followed in carrying out these
tasks are prescribed by the management control process. The
objective of task control is to assure that specified tasks are carried out efficiently and effectively [Anthony and Govindarajan,
1998]. Task control involves task specification, programming,
and quality control. Task specification involves the prospective definition of the work to be done and its communication
to workers. Task specification can be expressed alternatively in
terms of the steps to be followed or the outcome to be realized.
Where the steps to be followed from start to task completion can
be fully specified, these steps can best be described as programming. Programming is often embodied in the form of standard
operating procedures (SOPs). Quality control insures that the
task performance was effective; that is, task specifications have
been met or SOPs have been followed. Task control is central to
the direction of workers in their daily activities by supervisors
and managers.
Feedback, which is central to the control process, is based
upon communication [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998].
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 rganizational goals, objectives, and plans are communicated
O
down the organization’s chain of command while environmental intelligence and performance results are communicated up.
Management control relies on the communication between
managers and owners. Management accounting systems, which
convey economic and operating information, are nested within
these communication channels [Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978].
Managers and owners on Lowcountry rice plantations communicated with one another by face-to-face contact and/or letters,
journals, ledgers, and other hand-written reports. Communication between plantation owners and managers and slaves must
have been primarily by oral interaction. Thus, task specification,
programming, and quality control, the core of the task control
process, must have been exercised via general management controls of supervision and organizational structure.
Contingency theory has been one of the dominant conceptual frameworks for research into management control over the
past two decades [e.g., Otley, 1980; Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1995].
Waterhouse and Tiessen [1978] and Otley [1980] reaffirmed
the role of two key contextual variables, environment and
technology, in the design of an effective management control
structure. Technology defines how the work of the organization
is performed as well as the ways in which organizational participants and key stakeholders communicate and interact [Otley,
1980]. It includes a conversion technology that is the core of
the organization’s production process. Organizational information and communication technologies establish parameters on
its communications and feedback processes. Meyers and Scott
[1983] distinguish broadly between two types of organizational
environments, the technical and the institutional. Technical
environments are those in which organizations acquire factor
inputs, apply an appropriate conversion technology to those
inputs, and deliver the resulting product or service to the marketplace. These exchanges between the organization and its
environment occur in markets that reward efficient and effective
performance. Technical environments foster the development
of rationalized structures that efficiently coordinate technical
work. By contrast, institutional environments are characterized
by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support
[Rowan and Meyers, 1977]. In institutional environments, organizations are rewarded for utilizing the designated structures
and processes, not for the quality and quantity of their outputs.
This study draws its primary theoretical framework from
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managerial accounting research that seeks to develop models
that link organizational outcomes, contextual variables, and
management control-system design [Chenhall, 2003]. While an
organization’s control structures are contingent on its environmental context, its effectiveness and efficiency are measured by
its performance relative to its goals and objectives [Waterhouse
and Tiessen, 1978]. This paper proceeds from the notion that
superior organizational performance, defined operationally as
cash profits, is a function of the fit between the organization’s
key contextual variables and its management control-system
design [Gerdin and Greve, 2004]. Good fit means enhanced performance while poor fit implies diminished performance.
Figure 1
A Contingency Theory Perspective on
Management Control-System Design
Organizational Environment
Technical Environment
• Factor & Product Market
• Production & Information
Technology

Institutional Environment
• Customs and Language
• Political and Legal
Institutions

Management
Control System

Organizational
Outcomes
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Literature Review: Management control systems and activities
on slave plantations have received only modest attention in the
accounting history literature. Fleischman and Tyson [2004]
reviewed many account books and ledgers produced by 19th
century slave plantation owners and managers. Their review
was largely focused on the use of these journals to measure slave
valuation and productivity. They found that these plantation records were rarely used to compile the productivity and valuation
of individual slaves. Instead, they concluded that these journals
were instruments of social control over slaves rather than a
means for measuring and reporting the results of operations
or the financial condition of the enterprise. Vollmers [2003]
examines the role that hired managers played in supervising
and reporting on the work activities of slaves in the North Carolina turpentine industry. The drivers’ responsibilities included
inspecting production output, insuring that each slave met his
daily output quota. The overseer compiled daily production outputs and maintained an account book which contained records
of slave production, supplies received and purchased, as well as
miscellaneous cash payments including those to slaves. Tyson et
al. [2004] focuses exclusively on the task control relationships
between U.S. and British West Indies planters and their slaves.
Their research indicates that U.S. plantation owners relied on
two alternative methods of task control (ganging and tasking)
for their African work force. However, their work did not seek to
examine the role played by supervisory personnel and organizational structures that supported these relationships.
ARCHIVAL RESOURCES
This paper makes extensive use of the Records of Ante-Bellum Southern Plantations: From the Revolution to the Civil War
[Stampp and Boehm, 1985]. This collection consists of selected
microfilmed, primary-source material drawn from the University
of South Carolina Library, the South Carolina Historical Society,
the Duke University Library, the Maryland Historical Society,
the Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, the Louisiana State University Libraries, and the University of Virginia
Library. In particular, this paper draws on the Paul D. Weston
Family Papers 1786-1869, Georgetown District, South Carolina;
the Thomas Ashton Coffin Plantation Book 1800-1813, Beaufort
District, South Carolina; and the Richmond Overseer Journal,
1859-1860, Charleston District, South Carolina. Also used were
the Robert F.W. Allston Family Papers in The South Carolina
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Rice Plantation as Revealed in the Papers of Robert F.W. Allston
[Allston, 1945]. While the selection of these four collections of
family papers was drawn from geographically diverse locations
within the Carolinas Lowcountry, they do not reflect a randomly
selected sample or a complete census of all mid-19th century
rice plantations. Instead, these sources were chosen because of
their participation in the tidal rice culture, the breadth of their
records and correspondence, and their legibility. Hurmence
[1989] provided a different perspective derived from the recollections of African Americans working as slaves in the Carolina
rice fields. Hurmence recorded 27 oral histories of former slaves
gathered during the Great Depression by the Federal Writers’
Project. Olmsted [1856] toured the southern states starting in
1852 and reported on the management and operations of Mr. X’s
rice plantations in South Carolina.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Organizational Outcomes: This paper’s contingency theoretical perspective predicts that superior organizational outcomes
among 19th century tidal rice plantations are associated with
a management control-system design that efficiently adapted
to the key features of the organizational environment. Swan’s
[1973] analysis, based on a sample of 575 rice farms in 1859,
reported that rice farming was, for most planters, an unprofitable venture. Roughly two-thirds of the sample farms reported
an estimated rate of return below 6%, the assumed opportunity
cost of capital. Moreover, more than one-third of sample farms,
mostly small units, had negative net receipts. However, the
largest 20% of the sample units, those plantations with annual
production of at least 100,000 pounds of clean rice, accounted
for 96% of the region’s rice crop. Only this group of plantations
earned an average rate of return in excess of the opportunity
cost of capital with over 70% of large plantations at least this
profitable.
In the economic and technological context of the mid-19th
century rice industry, quantity production was possible only
with the use of tidal-flow agricultural techniques, expansive land
holdings, and the labor of hundreds of slaves. Robert F.W. Allston (1801-1864) was one of the mid-century’s most successful
rice planters. He owned and operated a network of seven plantations along the Pee Dee River near Charleston, South Carolina.
His land holdings included more than 4,000 acres in rice land
and another 9,500 acres of pasture and timber lands [Allston,
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1945]. In 1827, Allston resigned as surveyor-general of South
Carolina to take over full-time management of a large rice plantation, Chicora Wood, which he had inherited from his father.
Chicora Wood served as a home base for his network of rice
plantations. Rice production from these plantations exceeded
840,000 pounds of rice in 1850 and 1,500,000 pounds by 1860.
Based on prevailing rice prices, his plantations’ annual gross
receipts generally exceeded $65,000 during the 1850s. The slave
labor force that produced rice for him increased from 401 in
1850 to 630 by 1860.
While financial records documenting the full extent of Allston’s operations were not available, Table 1 provides a summary
of receipts, expenditures, and return on investment for Waverly
Plantation for 1855-1857 [Allston, 1945, pp. 46-48]. Waverly
Plantation included 587 acres of which about 150 acres were
dedicated to tidal-flow rice cultivation. Next to the rice lands
stood the plantation house, slave quarters, and a rice mill which
TABLE 1
Waverly Plantation Cash Receipts,
Expenditures, and Capital Investments
1855, 1856, and 1857
1855

1856

1857

$ 14,486.59
7,325.53
$ 21,812.12

$ 8,824.56
13,382.78
$ 22,207.34

$ 15,264.92
15,786.32
$ 31,051.24

4,875.80
2,747.25
878.50
1,100.00
580.14
780.00
237.25
4.00
231.71
454.97
839.47
631.98
13,361.07
$ 8,451.05

4,976.34
4,839.55
1,792.45
1,100.00
800.00
925.00
6.50
4.50
218.31
42.86
839.47

5,843.13
10,076.37
2,410.58
1,050.00
900.00
1,504.31
1,514.81
10.00
249.60

15,544.98
$ 6,662.36

1,419.01
188.06
25,165.87
$ 5,885.37

$ 62,074.78
17,731.76
7,062.13
$ 86,868.67
9.7%

$ 62,074.78
17,731.76
7,757.26
$ 87,563.80
7.6%

$ 62,074.78
23,388.76
8,965.16
$ 94,428.70
6.2%

Receipts
Crop Sales
Mill Earnings
Total Receipts
Expenditures
Supplies
Lumber and Fuel
Mill Repairs
Overseer’s Wages
Miller’s Wages
Slave Hire
Medical Services
Legal Services
Taxes
Interest on Advances
Interest on Bonds
Miscellaneous
Total Expenditures
Net Receipts
Capital Investment
Land
Slaves
Other
Total Capital Investment
Return on Investment

Source: Allston [1945, pp. 46-48] (adapted)
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“pounded” not only Waverly’s crop but that of many other neighboring plantations. Beyond this area, there were many acres of
cultivated lands dedicated to growing provision crops such as
sweet potatoes, corn, and peas.
These financial records from a single plantation among Allston’s larger properties indicate one of two sources of economies
of scale suggested by Swan’s [1973] broader findings. Larger
rice producers were able to accumulate the capital needed to
take advantage of new technologies. Historically, the husking
and polishing of the rice harvest was one of the most timeconsuming and labor-intensive aspects of its cultivation. By the
1830s, many of the larger plantations operated pounding and/or
threshing mills driven by steam engines. Carney [2001] suggests
that the mechanization of this process early in the 19th century
greatly improved the productivity and profitability of rice cultivation. In addition, mill operations enabled large planters like
Allston to diversify their revenue streams. Table 1 indicates that
mill receipts exceeded those from rice sales for two of the three
years presented.
The size of its slave labor force and the extent of its cultivated lands also provided a large Lowcountry rice plantation in
that era with considerable economies of scope as well. Like Waverly, most large plantations reserved many acres of cultivated
lands for provision crops and livestock. Olmsted [1856, p. 426]
observed that:
Mr. X allotted a half an acre of land to each family of
negroes for a garden. They are at liberty to sell whatever
they chose from the products of their gardens, and to
make what they can by keeping swine and fowls. Mr. X’s
family has no supply of eggs and poultry than what is
obtained by purchase from his negroes; they frequently,
also, purchase game from them.
In March 1858, Allston executed a contract with his slaves to
encourage them to raise hogs for his purchase [Allston, 1945,
p. 350]. The profitability of these large rice plantations was
considerably improved by their internal sourcing of produce
and meat for their free and slave residents. While the bulk of Mr.
X’s 200 slave residents were “prime hands” who worked in the
rice fields, Olmsted [1856, p. 426] observed that “Adjoining the
mill-house were shops and sheds, in which blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics, all slaves belonging to Mr. X, were at
work.” These skilled mechanics and artisans, such as carpenters,
who built the irrigation trunks and maintained the houses and
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fences; a blacksmith or two who did the iron works; coopers
who made the barrels to contain the rice; and bricklayers, were
able to produce virtually everything necessary to support the
plantation’s agricultural operations. These economies of scope
supported and supplemented the large plantations’ economies
of scale [Swan, 1973]. The combined impact of these economies
of scale and scope enhanced the profitability of large rice plantations by creating a largely self-sufficient economic enterprise.
Three Contingent Contextual Variables: This paper’s conceptual model predicts that the profitability accruing to Allston and
many other owners of large Lowcountry rice plantations were
linked through an efficient management control-system design
to three key contextual variables. These three contextual factors
were the natural features of the Carolina Lowcountry, the demographic and cultural aspects of the West-African labor force
who worked the rice fields, and the institution of chattel slavery.
These contextual factors offer opportunities and challenges that
motivated the control system design of the large rice plantations.
The Geographic Location, Climate, and Topography of the Carolinas Lowcountry: The geography, climate, and topography of
the coastal regions of the Carolinas, Georgia, and northern
Florida, later know as the Lowcountry, was a key contingent environmental factor leading to the development of the Carolinas
tidal-rice culture and the plantation economy it nurtured. Rice
was first grown successfully in South Carolina about 1680 when
Henry H. Woodward planted seed given him by the captain of
a Madagascar ship [Clifton, 1981b]. By the early 18th century,
it became a major export crop of the lower South. Rice exports
rose from 10,000 pounds in 1698 to over 20 million by 1730. The
cultivation of rice with the tidal-flow method transformed the
coastal southeast between 1783 and the early 19th century [Carney, 2001]. This highly productive method was practical only
on the lower stretches of a few rivers from Cape Fear in North
Carolina to the St. Johns in north Florida. Moreover, many of
these rivers, primarily the Ashley, the Pee Dee, and the Waccamaw, served as highways for the bulk movement of agricultural
produce and other goods to Charleston. Charleston became one
of the leading seaports in the Western Hemisphere in the early
18th century. This major seaport gave local rice planters ready
access to their customers in northern Europe and their slave
laborers from West Africa and the West Indies.
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The climate of coastal South Carolina and Georgia also
proved equally suitable for the spread of tropical diseases such
as malaria and yellow fever, diseases that thrived on the swampy
coastal plain, especially around the flooded rice plantations.
Early in the 18th century, the white planters adopted the custom
of leaving their farms altogether during the rainy summer and
autumn months when fever ran rampant. The white population
in the region stayed relatively low, but the importation of African slaves increased as the rice plantations expanded. By 1708,
there was a black majority in South Carolina, a unique situation
among the North American colonies. In some coastal areas, 8090% of the population was enslaved [Wood, 1974, p. 60].
The geography of South Carolina, together with the region’s
black majority, also encouraged the foundation and continuing
existence of maroon communities of runaway slaves [Lockley,
2005]. The swampy topography offered many areas of refuge to
maroons where they could carve out their lives free from white
control. The dense woods between the swamps were impassible
to slave hunters on horseback, forcing them to deploy themselves on foot in small groups where they were more vulnerable
and less effective [Stroyer, 1898]. Yet, no maroon community
could survive completely cut off from the outside world. While
food could be grown, water was abundant, and shelter readily
fashioned, maroon communities could not make metal goods
or replenish shot and powder for guns [Lockley, 2005]. In short,
these communities needed regular clandestine commerce either
with plantation-based slave communities or white merchants
for their long-term survival. However, these small communities
could only survive by maintaining a modest size and shadowy
existence. The bulk of the Lowcountry’s slaves was forced to
live on the plantation. Nevertheless, the presence of these communities reflected the limits of the planters’ control over their
workforce. They dared not press too hard lest their workers and
valued property would simply walk away into the swamps to
these communities [Olmsted, 1860].
A West-African Labor Force: The creation of a tidal rice plantation required a substantial capital investment and a tremendous
amount of back-breaking labor. Clifton [1981b, p. 278] reports
from contemporary sources that acquiring the necessary slave
force constituted more the half of the £2,000 cost of establishing a typical 1,000 acre rice plantation in the 18th century. In a
world before modern earth-moving machinery, men with shovels
and other hand equipment cleared riverside swamps of timber
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and undergrowth, surrounded them with earthen levees, and
then constructed an intricate system of dams, dikes, floodgates,
ditches, and drains. Moreover, rice cultivation was an extremely
labor-intensive activity, requiring continual labor inputs from
many workers throughout the year. This enormous need for
labor greatly encouraged the introduction of a slave labor force.
South Carolina was a slave colony from its inception in the 16th
century. Although the first Africans arrived in 1526 as part of
a large Spanish expedition from the West Indies, planters who
later emigrated from Barbados established large-scale slavery
in the Carolinas on indigo and rice plantations. The Atlantic
slave trade was at its height and agricultural laborers from West
Africa were available in great numbers. Clifton [1981b] reports
that the slave trade increased from an average annual importation of 390 slaves for the years 1721-1725 to almost 2,100 for the
years 1731-1738.
From the earliest times, there was a close relationship between the technical skills of the African slaves imported into the
region and rice cultivation. The South Carolina planters were,
at first, completely ignorant of rice cultivation, and their early
experiments with this specialized type of tropical agriculture
were mostly failures. On the other hand, Carney [1996] noted
that rice cultivation in West Africa dates back to at least 1500
B.C., and the methods of planting and processing the crop were
already known to thousands of slaves brought to South Carolina
with the onset of the transatlantic slave trade late in the 17th
century. These African slaves brought knowledge from their
homelands of different modes of rice cultivation, soil and water
management, and milling, which they adapted to Lowcountry
rice plantations. The Carolina planters soon recognized the
advantage of importing slaves from the traditional rice-growing
region of West Africa. Wood [1974, p. 60] reported that the
prominent 18th century Carolina merchant Henry Laurens
wrote: “…the Slaves from the River Gambia are preferr’d to all
others with us [here in Carolina] save the Gold Coast.... next to
Them the Windward Coast are preferr’d to Angolas.” As a result,
the Lowcountry rice planters largely adopted a system of rice
cultivation that drew heavily on the labor patterns and technical knowledge of their African slaves by the late 18th century. In
South Carolina and Georgia, the slaves simply continued with
many of the methods of rice farming to which they were accustomed in Africa [Clifton, 1981b].
Wood [1974] noted that writers of the period remarked that
there was no harder or unhealthier work possible than rice culhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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tivation. Working under a semi-tropical sun and standing knee
deep in periodically flooded fields, Lowcountry slaves worked
under brutal conditions and were regularly exposed to a host of
water-borne diseases. Moreover, the high population density of
the large rice plantations also meant these infectious diseases
spread rapidly. These conditions helped to create mortality rates
three times higher than those of slaves elsewhere in North America [Fogel and Engerman, 1974]. In addition, Dusinberre [1996]
estimated that nearly two out of every three African-American
children on rice plantations failed to reach their sixteenth birthday, and over a third of all slave children died before their first
birthday. This high level of infant mortality and morbidity was
probably the result of the mothers’ chronic malaria and fatigue
from the rigors of rice cultivation. Under these conditions, it is
not surprising that few if any people, white or black, would freely chose to work in the Carolina rice fields. Carney [2001] noted
that the large Carolina tidal rice plantations which produced
great wealth for their owners for a century and a half completely
disappeared two decades after the abolition of slavery.
Chattel Slavery – “America’s Peculiar Institution”: Slavery was
therefore an essential ingredient in the successful establishment
of cash-crop plantations in 18th century South Carolina. Slave
traders in Africa soon learned that South Carolina was an especially profitable market for slaves. The rice planters there were
willing to pay higher prices for slaves from the Rice Coast, the
Windward Coast, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. In the second half
of the 18th century, Bance Island was one of the major slavetrading operations on the Rice Coast of West Africa [Opala,
1986]. Richard Oswald was the principal partner in the London
firm that operated Bance Island. Circa 1756, Oswald established
a close personal and business relationship with Henry Laurens,
one of the wealthiest rice planters and slave dealers in the South
Carolina Colony. Laurens advertised the slaves and then sold
them at auction to local rice planters for a 10% commission. For
example, the Charleston Evening Gazette of July 11, 1785 advertised “a choice cargo of Windward and Gold Coast Negroes, who
have been accustomed to the planting of rice” [Wood, 1974, p.
60].
The legal institution of chattel slavery in British North
America became the basis of social control over African-American slaves. South Carolina passed a new slave code in 1740,
more commonly known as the “Negro Act” [Sirmans, 1962]. The
code, which was passed in response to the Stono slave rebelPublished by eGrove, 2010
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lion of 1739, remained largely unaltered until emancipation in
1865. The act also served as a model for the Georgia slave code
of 1755. The new code reduced slaves to the status of chattel
property. They were further denied any kind of protection under
the law. Punishment for the murder of a slave by a white, for
example, was reduced to a mere misdemeanor punishable by a
fine. Moreover, much of the Negro Act was devoted to controlling minute aspects of a slave’s life. For example, slaves were not
allowed to dress in a way “above the condition of slaves.” Blacks
were prohibited from learning how to read and write and were
not permitted to assemble. Blacks in violation of these provisions were subject to flogging or any other punishment that their
owners deemed appropriate. Moreover, these oppressive laws
were aggressively enforced, backed by the local law enforcement, state militia, and private slave catchers [Henry, 1913].
Management Control Structures and Practices in the Tidal Rice
Culture: A century and a half of evolution of the Carolina tidal
rice culture served to make the 1850s the zenith of the Lowcountry’s large rice plantations. It is this time period that forms
the temporal context for this study. The establishment of largescale rice plantations on the tidewater regions of the Carolinas
and Georgia required a massive engineering effort that was supported by an enormous investment in well-organized labor to
achieve and maintain [Stewart, 1996]. The 18th century African
slave trade brought thousands of slaves who formed this labor
force and the majority of the region’s population after the first
decade of the 18th century. Many of these slaves possessed the
expertise that facilitated a transfer of the tidal-flow rice cultivation technology from West Africa to the Carolinas [Carney,
1996]. Carney [2001] concluded that the task labor system was
probably of African origin as it was already a feature of African
slavery along the Upper Guinea Coast and its hinterlands during
the transatlantic slave trade. Moreover, she also found evidence
that some slaves possessed a special expertise that their masters
lacked, enabling them to negotiate the customary patterns of
work and reciprocity that evolved into the task labor system. Littlefield [1981] observed that this system initially evolved on the
rice plantation of the Carolinas beginning in the 18th century.
In addition, unlike tobacco which required continual attention
from closely supervised workers throughout its cultivation, rice
is a relatively hardy plant whose successful cultivation required
only a few readily observable operations [Morgan, 1982]. Largely in place by the middle of the 18th century, the task system
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on the Lowcountry’s rice plantations prescribed specific daily
expectations for each type of labor [Trinkley, 2005].
Work and Task Control in the Carolinas Rice Fields: By the mid19th century, the daily tasks assigned to field hands were well
defined by custom and practice. Olmsted [1856, pp. 435-436)
observed that:
All ordinary and regular work is performed by task: that
is to say, each hand has his labor for the day marked
out before him, and can take his own time to do it in…
In hoeing rice, a certain number of rows, equal to onehalf or two-thirds of an acre, according to the condition of the land; in sowing rice (strewing in drills), two
acres; in reaping rice (if it stands well), three-quarters
of an acre…
Sylvia Cannon recalled that on the plantation where she lived
and worked, “All the fields were named and the driver just had
to call on the horn and tell you what field to go work in that day”
[Hurmence, 1989, p. 124]. A slave would be expected to weed,
sow, or harvest that size field in one day. The daily assignment of
tasks to individual slaves was based on their age, sex, and physical strength. James Sparkman, a Georgetown District planter,
allocated tasks to each slave on his plantation based upon their
physical strength, age, and health. Field hands were rated as
one-quarter, one-half, three-quarters, or full hands. While the
size of the task would remain fixed, allowances could be made
for the individual and the work that he or she could be expected
to complete on a given day. For example, a young woman who
was ordinarily classified as a full-task hand might be reclassified
as a quarter-task hand during the period of her convalescence
from childbirth [Sparkman, 1945, p. 346].
Incentives and Punishment in the Carolina Rice Fields: The task
labor system provided 19th century Lowcountry planters with a
mechanism for rewarding productive field hands. Upon completing the day’s task, field hands could effectively earn the opportunity to perform other work. They had the free time necessary to
cultivate their own garden crops or perform plantation labor for
which they were to be monetarily compensated. Olmsted [1856,
p. 426] observed:
As the negroes finished the labor required of them by
Mr. X, at three or four o’clock in the afternoon, they
can employ the remainder of the day in laboring for
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themselves, if they choose. Mr. X allotted a half an acre
of land to each family of negroes for a garden. They are
at liberty to sell whatever they chose from the products
of their gardens, and to make what they can by keeping
swine and fowls.
This capability afforded by the tasking system to gain greater
control over their own lives and time was a powerful incentive for productivity and cooperation. Sam Polite, a Beaufort
County field hand, recollected: “When you knock off work, you
can work your land. Maybe you might have two or three tasks
(a quarter acre) of land round your cabin what Master gave you
for planting. You can have chicken, maybe hog. You can sell egg
and chicken to store and Master will buy your hog. In that way,
slave can have money for buy thing like fish and whatever he
wants” [Hurmence, 1989, p. 78]. Beyond the half days of release
the task system provided, a vacation of several days was given
to all the plantation hands following the harvesting period (six
to eight weeks), the one time of the crop season when the task
system was not followed. Here, the entire plantation work force
was busy from dawn to dusk and even on Sundays if the condition of the crop necessitated such a schedule [Trinkley, 2005].
Lowcountry planters supplemented the task-based incentives with a system of corporal and capital punishment to sanction those who failed to meet their daily tasks. Unlike free laborers of other times and places, the Lowcountry slaves could be
brutally beaten legally, could not move about freely, or assert any
economic rights. Sam Polite recalled further: “If a slave don’t
do task, they get licking with lash on naked back. The driver
give the licking, but Master most always been there. Sometime
maybe a slave [would] steal a hog or run away to the wood, then
he get licking, too” [Hurmence, 1989, p. 77]. The punishment of
slaves for their failure to meet their productivity objectives was
not limited to whipping and corporal punishment. Slaves, after
all, constituted a material proportion of their masters’ net worth
whose value would fall from extreme physical abuse. Roswell
King [1828, p. 1], a planter and overseer, observed: “When I pass
sentence myself, various modes of punishment are adopted;
the lash, least of all – Digging stumps, or clearing away trash
about the settlements, in their own time; but the most severe is,
confinement at home six months to twelve months, or longer....”
Prince Smith [Hurmence, 1989, p. 89] recalled that his master
relied on three types of punishment to discipline unproductive or disobedient slaves. One method included confinement
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to a small, unventilated room called the “sweat box.” A second
method was confinement to an open-air restraint called the
“stock.” Finally, a slave would be restrained with leg shackles for
a period of several days.
Field hands had to do much more than meet their task productivity standards. Corporal punishment was also an integral
part of an oppressive system of social control. Whippings were
also administered for offenses such as theft, illicit slave meetings, or being off the plantation without a pass. The harshest
punishments were reserved for attempting to run away. Elijah
Green, a Charleston County house servant, recalled: “When
slaves run away and their masters catch them, to the stockade
they go, they’d be whipped every other week for a number of
months. And for God’s sake, don’t let a slave be catch with pencil
and paper. That was a major crime” [Hurmence, 1989, p. 63].
Joyner [1984] reported that one plantation owner sold each of
his would-be runaways to different slave masters, ensuring that
these men would be permanently separated from their wives
and families. The rituals of whippings and other publicly administered forms of punishment were as much a part of the plantation compensation and incentive system as the rewards for faithful, productive service. When a master personally supervised or
administered punishment, no less than when he distributed gifts
or favors, he did so in rituals that emphasized his dominant position over his slaves.
Functional Diversity and its Implications for Organizational
Control: African-American slaves held a remarkable diversity of
the jobs within the Lowcountry plantation economy. The black
majority population and a physical climate that facilitated the
spread of such diseases as malaria and yellow fever drastically
limited the supply of free white skilled labor. Table 2 below summarizes the occupational distribution found on two Lowcountry
rice plantations [Joyner, 1984]:
This diverse occupational structure had two major implications of interest. First, it drew a high level of productivity from
the plantation’s slave labor force. All slaves worked, men and
women of all ages as well as children from age seven. While
most slaves toiled in the rice fields, many others worked in workshops surrounding the fields and in the planter’s residence. All
these jobs either directly or indirectly contributed to the size of
the annual harvest which, in turn, contributed to the plantation’s
profitability. Second, the presence of these non-field occupations
offered opportunities for those slaves who were willing to work
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TABLE 2
Distribution of Occupations among Slaves
Laurel Hill and Hagley Plantations, 1854
Occupation

Laurel Hill Plantation

Hagley Plantation

Field Hand

115

61

Drivers

3

1

Carpenters

10

3

Coopers

4

1

Carters

1

1

Bricklayers

1

0

Coachman

0

2

Engineer

3

0

Mill Hands

2

0

Mill Watchman

6

0

Cook

5

5

House Servant

6

9

Animal Minder

9

0

Stableman

1

0

Trunk Minder

1

1

Source: Joyner [1984, pp.61-62]

hard, not make trouble, or run away. Many advantages accrued
to the few slaves who became skilled artisans. For example, Mr.
X made it a practice to apprentice promising slave youngsters
for training as skilled workmen [Olmsted, 1856, p. 427]. Mr. X
relates the following brief biography of one of his favorite slave
artisans:
Being the son of a favorite house-servant, he had been,
as a child, associated with the white family, and received by chance something of the early education of
the white children. When old enough, he was allowed to
learn the blacksmith’s trade, in the plantation shop. Finally, his owner took him to a steam engine builder, and
paid him $500 to have him instructed as a machinist.
After he had become a skilled workman, he obtained
employment as an engineer; and for some years continued in this occupation, and was allowed to spend his
wages for himself. Mr. X eventually brought him, much
against his inclinations, back to the plantations. Being
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allowed peculiar privileges, and given duties wholly
flattering to his self-respect, he soon became contented;
and, of course, was able to be extremely valuable to his
owner.
This brief biography highlights many of the advantages that accrued to the few slaves who were able to become skilled artisans.
First and foremost, they were largely able to avoid the unhealthy
environment of the rice fields. Moreover, their command of
these skills enabled slave mechanics to have greater autonomy
over their work, the ability to travel unsupervised, and the opportunity to earn hard cash for their services [Olmsted, 1856].
As a consequence, black artisans commanded considerable status and prestige in the social hierarchy of the plantation’s slave
community. The continual striving for these relative advantages
by some slaves reflected their determination to make the best of
their subservient role under the slave regime.
The Lowcountry rice plantation was also a residential facility for the owner’s family as well as for hundreds of slaves.
Consequently, a number of slaves worked as cooks, domestics,
and child-care attendants. Olmsted [1856, p. 421] observed
that working in the “big house” offered many tangible rewards
to the domestic slave as well: “The labor required of them was
light, and they were treated with much more concern for their
health and comfort than is usually given to free domestics. They
live in brick cabins, adjoining the planter’s house and stables,
and one of these into which I looked, is neatly and comfortably
furnished.” Eating some of the food intended for the master’s
plate gave the domestic slave a better and more varied diet than
his field counterpart. Domestic servants were also better dressed
either as a function of their job duties or paternalistic hand-medowns from the master to “his favorite gal” or “uncle.” Finally,
sleeping in a mansion or adjoining brick structures was usually
warmer and drier than a night in the rudely constructed and
maintained “Negro houses.”
The Role of the Slave Driver: The position of driver was the
highest position of authority and responsibility open to the riceculture slaves [Clifton, 1981a]. The drivers’ primary work activities involved the personal supervision of the field hands under
their charge. Olmsted [1856, p. 432] accompanied Mr. X on daily
rounds of his holdings and observed that, “We found several
other gangs of negroes at work; one entirely of men engaging
in ditching; another of women, and another of boys and girls,
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listing an old corn-field with hoes. All of them were working by
tasks, and were overlooked by negro drivers.” P.C.J. Weston’s
[1786-1869, call #11/453] specimen overseers’ contract included
the following job description for his drivers: “Drivers are, under
the Overseer, to maintain discipline and order on the place. They
are to be responsible for the quiet of the negro houses, for the
proper performance of tasks, for bringing out the people early in
the morning, and generally for the immediate inspection of such
things as the Overseer only generally superintends.” As such, the
drivers constituted the primary link between the management
and task control systems on large rice plantations. The driver
would get the hands to the fields in the mornings, organize the
work gangs for the day, assign tasks, and excuse them upon the
satisfactory completion of the day’s labor. These slave drivers
were also the primary means through which work quality and
productivity standards were enforced upon the work activities of
the field hands in the Lowcountry rice fields. Olmsted [1856, p.
437] observed:
Before any field of work is entered upon by a gang, the
driver who is to superintend them has to measure and
stake off the tasks. To do this accurately, in irregularshaped fields, must require considerable powers of
calculation. A driver, with a boy to set stakes, I was told,
would accurately lay out forty acres a day, in half-acre
tasks. The only instrument used is a five-foot measuring
rod. When the gang comes to the field, he [the driver]
points out to each person his or her duty for the day,
and then walk about among them, looking out that each
proceeds properly.
The driver was also the primary mechanism through which
general controls were applied to ensure that task productivity
and quality standards were achieved by the field hands. Olmsted
[1856, p. 436] noted that, “It is the driver’s duty to make the
tasked hands do their work well. If, in their haste to finish it,
they neglect to do it properly, he ‘sets them back,’ so that carelessness will hinder more than it will hasten the completion of
their tasks.” Moreover, the driver’s responsibilities extended beyond the fields into the slave quarters and community. It was the
driver’s duty to maintain order among the field hands and other
slaves during their leisure hours, functioning as a policeman
and magistrate. Finally, the drivers provided the planter and his
hired manager with informational feedback on conditions in the
rice fields as well as the slave community. A Santee River, South
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Carolina, overseer reported that he required each of his three
drivers to report to him each evening. During these meetings,
each driver would report the work of the day just ended and
learn what undertakings were scheduled for the next day [Richmond Overseer Journal, 1859-1860, call #34/184].
The region’s generally unhealthy conditions and the small
size of its white population played a major role of limiting free
white participation in the drivers’ ranks. It is also possible that
the African origin of the tidal-rice technology and the supporting task labor system may have established a tradition of African slaves as labor supervisors or drivers on the rice plantations
[Clifton, 1981a]. In any event, the qualities for which a driver
received the greatest praise from a planter were intelligence,
managerial skills, and practical knowledge of the intricacies of
farming [Allston, 1945]. Olmsted [1856, p. 437] observed that
Mr. X went even further on his plantations:
Having generally had long experience on the plantation, the advice of the drivers is commonly taken in
nearly all the administration, and frequently they are,
de facto, the managers. Orders of the important points
of the plantation economy, I have heard given by the
proprietor directly to them, without the overseer’s being consulted or informed of them; and it is often left
with them to decide when and how long to flow the rice
grounds – the proprietor and overseer deferring to their
more experienced judgment.
Clearly, the driver’s job conveyed considerable status and
power. The drivers were often invested with their powers publicly amid great pomp and circumstance by their masters. For
example, Daniel, Benjamin Allston’s driver, was confirmed by
a local bishop [Allston, 1945]. A Santee River, South Carolina
overseer [Richmond Overseer Journal, 1859-1860, call #34/184]
always required that his Negro driver dress better than the other
slaves. He felt that his better clothes “caused him to maintain a
pride of character before them which was highly beneficial. Indeed, I constantly endeavored to do nothing which would cause
them to lose their respect for him.” Consequently, if this overseer felt a need to discipline or reprimand one of his drivers, it
was done in private. In summary, access to the power and status
conveyed by the position of driver helped motivate many slaves
to work hard and cooperatively with their masters.
The Overseer as COO and Managerial Accountant: Each year,
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at the end of May, fearing malaria (“country fever”), the Lowcountry rice planters and their families with their entourage of
domestic servants moved away from their plantations, not to
return until the first week in November [Boyle, 2005]. The overseer was the pivotal figure who managed the planter’s properties
during the cultivation and harvesting seasons. Scarborough
[1984] observed that the typical Lowcountry overseer was employed to provide absentee planters with on-site oversight and
routine operational reporting during the cultivation and harvesting seasons. Key measures of overseer performance included
births and deaths among the plantation population, the number
of persons in the plantation’s hospital, and the size and quality of the plantation’s rice and provisions crop. Consequently,
many overseers provided their employers with periodic written
reports about the plantation’s cultivation and harvesting activities as well as regular updates on their slaves’ general health and
mortality. Moreover, the Negro Act of 1740 required that a white
man be present for “each assembly of 10 or more negroes” and
more than 2,000 acres of land.
The relationships between plantation owners and their hired
managers were routinely governed by a management contract.
Allston retained William Thompson to work as his overseer from
1822 to 1839. While Thompson’s tenure as overseer extended
over 17 years, ended only by his death in 1838, his employment
relationship with Allston was governed by a series of one-year
contracts. According to his 1822 contract [Allston, 1945, pp. 245247], Thompson was to oversee Allston’s two plantations “and
the negroes, stock, barns, and every species of property thereon,
in a planter like manner….” While the contract enjoined Thompson “to exert himself to the utmost of his power for the interest
of his employer with care, skill, fidelity, sobriety, and ability,” as
overseer he was expected to act “with moderation and humanity
to the negroes.” Thus, the first duty of the overseer was to take
care of the slaves and the stock. Moreover, the phrase “planter
like manner” suggests the overseer’s primary duty was to be exercised in the spirit of the benevolent plantation owner with an
eye to the long-term well being of the slaves and stock. Specifically, the overseer was explicitly forbidden by his contract from
“striking a negro with a stick,” and he could only administer any
form of corporal punishment after first seeking and obtaining
permission from the plantation owner or his family. Failure to
do so would be grounds for dismissal. Next, he was to see to
it that enough food was produced for use on the plantation to
feed its human and animal population. Planters sought to have
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their plantations self-sufficient through the growing of com and
raising livestock. While the overseer was expected to maximize
plantation production of its cash crop, rice, it is interesting to
note that Thompson’s contract contains no provisions related
to that issue or the size of its seasonal agricultural output. His
compensation was fixed at “the full sum of Five Hundred Dollars
to be paid at the end of the term (year), & to allow him for the
year, a negro woman to cook & wash, & a negro boy to wait on
him.”
Where Allston offered his overseer a concisely written contract consisting of three paragraphs, P.C.J. Weston [1786-1869,
call #11/453] offered his overseers a contract consisting of 17
paragraphs. The contract specified the overseer’s duties and
obligations to his employer in very explicit and detailed terms.
The first provision of the contract states that the overseer’s primary objective “is to be, under all circumstances, the care and
well being of the negroes.” This state of well being, however, is
explicitly defined paternalistically in terms of “obedience, order,
and discipline.” His secondary objective was to maintain the
plantation’s physical plant and livestock. His tertiary objective
was to produce the largest possible crop of rice and provisions.
The contract goes on to describe the nature, timing, amount,
and appropriate mode of distributing the slaves’ food rations
in extensive detail. The overseer was to enforce a work holiday
schedule including “Good Friday, or Christmas day, or any Sunday.” Work was permitted on these days only as a punishment
for some criminal offense or the failure to complete an assigned
task. The contract also specified the appropriate timing and administration of punishment. Specifically, “it is desirable to allow
24 hours to elapse between the discovery of the offense and the
punishment. No punishment is to exceed 15 lashes…Confinement is to be preferred to whipping.” Finally, the overseer was
expected to prepare weekly reports “from which the Proprietor
[owner] will obtain most of the facts he desires….”
While the overseers’ periodic plantation activities and status reports have shared common topics, they varied greatly in
their form. Franklin Collins, an overseer on the Chicora Woods
Plantation, sent Allston a series of weekly reports summarizing
plantation activities during 1858 [Allston, 1945, p. 262]. These
weekly reports were a collection of seven summaries of daily
activity. These brief summaries covered such diverse activities
as the distribution of the slaves’ food rations (always done on
Sunday), the conduct of regular Sunday worship services, a
listing of sick slaves (always done on Saturday), a description
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of a whipping (e.g., “Punished Jacob, 39 strips”), a description
of food production activities (e.g., “Sam Picking Potatoes”), as
well as a description of the day’s cultivating activities (e.g., “All
Hands Hoeing rice”). E.W. Rose, an overseer on Thomas Coffin’s [1800-1813, call #34/199] rice plantation in the Beaufort
District of South Carolina kept a day book in which daily tasks
and Sunday ration distributions were recorded. Dr. Benjamin
Huger owned 155 slaves on the Richmond Plantation on the
Cooper River near Charleston, South Carolina. His overseer,
whose name is not noted in the archival record, maintained an
exhaustive journal on plantation activities from 1859 to 1860
[Richmond Overseer Journal, 1859-1860, call #34/184]. A typical
daily journal entry would routinely include a reference to the
day’s weather (e.g., “The weather was fine”), a description of
the day’s work activities (e.g., “All hands thrashed rice”), and a
roll call of sick slaves (e.g., “three sick”). His daily journals also
chronicled the production of food for the plantation such as the
cultivation of corn and potatoes or the care and slaughter of pigs
and chickens. The distribution of rations (e.g., “gave allowance
of potatoes and ‘small’ rice to the hands”) was also noted. Within
the year’s chronicles, only one instance of corporal punishment
(e.g., “Stanley was beat”) was noted. His journals also provided
an accounting of the Richmond Plantation’s November 1859
rice harvest between the barrels of “market” rice, “seed” rice (for
next year’s planting) , and “negro” or “small” rice (rations for the
slaves).
A review of these three plantations’ correspondence did
not reveal any form of quantitative objective setting, financial
budgeting, or formal operational planning that are fundamental
elements of contemporary management control systems. The
planters’ normative expectations represented the standards
against which the overseers’ performance would be judged. For
example, P.C.J. Weston’s [1786-1869, call #11/453] specimen
overseers’ contract included the following paragraph:
The Proprietor wishes particularly to impress on the
Overseer the criterions by which he will judge his usefulness and capacity. First – by the general well being
of the negroes; their cleanly appearance, respectful
manners, active and vigorous appearance; their completion of their tasks well and early; the small amount of
punishment; the excess of births over deaths; the small
number of persons in the hospitals, and the health of
the children. Secondly – the condition and fatness of the
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cattle and mules; the good repair of all the fences and
buildings, harness, boats, flats, and ploughs; more particularly the good order of the banks and trunks, and the
freedom of the fields from grass and volunteer. Thirdly –
the amount and quality of the rice and provision crops.
Figure 2 below graphically summarizes the application of
this study’s conceptual model of management control-systems
design for large 19th century Carolinas Lowcountry rice plantations.
Figure 2
A Contingency Theory Model of Management Control
Design for Large Mid-19th Century Carolinas Tidal-Rice
Slave Plantations
Institutional Environment

Technical Environment
•
•

The geography of the Carolinas
lowcountry
The hard labor and knowhow of
the West African work force

•
•

Chattel Slavery
Maroon Communities

Plantation Management Control System
General Controls
Supervision by Hired Oversees and Enslaved Drivers
Reporting & Feedback
Overseers’ Day Journals and Oral Reports
Compensation & Incentives
Cash Compensation, Occupational Status and Free Time
Corporal Punishment and Confinement

Plantation Task Control System
Task Specification and Programming
The Tasking System for Organizing Agricultural Activities
Diverse Functional Structure outside the Rice Fields
Quality Control
On Site Evaluation by Overseers and Drivers

Organizational Outcomes
Cash & Economic Profitability of Large Rice Plantations
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The overseers’ periodic reports provided the bottom-up communications necessary to close the feedback cycle of the control
process. The plantations’ absentee owners used this feedback
to obtain a view of their plantation’s productive activities and
the state of its physical and human resources. These journals
and narrative reports also helped the planters to assess their
managerial stewardship. Generally, the content of these reports
focused on non-financial metrics of agricultural cultivation,
crops harvested, or measures of human activities (slave births,
death, etc.). A review of several overseers’ reports revealed very
limited attempts at labor cost accounting. Monetary metrics of
costs and revenues do not appear to be a part of the overseers’
operational reporting activities. Reports from factors and sales
agents appear to be the planters’ primary sources of financial
information about their plantations’ productivity [Allston, 1945,
pp. 357, 409]. The findings suggest that rice planters relied on
the general controls of personal supervision by their overseers
and drivers and the feedback of written and face-to-face reports
from their white and black managers to maintain control of
their agricultural operations.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a model of management controlsystems design whose fit to three key contextual factors explains
the favorable organizational outcomes that demonstrate the
design’s effectiveness. These three key contextual variables – the
natural features of the Carolinas Lowcountry, the hard labor and
agricultural knowhow of the West-African slaves who worked
the rice fields, and the institution of chattel slavery itself – described the work to be done and the technology to be employed.
Large ante-bellum rice plantations utilized a characteristic
control design that enabled them to be very profitable economic
enterprises. The South Carolina Lowcountry planters’ control
was characterized by a hierarchical organizational structure, the
tasking system of labor organization, a diverse functional structure, and an elaborate system of positive and negative incentives
to motivate their slave workers. Plantation owners typically delegated operating authority to overseers and drivers during the
crucial cultivation and harvesting seasons. The overseers provided the owners with periodic reports summarizing the plantation’s agricultural operations and regular written updates on
the health and social status of the plantation’s slave population.
Most overseers delegated considerable supervisory authority to
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the drivers in order to control the plantation’s agricultural and
supporting activities. The drivers established daily performance
standards for the plantation’s field hands and measured their
performance relative to these standards to complete the task
control cycle. The use of the tasking system offered the agricultural workers with a clear short-term incentive for productivity.
The expedient completion of a field hand’s daily task offered a
brief but welcome respite from the brutal Carolina sun or the
opportunity to earn cash income from growing staple crops or
raising livestock. Other slaves performed key roles in these complex manufacturing, residential, and agricultural enterprises.
While there were no good jobs for a slave under chattel slavery’s
regime, skilled slave artisans and domestics enjoyed generally
better lives than those toiling in the fields. Consequently, many
slaves worked cooperatively with their masters to achieve these
opportunities. Ultimately, all slaves were men and women who
were aggressively denied the most basic human rights. As such,
those who failed to meet task performance standards, racist behavioral expectations, or tried to run away were subject to brutal
punishment such as confinement, whippings, or hanging.
This paper makes two major contributions to the accounting history literature through its focus on the organizational
control structure of a group of large ante-bellum slave plantations. Existing accounting history literature pays only passing
attention to the management control process of large slave plantations which were among the largest commercial enterprises in
the mid-19th century U.S. This paper closely examines both the
relationship between plantation owners and managers as well as
the communication that closed the control feedback loop. Additionally, this paper departs from the current focus of contemporary accounting history literature on American slavery solely as
unskilled laborers and inert objects of their masters’ activities.
The West-African origins of tidal-flow agricultural technology
and the tasking labor-control system were major contextual factors in the control systems of these large rice plantations. The
activities of slave drivers were central to managerial, task, and
social control on the plantation. Though backed fully by the
overwhelming power of the state and a dominant culture of
white supremacy, white planters were not all powerful. They
needed to elicit the active cooperation of their slave workers and
managers if their agricultural holdings were to run efficiently
and effectively. The planters in the Lowcountry rice culture used
both the crushing oppression of ante-bellum chattel slavery as
well as an integrated system of controls and incentives to obtain
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the managerial talents and skilled labor from their enslaved
workers. Their hard labor, skills, and talents were an integral
factor in the profitability of large mid-19th century rice plantations.
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SPROUSE’S WHAT-YOU-MAY-CALL-ITS:
FUNDAMENTAL INSIGHT OR
MONUMENTAL MISTAKE?
Abstract: We critically evaluate Sprouse’s 1966 Journal of Accountancy
article, which prodded the FASB towards a balance-sheet approach.
We highlight three errors in this article. First, Sprouse confuses
necessary and sufficient conditions by arguing that good accounting
systems must satisfy the balance-sheet equation. Second, Sprouse’s
insinuation that financial analysts rely on balance-sheet analysis is
contradicted by contemporary and current security-analysis textbooks, analysts’ written reports, and interviews with analysts. Third,
and most crucially, Sprouse does not recognize that the primary role
of accounting systems is to help managers discover and exploit profitable exchange opportunities, without which firms cannot survive.

INTRODUCTION
“Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of
a few years back” [Keynes, 1936, p. 383].
“If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts
to improve the social order, he will have to learn that in
this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of
an organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full
knowledge which would make mastery of the events
possible” [Hayek, 1975, p. 442].
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Soon after it was established, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) adopted an asset-liability approach
supplanting the previous revenue-expense approach summarized by Paton and Littleton [1940]. Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 6 [FASB, 1985a] begins by defining
assets and liabilities and discusses income measurement only
secondarily as reflecting changes in assets and liabilities. Many
FASB standards are strongly influenced by this balance-sheet
primacy perspective. Storey and Storey [1998, p. 76], who claim
that the asset-liability approach is “the most controversial, and
the most misunderstood and misrepresented, concept in the entire conceptual framework,” argue that (p. 83):
The revenue and expense view is still deeply ingrained
in many accountants’ minds, and the first reaction to an
accounting problem is to think about ‘proper matching
of costs and revenues.’ Time will be needed for them to
become accustomed to thinking first about effects of
transactions or other events on assets or liabilities (or
both) and then about how the effect on assets and liabilities has affected revenues, expenses, gains, or losses.
Many will be able to make that adjustment only with
difficulty, and a significant number simply will make no
attempt to do so, clinging instead to the revenue and expense view. The FASB’s experience suggests that a long
tradition of ad hoc accounting principles has fostered
a propensity to resist restraints on flexibility, especially
those that limit an enterprise’s ability to decide what
can be included in income for a period. (emphasis in
original)
While a decade has passed since Storey and Storey penned these
words, the revenue-expense view has not disappeared from the
accounting lexicon [Barth, 2008, pp. 1,166-1,169].
The FASB’s asset-liability approach stems from an influential article by Robert T. Sprouse, titled “Accounting for WhatYou-May-Call-Its” [Storey and Storey, 1998, pp. 51-69].1 Dr.
Sprouse was an original member of the FASB (1973-1985), its

1
Dr. Sprouse’s 2007 obituary noted that his “work had an enormous impact
on the development of the board’s conceptual framework. His 1966 article, “Accounting for What-You-May-Call-Its,” in the Journal of Accountancy, laid the
groundwork for the FASB’s asset-liability approach.” Dr. Sprouse’s obituary can
be found at www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/sprouseobit.html. Dr. Sprouse
was president of the American Accounting Association (1972-1973) before joining
the FASB.
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longstanding Vice Chairman (1975-1985), and his ideas shaped
the FASB’s vision. The unanimous passage of SFAS 2 [FASB,
1974] and SFAS 5 [FASB, 1975a] signaled the FASB’s commitment to the primacy of the “asset-and-liability view” over the
traditional “revenue-and-expense view” [Zeff, 2005, p. 20]. The
FASB Conceptual Framework that was largely written during
Dr. Sprouse’s FASB tenure enshrined this view for future U.S.
standard setting. Because Sprouse [1966] was a formative factor
in the current “asset-liability” approach to recognition and the
“fair-value” approach to measurement, we re-evaluate its core
arguments.2
Sprouse [1966, p. 45] makes two specific claims. First, accounting’s foundation lies in the traditional balance-sheet identity that Assets = Liabilities + Equities. Second, if the balancesheet identity is valid, it implies that balance-sheet accounts that
are inconsistent with specific definitions of assets and liabilities
are fallacious. Sprouse’s key assertion is an “if-then” proposition
that acceptance of the balance-sheet equation implies that it is
the starting point for identifying a valid accounting system. To
support his claim that investors emphasize the balance sheet,
Sprouse cites the importance given to a “safety” measure in a
recent edition of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis.
Sprouse’s claims have been widely, although not universally,
accepted. Despite several recent critiques of the asset-liability
approach [e.g., Benston et al., 2007; Penman, 2007; Dichev,
2008; O’Brien, 2009; Palmrose, 2009], it pervades the new Conceptual Framework project of the FASB and the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and if left unchallenged,
will likely shape U.S. and international accounting standards
for decades to come.3 We revisit Sprouse’s original paper and

2
Soon after Sprouse [1966] was published, the Accounting Principles Board
(APB) began a project in September 1968 to have marketable securities reported
at fair value on the balance sheet. Intense lobbying against the proposal by financial firms led to the SEC rapidly distancing itself from the APB’s position (during
September 1971 to March 1972), which contributed to the APB’s demise [Horngren, 1973, pp. 63-64]. Early FASB standards such as SFAS 8 [FASB, 1975b] resuscitated the fair-value approach by requiring unrealized gains and losses from
foreign currency transactions and translations to flow through earnings, provoking strong opposition from firms and rapid modification of standards [e.g., SFAS
52, FASB, 1981].
3
Although our focus is on the FASB, the IASB has advocated the balance-sheet
approach more forcefully in recent years. The IASB maintains a webpage for the
new Conceptual Framework at www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/
Conceptual+Framework/Conceptual+Framework.htm.
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develop three critiques (in ascending order of importance): (1)
Sprouse commits a logical error by not distinguishing between
necessary and sufficient conditions; (2) the evidence Sprouse
cites actually supports the claim he seeks to refute; namely, that
readers of financial statements place primary emphasis on the
income statement; and (3) the asset-liability approach leads to
an accounting system based on classificational double-entry,
which erodes the direct link between accounting by double-entry
and the economic function of a profit-seeking firm.4
In making his claims, Sprouse confuses necessary with
sufficient conditions. He correctly states that a double-entry
system that violates the balance-sheet identity is fallacious since
a violation of the identity implies that the sum of all debits does
not equal the sum of all credits. But, this merely restates the
long-recognized value of double-entry as a recording system
with built-in accuracy checks for a given classification of assets,
liabilities, and equities [e.g., Ijiri, 1975]. However, Sprouse’s
proposition can say nothing about whether one classification
scheme is better than another. So long as accountants follow
double-entry when journalizing and posting transactions, the
balance-sheet identity must hold for any asset, liability, and
equity definitions. Furthermore, it is far from self-evident that
the balance sheet should comprise exactly and only these three
categories.
Sprouse commits a second interpretational error when he
suggests that investors primarily demand balance-sheet information. Sprouse [1966, p. 45] quotes a definition of “safety” from
Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis to support his claim that
some investors seek information on assets and liabilities. However, Sprouse simply misreads this classic text when he infers
that investors’ interest in investment “safety” warrants greater
accounting emphasis on the balance sheet. Graham and Dodd
measure “margin of safety” using earning power, which they
derive without using the balance sheet. Furthermore, a broader
reading indicates that Graham and Dodd emphasize incomestatement analysis over balance-sheet analysis. In other words,
Sprouse’s claim of balance-sheet primacy is roundly rejected
by the very text he quotes to support his argument. Even more
4
We use the term financial-statement “readers” because we have in mind people who actually read financial statements and disclosures and then act upon that
information. This stands in contrast to some prototypical “user” that has been
self-constructed by standard setters and bears little resemblance to economic actors who make decisions in markets [Young, 2006].
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damning, Horngren [1955b] had previously documented that
financial analysts overwhelmingly focused on the income statement in their investment analyses.
A third issue is subtler but of far greater significance.
Sprouse’s balance-sheet primacy view essentially proposes an
accounting framework based on classificational double-entry.
Such a system ignores the causality recognized when resource
increments and decrements associated with exchange are simultaneously linked through the debit and credit of a journal entry
[Ijiri, 1975, pp. 80-84]. A classificational, double-entry system
does not align accounting measurement with a firm’s economic
function, which is to discover profitable exchange opportunities
in a world of uncertainty and costly knowledge [Coase, 1937;
Hayek, 1945, 1968]. The historical-cost accounting system with
an income-measurement focus has evolved over centuries to
help firms make better decisions when competing with other
firms and other economic institutions [Mises, 1952; Ball, 1989].
Emphasizing balance-sheet measurement rather than the
value created through profit-seeking exchange transactions is a
monumental mistake because it undermines each firm’s survival
in competition with other organizations. While an immediate
result is that the accounting system will not reflect a firm’s “business model” [Dichev, 2008], the far bigger problem is that the
accounting system no longer facilitates successful exchange and
productive division of labor, which support successful market
economies [Smith, 1776].
Mr. Sprouse’s legacy is now forever linked with the ultimate
success of the FASB-IASB Conceptual Framework. We believe
several legacies are possible. One is that the asset-liability approach will survive over the long haul and will eventually be
viewed as having improved the quality of financial reporting
worldwide. In this case, Sprouse [1966] will be hailed, in spite
of its limitations, for persuasively articulating an important
view of accounting that beneficially redirected standard setting.
An alternative legacy is that the FASB will not survive, in part
because the asset-liability approach lessens financial-reporting
quality. In this case, Sprouse will be remembered as a progenitor of what we view as dysfunctional accounting. A third possibility is that accountants are condemned to cycling between
balance-sheet and income-statement approaches, evidenced by
the income-statement approach of the 1930s itself supplanting
an earlier balance-sheet focus [Hendriksen, 1970; Waymire and
Basu, 2007]. Yet another alternative is that the debate will turn
out to be moot because future financial-reporting improvements
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will lead to a radically different reporting environment where
readers can customize financial statements using any approach
they want. We, of course, cannot distinguish these possibilities
absent a crystal ball that allows us to peer into the future. Nonetheless, since old ideas are frequently revived as times change,
we advise accountants to preserve their copies of Paton and
Littleton [1940] in case the income-statement approach is again
resurgent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We detail
Sprouse’s claims in the next section, and then discuss the issues of necessary versus sufficient conditions, evidentiary
support, and problems associated with classificational doubleentry in the following three sections respectively. A final section contains our concluding thoughts on the legacy of Sprouse
[1966].
A BRIEF REVIEW OF SPROUSE’S CLAIMS
The opening paragraph of Sprouse [1966] claims that American accounting students start their education with the balancesheet identity:
For most of us, among the very first subjects we were
exposed to in the study of accounting was the fundamental accounting equation and the nature of its components – assets, liabilities and owners’ equity. Slightly
different terminology may have been used or it may
have been stated in a slightly different way, but there
never has been any doubt about the substance or the
fundamental importance of the accounting equation:
Assets equal liabilities plus owners’ equity. Indeed, the
accounting equation is a truism – yet it is an extraordinarily meaningful and useful one. The statement of
financial position lists the entity’s resources and the
claims against those resources; the difference is the
owners’ equity. If one accepts the validity of the fundamental accounting equation, every account necessarily
falls into one of those three categories – assets or liabilities or owners’ equity – and an accounting analysis that
ends up with anything that does not fit any of those
three categories is necessarily fallacious. (emphasis in
original)
We critically examine Sprouse’s “if-then” proposition that if
we accept that the balance-sheet identity as universally valid (at
least under double-entry bookkeeping [DEB]), then accounting
systems that fail to maintain the balance-sheet identity must be
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fallacious.5
After recognizing that mid-1960s accounting practice emphasized income measurement, Sprouse [1966, p. 45] argues
that attaching primary importance to income measurement
could have negative consequences for financial statement users:
If this were only a matter of assuaging accounting theoreticians’ sensibilities, it could be chalked up as merely
another conflict between what teachers teach and what
practitioners do. On the other hand, if one is prepared
to admit that users of financial statements often attach
importance to the reported relationship between liabilities and assets and to the reported earnings per share,
this is a matter of considerable significance to both
practitioners and academicians.
Sprouse [1966, pp. 45-46] quotes the concept of “safety”
from the most recent edition of Security Analysis [Graham et al.,
1962] to support this latter claim, saying:
We may reasonably assume that those who are concerned with the relationship of liabilities and assets (or,
stated another way, the relationship of debt and equity)
are interested in liabilities as obligations to convey assets or perform services – obligations representing a
future demand on assets. This is the essence of financial position. For example, a leading reference in security analysis presents the following ‘principle’: ‘Safety
is measured not by a specific lien of contractual rights,
but by the ability of the issuer to meet all its obligations.’ Accordingly, where what-you-may-call-its appear
among the liabilities, the analyst is forced to do the accountant’s job of determining whether such accounts
are actually contra assets or an element of stockholders’
equity. Unfortunately, the analyst’s reclassification is
almost certain to be based on less information than was
available to the accountant.
In other words, Sprouse unilaterally assumes that some
users are interested in a balance-sheet approach to valuation,
and then further insinuates that some such users are financial
analysts using the quotation as evidence. Sprouse next discusses

5
One definition of a “fallacy” from Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary is
“a false or mistaken idea.” We infer that Mr. Sprouse used the term fallacious to
communicate the idea that accurate, high-quality accounting would not result
when the balance-sheet identity was not maintained.
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three contemporary accounting controversies where amortization of poorly defined balance-sheet components resulted in
artificially smoothed income. Sprouse [1966, p. 52] concludes by
recommending development of a conceptual basis for accounting consistent with the asset-liability approach:
The emergence of the three kinds of what-you-may-callits discussed here underscores the crucial need for the
kind of fundamental analytical framework the Accounting Principles Board was created to provide and utilize.
In the absence of established fundamentals – fundamentals such as the nature of assets and the nature of
liabilities, fundamentals that hopefully would lead logically and consistently to sound solutions to accounting’s
many problems – one is forced to predict that, as new
accounting problems arise, the number of what-youmay-call-its will tend to increase.
To summarize, Sprouse asserts that a balance sheet containing only well-defined assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity is the
hallmark of a valid accounting system since the balance-sheet
identity is a fundamental accounting relation. Quoting Graham
and Dodd’s Security Analysis, Sprouse next infers that at least
some users and analysts demand information on assets and
liabilities and that effective security analysis requires better balance sheets. To achieve this, he recommends the development of
a conceptual framework that starts by defining what he regards
as the fundamentals – assets and liabilities.
SPROUSE’S CONFUSION BETWEEN
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section, we consider the implications of the claim
that if an accounting system fails to maintain the balance-sheet
identity, then the resultant system is fallacious. This statement
is true in that it establishes a necessary condition for accounting under double-entry, but it is not a sufficient condition. The
balance-sheet equation can hold for any number of classificational, double-entry systems with fundamental differences in
how assets, liabilities, and equities are defined. For instance, the
balance-sheet equation can hold regardless of whether convertible debt is classified as all equity, all liability, placed in a mezzanine equity section, or arbitrarily allocated between equity and
liabilities.
DEB requires that the sum of debits is equal to the sum of
credits for each transaction or event recorded by a journal entry,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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and that this identity extends to the sum of debits and credits
for multiple transactions. Thus, a trial balance struck among
existing accounts will maintain the total debits = total credits
identity so long as all individual entries and postings maintain
this identity. Further, this identity holds regardless of which specific “nominal” accounts are pulled into the income statement.
The balance-sheet identity will hold for a system where all R&D
expenditures are immediately expensed as in SFAS 2 [FASB,
1974], one where research costs are expensed but development
costs are capitalized as in SFAS 86 [FASB, 1985b] for software
costs, or one where all R&D costs are capitalized as assets.
The balance-sheet equation will hold even if incorrect
measures are used. Consider a firm that pays $10,000 cash to acquire a machine that is expected to last five years. Assume also
that other firms purchased identical assets at the same time,
but did not pay identical prices, perhaps because of differences
in negotiating skill or information acquired through market
search.6 For simplicity, assume that transaction prices in this
asset market are uniformly distributed between a minimum of
$10,000 and a maximum of $14,000. That is, the firm bought the
machine for $2,000 less than the average price of $12,000 at the
same point in time.
The standard journal entry for this transaction would involve a debit to a Long-Term Asset and a credit to Cash. After
this entry, the balance sheet identity is maintained since assets
are increased by $10,000 for the machine but reduced $10,000
for the decrease in cash.
Suppose instead that this transaction had been recorded as
follows:
Long-Term Assets (A)
12,000
Gain on machine acquisition (OE)
2,000
Cash (A)
10,000
This journal entry would establish the long-term asset at its fair
value of $12,000 (i.e., the average of exchange prices in market
transactions consummated at the same time) with part of the
offset going to an equity account for the gain. This entry would
increase total assets by $2,000 (the difference between the longterm asset increase and the cash decrease) and owners’ equity
would increase by $2,000.
Both treatments for this transaction maintain the balancesheet identity even though the totals of assets and equities differ.
6
Price heterogeneity can persist under competition when buyers have heterogeneous information on the distribution of offer prices [Stigler, 1961].
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We cannot evaluate whether one treatment for the asset acquisition is more appropriate than the other by merely comparing
consistency with the balance-sheet identity. Rather, that evaluation requires separate definitions of asset, liability, and equity,
and the definitions of these terms (along with definitions of income) will determine whether the specific classifications applied
within DEB are sensible.
The balance-sheet identity will hold even if every alternate
transaction is not recorded and even if fictitious transactions
are recorded. Both a cash-basis accounting system and the U.S.
tax-accounting system meet the balance-sheet equation. Put
differently, there is nothing magical about a balance sheet that
balances so long as DEB is being applied, and Sprouse’s balancesheet primacy would not ensure good accounting.
THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR SPROUSE’S
CLAIMS OF BALANCE-SHEET PRIMACY
We next evaluate Sprouse’s evidence for his claim that some
investors demand information primarily about assets and liabilities. Sprouse quotes Security Analysis, “Safety is measured
not by a specific lien of contractual rights, but by the ability of
the issuer to meet all its obligations,” to insinuate that at least
some analysts focused primarily on the balance sheet. Sprouse
is correct that Graham and Dodd considered “safety” to be of
first-order importance in financial analysis, but he incorrectly
projects on to the second half of the quoted sentence his belief
that security analysts use the balance sheet to measure safety.
We claim that Sprouse misreads Security Analysis because
Graham and Dodd measure “ability to meet obligations” using
“earning power” rather than net-asset values.
Unfortunately for Sprouse, Graham and Dodd’s primary
“margin of safety” measure makes no reference to the balance
sheet. In The Intelligent Investor, Graham [1973, pp. 277-287]
summarizes the margin of safety as indicative of an investmentgrade security. In describing this concept in connection with
bonds and preferred stocks, Graham states:
All experienced investors recognize that the margin-ofsafety concept is essential to the choice of sound bonds
and preferred stocks. For example, a railroad should
have earned its total fixed charges better than five times
(before income tax), taking a period of years, for its
bonds to qualify as investment-grade issues. This past
ability to earn in excess of interest requirements consti-
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tutes the margin of safety that is counted on to protect
the investor against loss or discomfiture in the event of
some future decline in net income. (emphasis in original)
Graham [1973, pp. 278-279] advocates a similar approach
for common stocks by stating that a common stock’s margin of
safety “lies in an expected earning power considerably above the
going rate for bonds.” Graham’s primary measure of “safety” for
both bondholders and stockholders is a coverage ratio calculated
using income statement data and requires no data from the balance sheet. Sprouse’s suggestion that an investment’s “safety”
is better measured by balance-sheet analysis than incomestatement analysis is clearly inconsistent with Graham’s views.
The idea that margin of safety should be measured primarily in terms of net-asset values instead of earning power is generally absent in the original edition of Graham and Dodd [1934].
Graham and Dodd cite “margin of safety,” “safety,” or “risk” on
39 separate pages, according to the book’s index. None of these
citations make sole reference to corporate net assets or other
balance-sheet measures, eight make reference only to corporate
earnings, and three make reference to both earnings and netasset measures. Graham [1973, p. 278] does describe an alternative measure of margin of safety for a bond or preferred stock
based on market values of securities, but this clearly is labeled
as an alternative measure and is reported only after discussion
of the income-based measure of margin of safety.
A broader review of Security Analysis is also inconsistent
with a greater emphasis on the balance sheet than the income
statement. Table 1 tabulates data on the contents of Graham
and Dodd [1934]. Panel A indicates that the book runs 729 total
pages with the core of the book conveyed in 52 chapters. Panel
B indicates that Graham and Dodd devote roughly equal parts
of the text to an analysis of bonds and preferred stocks (39% of
total pages) and common stocks (40% of total pages). Within the
chapters on common stocks, income-account analysis precedes
balance-sheet analysis, and income analysis commands more
than double the space (135 pages for the income statement, 57
for the balance sheet).7
7
After noting an earlier historical emphasis on net tangible asset book value,
Graham and Dodd [1934, pp. 491-494] recognize that book value plays an important, but secondary, role to earnings: “Before we discard completely this timehonored conception of book value, let us ask whether it may ever have practical
significance for the analyst. In the ordinary case, probably not. But what of the
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TABLE 1
Description of Contents for Security Analysis
by Graham and Dodd [1934]
A: Page Counts for Book Components in Security Analysis
Component

Number of Pages

Preface & Table of Contents

5

Introduction

13

Main Text (in 52 Chapters)

603

Appendix

83

Index

25

TOTAL

729

B: Chapter and Page Counts for Parts of Main Text in Security Analysis
# Chapters

# Pages

I.

Survey and Approach

Title

5

50

II.

Fixed-Value Investments

16

173

III.

Senior Securities with Speculative Features

5

62

IV.

Theory of Common-Stock Investment: The
Dividend Factor

4

51

V.

Analysis of the Income Account: The Earnings
Factor in Common-Stock Valuation

11

135

VI.

Balance-Sheet Analysis: Implications of Asset
Values

4

57

VII. Additional Aspects of Security Analysis,
Discrepancies between Price and Value
TOTAL

7

75

52

603

Similarly, Graham and Dodd [1934] ascribe greater importance to earnings and its coverage of interest than net-asset
position in evaluating bonds and preferred stocks. As regards
industrial bonds, Graham and Dodd [1934, p. 85] state that
“the investor would seem to gain better protection against
adverse developments by confining his industrial selections to
companies which meet the two requirements of (1) dominant
size, and (2) substantial margin of earnings over bond interest.”
extraordinary or extreme case?....Book value deserves at least a fleeting glance by
the public before it buys or sells shares in a business undertaking…Let the stock
buyer, if he lays claim to intelligence, at least be able to tell himself, first, how
much he is actually paying for the business, and secondly, what he is actually getting for his money in terms of tangible resources.” (emphasis added)
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This statement is generalized subsequently as the “present-day
investor is accustomed to regard the ratio of earnings to interest
charges as the most important specific test of safety” [Graham
and Dodd, 1934, p. 105]. The emphasis on coverage of capital
charges applies also to preferred stocks [see Graham and Dodd,
1934, pp. 158, 168].8
Our re-examination of Graham and Dodd’s text is inconsistent with Sprouse’s inference that financial analysts should or
actually do place greater emphasis on the balance sheet than
the income statement. Nor were Sprouse’s views consistent with
prevailing security analysis. For his Ph.D. dissertation, Horngren [1955a] surveyed the investment analysis literature, scrutinized 123 written analyst reports, and interviewed 51 financial
analysts to understand the information use of financial analysts.
American financial analysts behaved largely as Graham and
Dodd recommended. Horngren [1955b, p. 576] reported:
The income statement is regarded as the most important reflector of the operations of the firm. There is a
definite tendency to think in terms of ‘normal earning
power,’ but all components of the statement are examined carefully…The most important ratio is considered
to be the percent of net operating profit before income
taxes to sales.
Previts et al. [1994] apply content analysis to more recent
sell-side U.S. financial analysts’ reports and find that incomestatement-related terms or phrases appear three times as often
as combined references to balance-sheet and cash-flow terms.9
Francis et al. [1997] find that at corporate presentations to
the New York Society of Security Analysts, management most
8
As with common stocks, Graham and Dodd assigned a clearly secondary
role to balance-sheet analysis for other securities like industrial bonds. Graham
and Dodd [1934, p. 151] state: “For reasons already explained, a company’s statement of its fixed assets will not ordinarily carry much weight in determining the
soundness of its bonds. But the current-asset position has an important bearing
upon the financial strength of nearly all industrial enterprises, and consequently
the intending bond purchaser should give it close attention. It is true that industrial bonds which meet the stringent tests already prescribed will in nearly every
instance be found to make a satisfactory working-capital exhibit as well, but a
separate check is nevertheless desirable in order to guard against the exceptional
case.” (emphasis in original)
9
Breton and Taffler [2001] find that U.K. analyst reports are four times as
likely to include profitability information as balance-sheet information, and analyst stock recommendations are significantly positively associated with the profitability information but not with the balance-sheet information.
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f requently discusses revenues and earnings, and security
analysts ask most frequently about sales revenues, earnings, and
output prices. During conference calls, security analysts most
frequently request data on recent operating performance components such as revenues and costs and forecasts of future revenues and costs [Tasker, 1998a].10 Chen et al. [2002] report that
only about one-third of firms voluntarily disclose balance sheets
in their quarterly earnings announcements, suggestive of lower
demand for balance-sheet data.
Furthermore, analysts prefer earnings computed without
a balance-sheet focus.11 As Black [1980, p. 19] trenchantly observes:
Users of financial statements – analysts, stockholders,
creditors, managers, tax authorities and even economists – really want an earnings figure that measures
value, not change in value. Analysts, for example, want
an earnings number they can multiply by a standard
price-earnings ratio to arrive at an estimate of the firm’s
value. Accordingly, the ideal set of accounting rules is
one that makes the price-earnings ratio as constant as
possible. The main thing lacking in present accounting
practice is the recognition that this has been the goal all
along.
Consistent with this claim, Philbrick and Ricks [1991], Gu
and Chen [2004], and others report that in constructing “street
earnings,” financial analysts routinely discard non-recurring,
income-statement items (called special items by Compustat) that
are generated by GAAP attempts to measure the balance-sheet
accurately.12 Demirakos et al. [2004] analyze the contents of analysts’ reports and find that the most common valuation models
are based on price-earnings multiples, whereas book-value-of10
Tasker [1998b] summarizes the transcripts of two typical quarterly conference calls which clearly show that analysts usually focus on recent operating performance and prospects for future revenues and costs.
11
Gilman [1941] surveyed 300 bank credit analysts to determine the importance of the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation rule for credit analysis.
Of the 176 respondents (58.7% of 300), 131 (74.4% of 176) replied that they would
be satisfied with both balance sheet and income statement reported at cost if
the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation number was also disclosed parenthetically on the balance sheet or in a footnote. The survey results appear inconsistent with a single-best, balance-sheet format.
12
Financial analysts also state that they are unlikely to find the capitalization
of intangible assets on the balance sheet to be useful despite the FASB’s and the
IASB’s claims that analysts want this information [e.g., Elwin, 2008].
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equity multiples or asset multiples are rarely used. Asquith et al.
[2005] find that members of Institutional Investor’s All-American
Research Team are far more likely to use models based on earnings, cash flow, or sales (99%) than market-to-book (25%).
In short, both Graham and Dodd’s textbook and analysis of
contemporary security-analyst behavior suggest that Sprouse’s
evidence provides a very shaky foundation for balance-sheet primacy in the current conceptual framework.
THE ASSET-LIABILITY APPROACH AND
CLASSIFICATIONAL DOUBLE-ENTRY
We now discuss how classificational double-entry inherent
in the asset-liability approach is likely misaligned with the economic function of accounting. Our argument derives from the
frequently overlooked importance of causal double-entry in the
discovery and exploitation of profitable exchange transactions,
which is the most important reason that firms even exist. We
trace the economic arguments for a focus on income measurement from modern economists like Ijiri [1975] and Hicks [1939]
back to the writings of Adam Smith and his contemporaries. We
discuss historical research showing that earnings power was
used for valuing firms even earlier. Finally, we draw on Coase
[1937], Mises [1949], and others to explain why a historical
transaction-based income-statement approach is vital for entrepreneurial decision making.
Ijiri [1975, pp. 51-69] identifies three concepts inherent
to economic performance measurement under double-entry
accounting (DEA). Control represents the extent to which an
organization has economic control over the use of resources,
and quantities refer to an ability to quantify differing degrees to
which resources exist. The third, and most important, concept
is exchanges, which includes “not only exchanges in a market,
but also exchanges in production which may be considered exchanges between the entity and nature” [Ijiri, 1975, pp. 60-61].
Exchanges is a foundational concept in accounting because of
“the perceived cause-and-effect relationship between a sacrifice
(a decrement) and a benefit (an increment), namely the benefit
cannot be obtained without the sacrifice.” While a classificational, double-entry system is built with only the control and quantities concepts, a causal double-entry system also incorporates the
powerful exchanges concept.
Ijiri [1975, pp. 81-84] argues that the causal relation between benefit and sacrifice inherent to reciprocal exchange,
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manifested in debit and credit, is the essence of DEA and is associated with powerful cognitive forces that alter how we view
exchange:
There are two entirely different reasons why debit
should equal credit. One is that both are based on different classifications or descriptions of the same object.
We call this type of double-entry classificational doubleentry. For example, the double-entry bookkeeping system is often taught by starting with the fundamental
equation assets = equities, because the two are considered to be different classifications of the same set of resources, one based on the types of assets and the other
based on claims upon them.
The other type of double-entry is what we may call
causal double-entry, where the value of an increment
(debit) is set equal to the value of a decrement (credit),
as in (Dr.) Inventories $100: (Cr.) Cash $100. Here the
same set of resources is not classified from two viewpoints. This entry clearly involves two different re
sources, cash and inventories. They are tied together
because of the cause-and-effect relationship between
the increment and the decrement….
Apparently, double-entry can enormously affect our
perception of economic events. Under a so-called
single-entry system, a cashier can keep his record quite
independently from a warehouse bookkeeper who
records inventories and inventory changes. But an
accountant who is trained in double-entry bookkeeping cannot treat a decrease in cash or an increase in
inventories independent of each other. A decrease in
cash alone cannot be recorded unless he finds a proper
debit account. In doing so, he is led to recognize the
cause-and-effect relationship of changes in resources.
Eventually, he acquires the habit of always looking at a
change in relation to other changes rather than in isolation…. Thus, it should be remembered that the real
significance of double-entry bookkeeping compared to
single-entry bookkeeping is not in dual classification or
the computational double-check (what a triviality!), but
in the power of double-entry to make us look into the
cause-and-effect relationship among the changes in the
resources controlled by the entity.
In contrast, economic exchange is, at best, a secondary element of the asset-liability approach. This approach starts by defining and measuring assets and liabilities with the resultant rehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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sidual being equity; i.e., wealth. Income is the change in wealth
that arises from either an exchange transaction or another event
that alters the store of wealth. Thus, income measurement under the asset-liability approach must capture both the effects of
exchange transactions as well as holding gains and losses. This
measure appears superficially consistent with a theoretical view
of income posited by Hicks [1939], and has been cited as a basis
for the FASB and the IASB conceptual frameworks [Schipper
and Vincent, 2003; Barth, 2008, p. 1,168].
Hicks’ [1939, p. 173] first measure of income (“Income No.
1”) is “the maximum which can be spent during a period if there
is to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value
of prospective receipts (in money terms).”13 However, Hicksian
income is defined only for a world of complete and perfect markets and is less useful for a firm operating in costly incomplete
markets. Hicks [1939, pp. 193-196] describes a firm’s decision as
the “establishment of a production plan,” with an optimal production plan maximizing the “surplus of receipts over costs,” or
the capitalized value of all future expected surpluses in a multiperiod setting. Within this context, Hicks defines business profit
as surplus of receipts over costs less charges from prior commitments less depreciation (or plus appreciation). Thus, Hicks
posits that the firm chooses production plans to increase profits
which arise from interactions in product and factor markets.14
Hicks [1939, pp. 179] specifically excludes unrealized gains
and losses from such planning, saying: “The income which is
relevant to conduct must always exclude windfall gains; if they
occur, they have to be thought of as raising income for future
weeks (by the interest on them) rather than as entering into any
effective sort of income for the current week. Theoretical confusion between income ex post and ex ante corresponds to practical confusion between income and capital.” Hicks explains that
decisions should be based on real rather than nominal income,
13
In considering complications from interest rate and consumption price
changes, he also developed two other income constructs. Hicks [1939, p. 174]
defines “Income No. 2” as “the maximum amount the individual can spend this
week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in each ensuing week”
and “Income No. 3” as “the maximum amount which the individual can spend
this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real terms in
each ensuing week.” (emphasis in original)
14
Bromwich et al. [2010] and Jameson [2005] critique the application of
Hicks [1939] to practical matters of income measurement, and point out that
Hicks advocated an earnings power focus in practice. Klamer [1989, pp. 179-180]
points out that Hicks himself was uncertain as to how income should be measured.
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implying that variations in prices should be excluded from calculation of capital values, which is exactly opposite to the FASB/
IASB fair-value measurement approach.
A concern with Hicks [1939] and neoclassical economics
more generally is that it does not explain the nature and role of
accounting within profit-seeking firms that operate in markets
that are themselves dependent on complex economic institutions. The balance-sheet approach takes market values as given
rather than resulting from the interaction of profit-seeking individuals. Kohn [2004, p. 314] summarizes limitations of the “value paradigm” that relies on neoclassical economics as follows:
The approach of the value paradigm, like that of traditional mathematical theory in the natural sciences, is a
special approach that is valid only in a subset of cases.
We can be more specific if we divide the domain of
economic theory according to the three basic questions
addressed by Adam Smith: How are relative prices determined? How is economic activity coordinated? What
are the causes of economic growth? The special approach of the value paradigm is reasonably successful
when applied to the first of these questions. It is not unrealistic to think of the forces that determine prices, at
least in the short run, as being relatively powerful and
rapid, relying as they do primarily on trading and arbitrage. In these circumstances, the assumption of trading equilibrium is a fruitful simplification – fruitful because it permits the greater precision and logical clarity
of mathematical reasoning. However, when applied to
questions of coordination and growth the assumption
of trading equilibrium is not at all realistic….
To reiterate, there is nothing wrong with the theory of
value as a theory of value. Indeed in many ways it is
the crown jewel of economics. The problem is with the
value paradigm – that is, with the attempt to extend assumptions that are appropriate to the theory of value
to areas of economics where they are not appropriate.
The theory of value is a special or partial theory, not a
general theory.
Kohn [2004] suggests that Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations
is a useful starting point for thinking about economics. Smith’s
[1776, p. 17] hypothesis is that specialized division of labor,
coupled with opportunities for market exchange, generates human wealth [Kimbrough et al., 2008]. This foundational insight
helps us better understand why economic institutions emerge to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
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foster favorable performance outcomes (e.g., higher total output) [Stigler, 1951; Buchanan, 1964; North, 2005; Smith, 2008].
Accounting is likely one such institution that has evolved to
facilitate mutually beneficial exchange that increases the wealth
of the transacting parties [Waymire and Basu, 2007; Basu et al.,
2009; Waymire, 2009].
The Wealth of Nations was a seminal event in the development of economics as a scientific discipline [Samuelson, 1948, p.
136]. It is thus interesting to consider what Smith thought about
valuation and performance measurement. Smith asserted that a
nation’s economic progress was measured by productive activity
that enabled greater consumption. Smith [1776, p. 1] states his
view, which was contrary to prevailing orthodoxy, in his opening
sentence:
The annual labor of every nation is the fund which supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life
which it annually consumes, and which consist always
of either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in
what is purchased with that produce from other nations.15
The Wealth of Nations provides a conceptual basis for economic performance measures such as Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) [Samuelson, 1948, p. 11].16 GDP is directly measured
using a “product approach” by summing the “values added” by
each enterprise in the society after adjusting for taxes and subsidies.17 The “value added” by a given enterprise is the sales of its
final goods or services less the cost of intermediate goods used
to produce final output [Samuelson, 1948, pp. 232-234]. In other
words, Smith [1776] argued for an income-statement approach
whose focus was on wealth creation in place of a balance-sheet
approach focused on wealth storage.
Robert Hamilton, a contemporary of Adam Smith, intro15
Smith’s purpose in writing The Wealth of Nations was to discredit the contemporary economic orthodoxy of mercantilism [Sowell, 2006, pp. 5-13]. Mercantilism advocated the accumulation of wealth as reflected in the store of monetary
assets such as gold, and can be viewed as a distant precursor of the balance-sheet
approach.
16
The argument favoring total output as a macroeconomic performance measure predates Smith; e.g., William Petty suggested this measure in the 17th century (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Petty).
17
A summary of GDP measurement is available at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gross_domestic_product, and the national income accounts used by the U.S. government are described in BEA [2009]. Marcuss and Kane [2007] provide a review
of the historical development of the U.S. national-income accounts.
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duced the idea of residual income (but not the term itself) by
arguing that a firm must earn more than its cost of debt and equity capital to create wealth [Mepham, 1983]. Hamilton [1777,
Part V, Chapter III, Section 8] states:
In all commercial countries there is a fixed rate of interest, and the merchant’s gain should only be estimated
by the excess of his gross profits above the interest of
his stock. The latter may be obtained with little risk or
trouble; the former alone is the reward of his industry
and the compensation for his hazard. And, if the profit
of his trade be less than his stock would have yielded at
common interest, he may properly account it a losing
one.
Hamilton [1777, Part V, Chapter V, Section 27] emphasizes
the relevance of income measurement for managerial decision
making, saying: “When a person is engaged in several branches
of manufacture, whether on different materials, or on the same
materials through successive stages, he should keep his books in
such a manner as to exhibit the gain or loss on each.” This recommendation is explained by modern economic analyses.
A firm adds value by generating greater net gains from specialized labor than could be attained solely through a set of production decisions executed via a series of market transactions.
Coase [1937, pp. 390-391] states this proposition as:
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price
mechanism. The most obvious cost of ‘organizing’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are…. (i)t is important
to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract
is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration
(which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the
directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. (emphasis in original)
The entrepreneur thus performs a discovery function that
includes developing products, identifying customers, and organizing production.18 These functions are performed within the
18
Cheung [1983] suggests that the costs of using the market to coordinate
production include the number of heterogeneous transactions required, the costs
to consumers of knowing all attributes of a product, the costs of measuring those
attributes, and the problem of defining prices in a joint task involving collaboration between two factors.
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context of a competitive process that creates strong incentives
to exploit knowledge pertinent to the firm’s local circumstances
[Hayek, 1945, 1968]. Consequently, the defining event in a competitive process where transactions result from the entrepreneur’s actions is the successful consummation of exchange with
a customer. Accounting facilitates discovery of consumer preferences and more efficient means for satisfying those preferences
[Vatter, 1950; Demski and Feltham, 1976; Kaplan and Norton,
1996]. Causal DEA can thus be an extraordinarily powerful tool
for identifying and quantifying the consequences of exchange
interactions between a firm, factor suppliers, and the eventual
consumers of the firm’s output.
Surviving historical records shows that entrepreneurs and
financiers for the last several centuries have evaluated firms using variants of earning power [e.g., Bryer, 2000; Toms, 2010].
Merchants in feudal England frequently computed gross profits
on individual transactions to decide their prices [Grassby, 1995,
p. 236]. Robert Loder of Romney Marsh calculated the rate of
return on capital using a single-entry bookkeeping system, and
by 1611 was calculating residual income [Bryer, 2000]. In 1654,
the East India Company reported the rates of return on capital
for all of its early voyages to its stockholders [Chaudhuri, 1965,
p. 209]. Several examples of similar computations in agriculture, coal, textiles, and mining have been documented over the
next two centuries [e.g., Toms, 2010]. Thomas Hall in 1834-1835
was discounting forecasted profits using a 12.5% interest rate,
an early example of discounted cash-flow analysis [Fleischman
and Parker, 1997]. To summarize, there is a long English history
of computing profits using historical cost to aid in running the
business and for investors to evaluate the firm.
The “fatal flaw” in classificational double-entry is that it
expands the set of conditions that call for entries to the books of
account. This cuts the link between the accounts and the causal
forces that generate transactions. A classificational system permits changes to the accounts for a broad range of counterfactual
circumstances beyond the set of consummated transactions. In
other words, “fair value” measurements reflect gains that may
never be realized because the assumed transactions will never
occur.
To clarify, a journal entry resulting from a consummated
transaction encodes several simultaneously determined attributes of a transaction. Obvious attributes include the price and
quantity for which a transaction is consummated. A less obvious
but far more important attribute of any consummated transacPublished by eGrove, 2010
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tion is the underlying decision to transact. This decision is of vital
importance in a world where it takes skill and effort to discover
favorable opportunities to transact with customers and factor
suppliers. Stated differently, the decision to transact reflects an
entrepreneur’s decision to “cause” the consummation of a specific transaction, when the firm’s raison d’être is to identify and
transact value-increasing exchanges.19
The accountant’s focus on consummated transactions, with
an emphasis on objective, verifiable evidence of arm’s length
exchange, is the likely “reason for the persistent use of historical cost in accounting over many centuries” [Ijiri, 1983, p. 79].
The need for objective and verifiable evidence of consummated
transactions is a guiding feature of the framework of Paton and
Littleton [1940, pp. 18-21; see Ijiri, 1980, pp. 622-623]. Paton
and Littleton [1940, p. 10] assert the primacy of historical-costbased income measurement derived from repeated application
of the revenue-realization and expense-matching principles.
These principles applied to objective verifiable evidence align
recognition of “effort and accomplishment” [Paton and Littleton, 1940, pp. 14-18; Ijiri, 1980, p. 623; Ball, 1989].
So, what do we believe is lost by eroding the foundation of
double-entry built on causality in exchange? Over the centuries,
various scholars have written of the interdependent changes
wrought by double-entry accounting on human cognition and
the development of modern capitalist organizations [Sombart,
1919; Weber, 1927; Schumpeter, 1942; Mises, 1949; Ijiri, 1975,
pp. 81-84].20 The notion that double-entry reflects the causality
of action in exchange was reinforced over 450 years after Pacioli
[1494] by Mises [1949, p. 231] when he stated:
It was economic calculation that assigned to measurement, number, and reckoning the role they play in our
quantitative and computing civilization….Monetary cal19
When the FASB and the IASB proposed removing stewardship as an objective of financial reporting in their Preliminary Views [FASB, 2006] consistent with
their focus on balance-sheet valuation, an overwhelming majority of respondents
preferred to retain stewardship or accountability, consistent with a contracting
perspective.
20
Pacioli noted such effects when he wrote of the need for accurate records
and accounts “so that one may get, without loss of time, all the particulars as to
the debit and also the credit of all of them, as business does not deal with anything else. This is very useful, because it would be impossible to conduct business
without due order of recording, for without rest, merchants would always be in
great mental trouble” [Pacioli, 1494, p. 1, quoted by Carruthers and Espeland,
1991, p. 36].
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culation reaches its full perfection in capital accounting. It establishes the money prices of available means
and confronts this total with the changes brought about
by action and by the operation of other factors. This
confrontation shows what changes occurred in the
state of acting men’s affairs, and the magnitude of those
changes; it makes success and failure, profit and loss ascertainable….Our civilization is inseparably linked with
our methods of economic calculation. It would perish if
we were to abandon this most precious intellectual tool
of acting. Goethe was right in calling bookkeeping by
double entry ‘one of the finest inventions of the human
mind.’
Thus, a classificational system like that advocated by
Sprouse severs the link between accounting and economic exchange, which is the fundamental focus of economic activity.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGACY
OF THE ASSET-LIABILITY APPROACH
Sprouse [1966] is important neither because of its conceptual insights nor because of its unpersuasive evidence. Rather, the
article matters mainly because it shaped the FASB’s rhetoric and
subsequent standard-setting approach and today’s international
standard-setting agenda. Sprouse’s misinterpretation of Graham
and Dodd’s Security Analysis foreshadows the FASB and IASB
misinterpretation of Hicks [1939]. Sprouse and the two Boards
are equally culpable in ignoring actual security-analyst behavior
when advocating their preferences, relying instead on made-up
“users” [Young 2006]. Thus, the current FASB/IASB Conceptual
Framework [FASB, 2006] is justifiably seen as a direct descendant of Sprouse [1966].
Sprouse and the two Boards ignore the implications (or
are unaware) of one of the major stylized facts of U.S. financial
reporting history – the shift from a balance-sheet approach to
an income-statement approach during 1900-1930. The shift to
an income-statement approach is usually attributed to the information needs of a massive influx of individual investors into
U.S. equity markets during this era [e.g., Hendriksen, 1970, pp.
51-55].21 If individual equity investors are primarily interested
in balance-sheet information, then this shift should not have occurred when it did. Sprouse and the two Boards never address
21
U.S. shareholders more than tripled in number between 1900 and 1923 with
greater middle-class participation [Warshow, 1924].
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this salient historical evidence that contradicts their core assumption of investor information needs. More broadly, Sprouse
and the two Boards ignore the historical development of the
revenue-expense approach, both in theory and practice, which
we survey in this paper. If financial accounting has emerged over
many generations to maintain consilience with the biologically
evolved human brain [Dickhaut et al., 2010], then an abrupt
change to a fair-value-based, asset-liability approach might well
make financial reports less useful to actual human readers.
Contrary to the theoretical ruminations of Sprouse, security
analysts to this day rely primarily on earnings forecasts in valuing firms. However, today’s analysts can construct their earnings
forecasts only after adjusting for many more non-recurring
items that the FASB has introduced into the income statement.
Although SFAS 130 [FASB, 1997] introduced a broader, comprehensive income concept that includes even more non-recurring
items, analysts show no interest in forecasting it or using it in
their analyses. We believe that the FASB’s shift in focus to the
balance sheet has created bigger problems than merely whether
financial analysts have to adjust for new income statement
“thingamajigs” instead of balance sheet “what-you-may-call-its.”
We claim that the lack of analyst interest in the FASB-mandated,
non-recurring items is symptomatic of a monumental mistake
in the asset-liability approach; specifically, it is misaligned with
the reasons that firms exist and the resulting demand for causal
double-entry accounting as an economic institution.22 In other
words, while the asset-liability approach is constructively rational, i.e. deduced from assumptions that work in a theoretical
model, it is unlikely to be ecologically rational in the sense of
improving firms’ survival prospects in the complex real world
[Sargent, 2008; Smith, 2008].
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
2010 VANGERMEERSCH MANUSCRIPT AWARD
In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established
an annual manuscript award to encourage scholars new to the
field to pursue historical research. An historical manuscript on
any aspect of the field of accounting, broadly defined, is appropriate for submission.
ELIGIBILITY AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS
Any accounting faculty member, who holds a full-time appointment and who received his/her masters/doctorate within seven
years previous to the date of submission, is eligible to be considered for this award. Coauthored manuscripts will be considered (if at least one coauthor received his/her master/doctorate
within the last seven years). Manuscripts must conform to the
style requirements of the Accounting Historians Journal. Previously published manuscripts or manuscripts under review are
not eligible for consideration.
Each manuscript should be submitted by August 1, 2010 in a
Word file as an e-mail attachment to the chair of the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee, Dr. Gary Giroux (ggiroux@tamu.edu).
A cover letter, indicating the author’s mailing address, the date
of the award of the masters/doctoral degree, and a statement
that the manuscript has not been published or is not currently
being considered for publication should be included in the submission packet.
REVIEW PROCESS AND AWARD
The Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee will evaluate submitted manuscripts on a blind-review basis and select
one recipient each year. The author will receive a $500 (U.S.)
award and a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding achievement in historical research. In the case of coauthored manuscripts, only the junior faculty member(s) will receive prizes.
The winning manuscript will be published in the Accounting
Historians Journal after an appropriate review. The award will
be given annually unless the Manuscript Award Committee determines that no submission warrants recognition as an outstanding manuscript.
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The 2nd EIASM workshop on

Imagining Business
Reflecting on visuality, performances and materialities
in practices of management, organising and governing
IE University Business School
Segovia, 19-20 May 2011
Guest speakers
Mario Biagioli
History of science
Harvard University

Jacques Fontanille
Semiotics
Université de Limoges

Nigel Thrift
Geography
University of Warwick

Following the success of the 1st Imagining Business Workshop (Oxford, 2008),
this second event seeks to explore in further detail the impact of images, pictures,
and signs on everyday organizational life. Inspired by the principle that any social
activity results from how various organisational actors are tied together (Latour’s
idea of ‘socie-ties’), this workshop intends to examine how various organisational
performances and material objects of all kinds (e.g. information technologies,
forms, charts, plans, models, etc.) help to construct unstable although durable
links between organizational actors. This includes exploring how they contribute
to the creation of business visions, images and visualizations in ways which allow
organizings and organizations to ‘succeed’ (i.e. to happen), as well as ‘fail’.
This workshop thus provides an interdisciplinary arena in which academics and
practitioners from a wide range of subject areas can come together to debate issues of imagining. For instance, some examples where a study of imagining business has or would provide interesting reflections and contributions include (but
should by no means be limited to):
 the role of images, standards and visual management in the organizing process
and how this links to ideas of relational entities and distributed action;
 the role of management practices in creating visions of organization and strategy;
 the role of Information & Communication Technologies in prompting action
and accountabilities;
 The role of educative and pedagogical discourses in the creation of entrepreneurial mindsets;
 ways of mapping controversies in science, technology and policy making;
 The role of images, signs and icons in policy making and governmental decision making…
We welcome abstracts (1,500-2,000 words), extended abstracts and draft papers.
The format for discussion will include both traditional paper presentations and
alternative forums (e.g. performance, exhibition, panel, discussion group, etc).
Deadline for submissions: 27th September 2010
Acceptance: 20 th December 2010
Full paper: April 2011
The organising committee:
Paolo Quattrone
Paolo.Quattrone@ie.edu

François-Régis Puyou
frpuyou@audencia.com
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Chris.Mclean@manchester.ac.uk
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22nd Cardiff Business School

ACCOUNTING & BUSINESS HISTORY RESEARCH UNIT
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
at Cardiff University, 6-7 September 2010
ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONFERENCE AND CALL FOR PAPERS
Guest Speaker - Marcia Annisette (Schulich School of Business, York University, Canada)
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of accounting,
business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and discussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to fully
developed manuscripts. The programme allows approximately 35 minutes for
presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile feedback from
those attending. In the past, many papers presented have subsequently appeared
in print in a range of international, refereed academic accounting, business and
economic history journals.
The 2010 conference, organised by Malcolm Anderson, will be held at Cardiff
University. It will commence at lunchtime on Monday, 6 September 2010 and
conclude in the late afternoon of Tuesday, 7 September 2010.
The conference fee will include all conference materials and the following meals:
Monday - lunch, afternoon tea, wine reception and the conference dinner; Tuesday: morning coffee, lunch and afternoon tea). Details of university accommodation and a list of nearby hotel options can be found on the conference website
– www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/conferences/abfhc10/index.html.
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the conference should send a one page abstract (including name, affiliation and
contact details) by 1st June 2010 to: Beth Green, Cardiff Business School,
Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU. Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5731. Fax +44 (0)29 2087
5129. Email. Carbs-Conference@cf.ac.uk
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference organisers’ decision by 21st June 2010.

The ongoing financial support of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales’
charitable trusts is gratefully acknowledged. The Centre for Business Performance of the
ICAEW manages all grant applications.
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Conference Announcement
Presented: by Academy of Accounting Historians
&
Accounting Hall of Fame

2010 Research Conference
“Accounting in Economic Recovery and Reform”
September 30, 2010 to October 2, 2010
The Blackwell Inn
Columbus, OR
The theme of the 2010 conference is “Accounting in
Economic Recovery and Reform.” Concurrent paper
sessions will address both historical and public policy
issues related to recent and continuing economic recovery and its regulatory and market environment, both in
the United States and around the world.
In addition to Concurrent Paper Sessions, the program
includes speeches by Mary E. Barth (Joan E. Horngren
Professor of Accounting, Stanford University) and Gregory J. Jonas (Managing Director of Research, Morgan
Stanley) plus panel discussions chaired by Robert Swieringa (Cornell University), William Kinney (University
of Texas at Austin), Andrew Bailey (Grant Thornton),
and Stephen Penman (Columbia University).
The panel discussion will provide perspectives on accounting standard setting, judgment in auditing and
financial reporting, regulatory oversight of auditing, and
user perspectives on financial reporting and auditing.
Silent Auction
Do you have accounting books, monographs, pamphlets, or other materials that you would donate to
a silent auction? We are looking for older accounting
materials that would be useful to accounting scholars, especially accounting historians. We are generally not interested in runs of journals or old textbooks.
For more information, please visit the website and
click on Upcoming Events.

For More
Information and
to Register:
Go to
www.aahhq.org
and click on
Upcoming Events

Call for Papers
Deadline:
July 15th
See website for
more info!

Questions?
Contact Dan Jensen
at (614) 292-2529 or
Jensen.7@osu.edu.

The Blackwell Inn
2110 Tuttle Park Place
Columbus, OR 43210
At the corner of Tuttle Park Place and Woodruff.
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2010 OFFICERS
President
Gregory Waymire
Emory University
PH: (404) 727-6589
FAX: (404) 727-6313
Email: gregory_waymire@bus.emory.edu
President-Elect
James McKinney
University of Maryland
PH: (301) 588-3266
Email: jim@mckinneycpa.com
Vice-President - Communication
Yvette Lazdowski
Plymouth State University
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Email: yjlazdowski@plymouth.edu

Vice-President - Partnerships
Robert Colson
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and maintains a comprehensive website. Annual membership dues include
subscriptions to both publications, special conference pricing, and full access to
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concerning membership, publications, and other matters relating to the
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Journal) should be addressed to Tiffany Welch, The Academy of Accounting
Historians, Weatherhead School of Management, 10900 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, OH, USA 44106-7235.
E-Mail: acchistory@case.edu

APPLICATION FOR 2010 MEMBERSHIP
Individual Membership:
Student Membership:

$45.00
$10.00

Name: (please print)
Mailing Address:
City:

State:

Zip Code:

Country:

Accounting History Area of Interest:

Phone:

Fax:

E-mail:
____
Method of Payment: /___/ check enclosed
____
____
/___/ Mastercard
/___/ VISA
Card Number:
Expiration Date:
Signature:

Mail to: Ms. Tiffany Welch
Case Western Reserve University
Weatherhead School of Management
10900 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44106
USA

Website: http://www.aahhq.org

Published by eGrove, 2010

163

